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I.  INTRODUCTION
The Year in Review is a collection of brief summaries of se-
lected cases concerning Alaska law.  This year’s edition is devoted
to cases decided in 2003.  The Year in Review is comprehensive
neither in its breadth (many cases are omitted) nor in its depth
(many issues within individual cases are omitted).  Attorneys
should not rely on these summaries as an authoritative guide;
rather, the summaries are intended to provide a useful starting
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point for additional research.  The summaries are grouped by sub-
ject matter and presented alphabetically within each grouping.
Abbreviations.  Several abbreviations are used throughout the
Year in Review.  The Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal
Procedure, and Evidence are abbreviated “Civil Rule ___,”
“Criminal Rule ___,” and “Evidence Rule ___,” respectively.  The
State Department of Health and Social Services, Division of Fam-
ily and Youth Services is abbreviated “DFYS.”
II.  ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In ACS of Alaska, Inc. v. Regulatory Commission of Alaska,1
the supreme court held that where a competitor challenges an in-
cumbent rural local service provider’s exemption under the Federal
Telecommunications Act,2 the burden of proof must fall on the
competitor.3  The Federal Telecommunications Act exempts rural
local telecommunications providers from being required to allow
competitors to piggyback (or “interconnect”) on their telecommu-
nications networks.4  However, the exemption does not apply to ru-
ral service providers if a competitor receives a bona fide request for
interconnection, and the state regulatory commission determines
that the request is not economically burdensome.5  GCI
Communications Corp. (“GCI”) requested interconnection with
three subsidiaries of the incumbent service provider, Alaska Com-
munications Systems (“ACS”).6  The Regulatory Commission of
Alaska (“RCA”) affirmed the termination of ACS’s exemptions
under the Telecommunications Act.7  The court reversed the
RCA’s ruling, holding that the agency had inappropriately placed
the burden on the incumbent local exchange carrier, ACS.8  The
court held that the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Iowa Utilities Board
v. FCC,9 allocating the burden of proof to the competitor, con-
trolled in this case, because federal appellate courts have jurisdic-
tion to hear challenges to FCC rulings, and the Eighth Circuit’s de-
cision was the only ruling allocating the burden of proof in such
1. 81 P.3d 292 (Alaska 2003).
2. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c) (2001).
3. ACS, 81 P.3d at 293.
4. Id. at 293.
5. Id. at 296.
6. Id. at 294.
7. Id. at 295.
8. Id. at 301.
9. 219 F.3d 744 (8th Cir. 2000).
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cases.10  The court remanded the case for further proceedings that
would allocate the burden of proof to GCI.11
In Brigman v. State,12 the court of appeals held that the De-
partment of Fish and Game (“DFG”) had authority to define per-
mit hunt areas and that these areas could be defined by internal
decision.13  Brigman was convicted for transporting a brown bear
that was shot and killed in an area outside the designated permit
hunt area.14  Brigman appealed, arguing that the DFG had no
authority to establish permit hunt areas and, in the alternative, that
the DFG could not establish the permit hunt areas by internal deci-
sion since it would violate the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”).15  Rejecting this argument, the court of appeals found
that a former regulation granted the DFG the power to establish
brown bear permit hunt areas.16  The court then presumed that the
DFG established the permit hunt areas while this regulation was in
effect.17  Since there were no regulations that abolished the permit
hunt areas, the court concluded that the DFG had the power to es-
tablish them.18  The court of appeals then found that the establish-
ment of the permit hunt areas did not constitute a “regulation” un-
der the APA and therefore could be made by internal decision.19
The court based its decision on Kachemak Bay Watch, Inc. v.
Noah,20 which stated that identification of districts that do not alter
the rights of parties, do not deprive parties of a fair opportunity for
public participation, and do not establish criteria by which permit
applications should be evaluated do not constitute regulations un-
der the APA.21  Here, the court of appeals reasoned that the hunt-
ing permits were awarded by lottery and that all applicants there-
fore had an equal chance to secure a permit for a specified area.22
Thus, the court of appeals found that the DFG had the authority to
10. ACS, 81 P.2d at 298-99.
11. Id. at 299.
12. 64 P.3d 152 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
13. Id. at 155.
14. Id. at 157.
15. Id. at 158, 159.
16. Id. at 158.
17. Id. at 158-59.
18. Id. at 159.
19. Id. at 161-62.
20. 935 P.2d 816 (Alaska 1997).
21. Id. at 825-26.
22. Brigman, 64 P.3d at 161.
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establish permit hunt areas by internal decision, and affirmed
Brigman’s conviction.23
In Crawford & Co. v. Baker-Withrow,24 the supreme court held
that an Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board (“Board”) finding
that Crawford & Company had unfairly and frivolously contro-
verted insurance claims was a final appealable order.25  Upon a de-
termination that an insurer has frivolously or unfairly reported a
workers’ compensation claim, Alaska Statutes section 23.30.155(o)
requires the Board to notify the Division of Insurance (“Divi-
sion”), and for the Division to determine whether the insurer
committed an illegal claim settlement practice.26  Based on a state-
ment of the Division’s practices and policies, the court held that the
Board’s determinations and subsequent Division procedures,
though necessarily linked, did not amount to a review process for
re-examining the Board’s factual findings of frivolous conversion.27
Furthermore, the court held that the appealability of the Division’s
determinations of unfair claim settlement practices, under Alaska
Statutes section 21.36.125, had no effect on its determination that
the Board’s decisions were final orders which were appealable im-
mediately.28
In Enders v. Parker,29 the supreme court held that an estate’s
personal representative was entitled to attorney’s fees if her claim
was brought in good faith.30  Enders unsuccessfully sued Parker
over the admission into probate of Joel Kottke’s 1997 will, which
disinherited Enders and transferred all interest to Parker.31  Enders
then sought payment of attorney’s fees under Alaska Statutes sec-
tion 13.16.435, and Parker cross-appealed for fees under Civil
Rules 79(b) and 82(b).32  On appeal, the supreme court held that
under Alaska Statutes section 13.16.435 an estate claimant may re-
cover attorney’s fees upon satisfying three rules: (1) the claimant
must be a personal representative or hold a nomination as such; (2)
the suit must have been brought in good faith; and (3) the expenses
must be necessary and attorney’s fees reasonable.33  Good faith ex-
23. Id. at 168.
24. 81 P.3d 982 (Alaska 2003).
25. Id. at 983.
26. Id. at 982-83.
27. Id. at 985.
28. Id.
29. 66 P.3d 11 (Alaska 2003).
30. Id. at 17.
31. Id. at 12, 13.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 15 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 13.16.435 (Michie 2003)).
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ists if the personal representative acted to benefit the named suc-
cessors in the instrument she sought to uphold.34  The supreme
court denied Parker’s cross-appeal, stating that claims for attor-
ney’s fees under Rules 79(b) and 82(b) do not apply if a specific
statutory scheme for attorney’s fees exists, such as section
13.16.435.35
In Fuller v. City of Homer,36 the supreme court held that under
certain circumstances, the city cannot raise the deliberative process
privilege in order to withhold documents from public view.37  Fuller
brought suit against the City of Homer after the city refused her
requests to inspect various documents relating to an annexation pe-
tition which was ultimately approved by the city council.38  The city
claimed that the documents were protected under the deliberative
process privilege.39  The court stated that in order to establish a de-
liberative process privilege, the government must show that the
disputed document is an internal communication which is both
predecisional and deliberative.40  If the government meets these re-
quirements, the opposing party can then rebut the presumption of
privilege by showing that the public’s interest in disclosure out-
weighs the government’s interest in confidentiality.41  Here, the
court determined that the public’s interest in disclosure did out-
weigh any governmental interest in confidentiality, because Fuller
requested to view the documents after the proposed annexation
was submitted to and approved by the city council.42  In addition,
while the city’s interest in confidentiality, significantly waned after
approval by the city council, the public’s interest in disclosure grew
significantly stronger.43  The court concluded that the deliberative
process privilege was not available at the time Fuller’s request was
made; therefore, the court reversed and remanded the case with di-
rections to grant Fuller’s request.44
In Garner v. State, Department of Health and Social Services,45
the court of appeals held that the Department of Health and Social
34. Id. at 17.
35. Id. (citing ALASKA R. CIV. P. 79(b), 82(b)).
36. 75 P.3d 1059 (Alaska 2003).
37. Id. at 1065.
38. Id. at 1060-61.
39. Id. at 1061.
40. Id. at 1063.
41. Id.
42. Id at 1064.
43. Id at 1065.
44. Id.
45. 63 P.3d 264 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
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Services had abused its discretion by failing to consider whether
“undue hardship” would result from a refusal of Medicaid coverage
for dental services to persons over twenty-one years of age.46 John
Garner, a mentally retarded thirty-five year old, was denied cover-
age for dental procedures because he failed to meet the regulatory
requirement of being able to verbally express any “pain and acute
infection.”47  Alaska’s Medicaid regulations contain a provision al-
lowing the Department of Health and Social Services to make ex-
ceptions to the requirement where undue hardship would result.48
The court found that Garner had established a prima facie case for
undue hardship and discrimination under the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act.49  Garner and the State disagreed as to what accom-
modation was reasonable to remedy such discrimination and undue
hardship.50  The court of appeals remanded the case to the superior
court for further investigation.51
In Greenpeace, Inc. v. State,52 the supreme court held that the
Alaska Office of Management and Budget is not required to con-
duct an environmental analysis that utilizes standards under the
National Environmental Policy Act in making a determination of
whether a project is consistent with the Alaska Coastal Manage-
ment Program (“ACMP”).53  Greenpeace appealed a determina-
tion by the Division of Governmental Coordination (“DGC”) (an
arm of the Alaska Office of Management and Budget) that British
Petroleum’s “Northstar” project to develop an offshore oilfield
near Prudhoe Bay was consistent with ACMP.54  Under ACMP,55
projects impacting Alaska’s coastline must undergo a review to de-
termine the project’s consistency with ACMP standards.56  Green-
peace alleged that DCG had failed to assess the cumulative impacts
of the Northstar project, and that DCG did not utilize adequate in-
formation in allowing certain aspects of the project to move for-
ward.57  In affirming the DCG’s consistency determination, the su-
preme court held that the broad definition of “cumulative effects”
46. Id. at 269.
47. Id. at 266.
48. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 7 § 43.080(a) (2003).
49. Garner, 63 P.3d at 266, 267.
50. Id. at 272.
51. Id.
52. 79 P.3d 591 (Alaska 2003).
53. Id. at 597-98.
54. Id. at 592.
55. ALASKA STAT. § 46.40.010 (Michie 2003).
56. Greenpeace, 79 P.3d at 592.
57. Id.
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advocated by Greenpeace was not supported by prior case law, the
state constitution, or the state attorney general’s opinions.58  Under
Alaska Law, DCG was only required to conduct a “whole project
analysis” to determine cumulative impacts, as opposed to a broader
definition that would assess the likelihood of future impacts.59  The
court further held that the consistency review of the Northstar
project was not improperly phased by the premature issuing of
permits by DCG.60  The court held that Alaska law did not require
that the project be phased, and therefore the issuing of permits was
not premature.61
In Grimm v. Wagoner,62 the supreme court held that Senator-
elect Wagoner’s failure to disclose several financial interests did
not violate an Alaska statute that required all candidates to dis-
close their financial affairs.63  Alaska’s Public Official Financial
Disclosure Law64 requires candidates for elected public office in
Alaska to file disclosure reports with an “‘accurate representation’
of their financial affairs.”65  A candidate for the State Senate,
Wagoner filed his financial statements in May 2002 and was elected
in November of the same year.66  Later that month, two voters sued
to enforce the Public Official Financial Disclosure Law, alleging
that Wagoner failed to disclose some of his financial affairs.67  The
superior court found in favor of Wagoner on two alternative theo-
ries.68  First, if this case were treated as an election contest under
Title 15, the plaintiffs’ claim would fail because they did not show
that Wagoner’s omissions affected the election results.69  In the al-
ternative, the superior court held that Wagoner’s statements satis-
fied the “substantial compliance” requirement and were thus satis-
factory.70  The supreme court affirmed, applying the substantial
compliance standard.71  Tracking the superior court’s reasoning, the
supreme court held that of Wagoner’s eight omissions, only two
58. Id. at 594.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 599.
61. Id.
62. 77 P.3d 423 (Alaska 2003).
63. Id. at 438.
64. ALASKA STAT. § 39.50.030(a) (Michie 1998).
65. Grimm, 77 P.3d at 425.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 426.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 429.
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were required disclosures; the supreme court found that these two
disclosure violations were trivial, and thus that Wagoner substan-
tially complied with the Public Official Financial Disclosure Law.72
In Hamrick v. State,73 the court of appeals held that in order to
revoke an inmate’s probation for failure to join a court-ordered
treatment program, the Department of Corrections must make it
clear to the inmate that his failure to comply will violate his proba-
tion.74  After being convicted of a sexual abuse charge, Floyd Ham-
rick was sentenced and offered probation if he successfully com-
pleted an approved sexual offender treatment program.75  Hamrick
filed an application with a treatment center which subsequently lost
the application.76  After the Department of Corrections transferred
Hamrick to Arizona, a probation officer checked his application
and informed him that it was misplaced and that he would need to
file a second application.77  Hamrick waited approximately nine
months to file a new application, at which time there was not
enough time left on his sentence to complete the program; there-
fore, his application was rejected.78  Since Hamrick was unable to
complete a court-ordered treatment program, the Department of
Corrections filed a petition to revoke his probation.79  The court of
appeals stated that before the Department of Corrections could re-
voke Hamrick’s probation, it had a duty to make clear to Hamrick
that his noncompliance would result in termination of his proba-
tion.80  Hamrick was never ordered to fill out the application or to
submit it by a specific time, and he was never informed that his
failure to apply for a treatment program would result in termina-
tion of his probation; therefore, the court of appeals reversed the
superior court’s order revoking Hamrick’s probation.81
In Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Ketchikan Indian Corp.,82
the supreme court reversed a finding of implied federal preemption
of borough taxes concerning uncommitted space in a building oc-
cupied by a federally-regulated Indian health clinic.83  In 1997, the
72. Id. at 434-37.
73. 64 P.3d 175 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
74. Id. at 178-79.
75. Id. at 176.




80. Id. at 177-78.
81. Id. at 178-79.
82. 75 P.3d 1042 (Alaska 2003).
83. Id. at 1044.
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United States transferred land in Ketchikan to the Ketchikan In-
dian Corporation (“KIC”).84  On appeal to the Borough Board of
Equalization, the KIC was granted a sixty percent tax exemption
for the five-story building it had constructed to house a federally-
funded Indian Health Service clinic.85  Questions of implied federal
preemption with regard to the taxation of Native American prop-
erty require a balancing of federal policy against state interests in
taxation.86  The supreme court held that: (1) the uncommitted space
in the KIC building could not be considered part of any compre-
hensive and pervasive federal oversight because there had been no
determination as to its use; and (2) the state’s interests were not in-
consequential because the taxes assessed would be in exchange for
the governmental functions the state provides to the property in
question.87  The court remanded to determine a proper apportion-
ment between clinic and non-clinic use for tax purposes.88
In Kodiak Island Borough v. Mahoney,89 the supreme court
held that clerks reviewing proposed ballot initiatives under Alaska
Statutes section 29.26.110(a)(4) “must presume an initiative to be
constitutional absent clear authority establishing its invalidity.”90
When Edward Mahoney attempted to file an initiative petition
proposing mayoral term limits, the Kodiak Island Borough clerk
refused to certify the application, primarily on the grounds that sec-
tion 29.26.110(a)(4) prohibited her from doing so.91  The statute
provides that a clerk may only certify applications that “would be
enforceable as a matter of law.”92  The Borough argued that be-
cause mayoral term limits had not yet been ruled constitutional in
Alaska, the clerk could not conclude with certainty that the initia-
tive proposed would be enforceable.93  The superior court rejected
the Borough’s argument, holding that this interpretation of the
statute would undermine the purpose of ballot initiatives, “de-
priv[ing] the voters of access to the initiative process for all issues
of first impression.”94  The supreme court affirmed the lower
court’s decision, holding that under section 29.26.110(a)(4), a clerk
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 1046.
87. Id. at 1048.
88. Id. at 1049.
89. 71 P.3d 896 (Alaska 2003).
90. Id. at 900.
91. Id. at 898.
92. ALASKA STAT. § 29.26.110(a)(4) (Michie 2002).
93. Kodiak Island Borough, 71 P.3d at 898.
94. Id. at 899.
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may only reject petitions that violate constitutional restrictions re-
garding initiatives or that propose substantive ordinances that are
“clearly unconstitutional.”95
In Koyukuk River Basin Moose Co-Management Team v.
Board of Game,96 the supreme court held that the decision of the
Board of Game (“Board”) to distribute up to four hundred general
hunting permits in the Koyuk Controlled Use Area (“KCUA”) was
not subject to the limitations of Alaska’s sustained yield require-
ments in Alaska Statutes section 16.05.258.97  The Koyukuk River
Basin Moose Co-Management Team brought this appeal against
the Board, arguing that the Board’s authorization of general per-
mits violated Alaska’s sustained yield requirements regarding the
moose population in the KCUA.98  The supreme court stated that
sustained requirements only apply to game populations that have
been designated as distinct game populations for management pur-
poses.99  The court then held that Alaska Administrative Code sec-
tion 85.045 merely created a controlled use area by setting permit
limits and did not designate a manageable game population.100  The
court further held that the decision not to manage moose in the
KCUA as a distinct game population was within the Board’s dis-
cretion.101  Therefore, the Board was not subject to sustained yield
requirements, and the lower court’s decision in favor of the Board
of Game was affirmed.102
In Koyukuk River Tribal Task Force on Moose Management v.
Rue,103 the supreme court held that an organization is a public in-
terest litigant, which is not subject to paying awarded attorney’s
fees, when the organization can show that its members possess no
economic interest in the organization’s suit.104  The Koyukuk River
Tribal Task Force sued the Board of Game (“Board”), alleging
that its allowance of increased moose hunting, which contributed to
decreasing moose populations, violated the Alaska Constitution
and selected statutes.105  The superior court dismissed the case on
summary judgment, noting that the Task Force had not exhausted
95. Id. at 900.
96. 76 P.3d 383 (Alaska 2003).
97. Id. at 388.
98. Id. at 387.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 388.
101. Id. at 389.
102. Id. at 390.
103. 63 P.3d 1019 (Alaska 2003).
104. Id. at 1022.
105. Id. at 1020.
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all administrative remedies.106  The Board then petitioned for par-
tial costs and attorney’s fees, which the Superior Court granted.107
The Task Force contested the fees, stating that it was a public in-
terest litigant, and therefore exempt.108  Using the four-part public
interest litigant analysis developed by the court in Anchorage Daily
News v. Anchorage School District,109 the supreme court found that
the Task Force met the first three requirements, but its status un-
der the fourth requirement was unclear.110  Under the fourth re-
quirement the Task Force must not have a “sufficient economic in-
terest to file suit.”111  The supreme court therefore remanded the
case, pending a determination of the Task Force’s membership and
the members’ economic interests in suing the Board.112
In Palmer v. Municipality of Anchorage,113 the supreme court
held that the voting practices of the Police and Fire Retirement
Board were valid and constitutional,114 and that conflicting findings
from a second board were not given preclusive effect.115  Appellant
Geoffrey Palmer applied for occupational disability benefits after
heart problems that he deemed were related to his work as a police
officer.116  The Board twice denied his application, determining that
his heart problems were not work-related.117  Palmer challenged the
Board’s practice that five out of eight possible members were re-
quired to approve the award of benefits,118 but the court applied the
three-part test for procedural due process from Mathews v. El-
dridge,119 and determined that there was no deprivation of due pro-
cess.120  The court also held that the Alaska Workers’ Compensa-
tion Board’s determination that Palmer’s problems were health-
related did not warrant preclusive effect,121 because the parties




109. 803 P.2d 402 (Alaska 1990).
110. Koyukuk, 63 P.3d at 1021-22.
111. Id. at 1021.
112. Id. at 1022.
113. 65 P.3d 832 (Alaska 2003).
114. Id. at 838.
115. Id. at 842.
116. Id. at 836.
117. Id. at 836-37.
118. Id. at 838.
119. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
120. Palmer, 65 P.3d at 841.
121. Id. at 842.
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Retirement Board.122  Although there was a rebuttable presump-
tion that Palmer’s condition was work-related, the Board’s findings
were all supported by substantial evidence, so Palmer’s challenge
failed.123  Reliance on a particular doctor’s testimony was not a
violation of the superior court’s order, and it was also supported by
substantial evidence.124  Therefore, the court affirmed the Board’s
decision to deny Palmer occupational disability benefits.125
In Wendte v. State Board of Real Estate Appraisers,126 the su-
preme court upheld suspension of a real estate license based on the
Board of Real Estate Appraisers’ finding that a theft conviction
was a crime of moral turpitude that warranted such action.127
Wendte was convicted of stealing over $250,000 from several non-
profit sports organizations through his connections as a volunteer
with financial services matters.128  The Board found that Wendte’s
offense constituted “a crime of moral turpitude” under Alaska
Statutes section 08.87.210(2) sufficient to suspend his real estate li-
cense.129  The court rejected Wendte’s defense of double jeopardy
because suspension of a professional license is not considered
“punishment,” but rather serves to protect the public from being
harmed by unfit professionals.130  The court also rejected any argu-
ment that the Board failed to base its decision on relevant and cur-
rent information, stating that Wendte’s argument was misplaced.131
Despite the fact that the theft was not in the course of Wendte’s
professional duties, the court found that the Board did have the
authority and did properly sanction Wendte under section
08.87.210(2), which permits the use of disciplinary powers when a
real estate appraiser is convicted of a crime of moral turpitude.132
In Whalen v. Hanley,133 the supreme court upheld legislative
immunity for legislators who were merely acting within the scope
of their legislative duties.134  Alaska Marine Highway System em-
ployee Ronald Whalen had been under investigation with regard to
122. Id. at 843.
123. Id. at 843-44.
124. Id. at 846.
125. Id. at 849.
126. 70 P.3d 1089 (Alaska 2003).
127. Id. at 1097.
128. Id. at 1090.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1094.
131. Id. at 1095.
132. Id. at 1091-92.
133. 63 P.3d 254 (Alaska 2003).
134. Id. at 258-259.
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his eligibility status for cost-of-living-differential payments.135  After
state legislators, including Defendant Representatives Mark Han-
ley and Richard Foster, conducted a meeting of the House Finance
Committee, Whalen alleged that previously dismissed cold pay-
ment claims against him were made public when an earlier memo-
randum discussing those claims was attached to the meeting’s min-
utes.136  Whalen sued Hanley and Foster for defamation, arguing
that the legislators were acting outside the scope of their legislative
duties when questioning the previous memorandum and therefore
were not entitled to protection from suit through legislative immu-
nity.137  Because the state legislative immunity clauses were pat-
terned after federal clauses, the supreme court employed the
United States Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of federal
legislative immunity, which declines to impose liability regardless
of whether the Court considers the legislative acts useful or neces-
sary.138  Because there was no showing here that the legislators
acted outside the scope of their legislative duties, the supreme
court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment for the
defendants.139
III.  BUSINESS LAW
In Froines v. Valdez Fisheries Development Ass’n,140 the su-
preme court held that the parol evidence rule did not bar the ad-
mission of evidence that would supplement, rather than contradict,
an existing contract.141  Froines was a fisherman who had entered
into yearly contracts with the Valdez Fisheries Development Asso-
ciation (“Association”) to be a member of its fleet.142  The Associa-
tion’s Board of Directors refused to renew Froines’ fishing contract
for the 1998 season following his lack of participation in a strike
protesting the prices offered by local processors.143  Froines sued,
alleging that the Association breached its policy of retaining all but
the least productive vessel in the fleet.144  The superior court held
that the parol evidence rule prohibited admission of the Associa-
tion’s production policy for the purpose of determining whether
135. Id. at 255.
136. Id. at 256.
137. Id. at 257-58.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 258-59.
140. 75 P.3d 83 (Alaska  2003).
141. Id. at 89.
142. Id. at 85.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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the fishing contract was renewable.145  The parties agreed that this
ruling effectively granted summary judgment to the Association,
and the court entered a final judgment against Froines.146  The su-
preme court reversed the superior court’s grant of summary judg-
ment for the Association, holding that proof of the renewal policy
would supplement, rather than contradict, the terms of the vessel
contract arrangement, and was therefore not necessarily subject to
the parol evidence rule.147  The court acknowledged that the lower
court correctly conducted a three-part test that considered whether
the contract was integrated, the meaning of the contract, and
whether prior agreements conflicted with the integrated writing.148
However, the court held that the lower court did not properly con-
sider extrinsic evidence in addressing the first two issues: integra-
tion and meaning.149  The lower court found that the fishing con-
tract was a partial expression of the parties’ agreement; therefore,
Froines’ extrinsic evidence of a renewal policy should have been
initially considered because it was not inconsistent with the charter
agreements.150
In Hawken Northwest, Inc. v. State,151 the supreme court held
that a bidder on a laboratory space was entitled to an award based
on breach of contract.152  After winning the construction bid for a
new space153 and commencing construction, Plaintiff Hawken
signed two different releases, absolving the Department of Ad-
ministration against any construction claims.154  Later, however,
Hawken argued that both releases were void due to the economic
distress under which they were signed.155  Economic distress sup-
ports invalidation of a contract when: (1) one party involuntarily
accepted the terms of another; (2) circumstances permitted no
other alternative; and (3) the circumstances were the result of coer-
cive acts by the other party.156  Arguments for the invalidation of
the first release failed to prove the second prong, so it was upheld
145. Id. at 86.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 87.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 89.
151. 76 P.3d 371 (Alaska 2003).
152. Id. at 374.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 376.
155. Id. at 377.
156. Id.
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as valid.157  Arguments for the second release failed to prove the
third prong so it was also upheld as valid.158  Furthermore, no bad
faith was proven to invalidate the contract.159  Therefore, the su-
preme court upheld the department’s award.160
In Jerue v. Millett,161 the supreme court held that (1) neither
the shareholders nor the directors of a corporation were prevailing
parties in a derivative action, and, thus neither were entitled to at-
torney’s fees; and (2) the directors were not entitled to indemnifi-
cation from the corporation.162  Ingalik, an Alaska Native village
corporation, was involuntarily dissolved by the state because it
failed to report or pay taxes.163  The shareholders then filed a de-
rivative action asking the court to compel the directors of Ingalik to
hold an annual meeting to rectify the situation.164  However, the
shareholders did not make a formal request to the directors before
filing suit.165  Subsequently, the directors voluntarily reinstated the
corporation.166  After reinstatement, the superior court granted the
motion to dismiss the action as moot.167  The shareholders and di-
rectors then filed motions under Civil Rule 82 for recovery of at-
torney’s fees, claiming that they were the prevailing party in the
suit.168  The directors also filed a motion for indemnification by the
corporation.169  The superior court awarded fees and indemnifica-
tion to the directors and found that the shareholders were not pre-
vailing parties.170  The shareholders appealed.171 The supreme court
held that the shareholders and the directors were not prevailing
parties because the shareholders had failed to make a demand to
the directors before filing suit, as required by Alaska Statutes sec-
tion 10.06.435(c), and had not met the exception to the statute.172
The court also held that the directors were not prevailing parties
because they did not demonstrate that their efforts to reinstate the
157. Id. at 378.
158. Id. at 381.
159. Id. at 382.
160. Id. at 383.
161. 66 P.3d 736 (Alaska 2003).
162. Id. at 751.








171. Id. at 740.
172. Id. at 751.
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corporation were not the result of the suit.173  Therefore, the su-
preme court refused to award attorney’s fees to either party or to
indemnify the directors.174
In Quality Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. State, Department of Trans-
portation and Public Facilities,175 the supreme court applied the sub-
stantial evidence standard to a decision made by a state commis-
sioner concerning the exercise of a termination-for-convenience
clause in a contract.176  Quality Asphalt Paving, Inc. (“Quality”) en-
tered into a contract with the State Department of Transportation
to widen a state road.177  The contract included a termination-for-
convenience clause that allowed the state to terminate the contract
at will.178  Shortly after the contract was issued, the project ran into
an obstacle and the state exercised the clause.179  Subsequently,
Quality claimed that under the terms of the contract the state owed
Quality over $4.5 million.180  A commissioner from the Department
of Transportation reviewed Quality’s claims and awarded Quality
roughly a third of what it had requested.181  Quality appealed to the
supreme court, which affirmed all but one of the commissioner’s
findings because the findings were based on substantial evidence.182
The court commented that the commissioner’s resolutions did not
have to be the best solution in order to meet the substantial evi-
dence standard.183
In Skaflestad v. Huna Totem Corp.,184 the supreme court af-
firmed the superior court’s judgment for Huna Totem.185  Share-
holders of Huna Totem filed a class action alleging that proxy in-
formation was materially misleading.186  The superior court found
that while there were some omissions, the information was not ma-
terially misleading on the whole.187  First, the supreme court deter-
mined that the superior court applied the correct legal test.188  Re-
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. 71 P.3d 865 (Alaska 2003).
176. Id. at 869-70.
177. Id. at 868.
178. Id. at 868 n.1.
179. Id. at 868.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 869.
182. Id. at 869, 882.
183. Id. at 878.
184. 76 P.3d 391 (Alaska 2003).
185. Id. at 398.
186. Id. at 393-94.
187. Id. at 394.
188. Id. at 395.
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lying on Brown v. Ward,189 the supreme court held that proxy mate-
rials are materially misleading only if “there is a substantial likeli-
hood that a reasonable shareholder would consider [them] impor-
tant in deciding how to vote.”190  The supreme court found no merit
to the shareholders’ claims that the superior court wrongly imposed
a scienter requirement.191  Second, the supreme court affirmed the
factual finding that the omissions were not materially misleading.192
Accordingly, the judgment of the superior court was affirmed.193
In Wyller v. Madsen,194 the supreme court held that a partner’s
own wrongful acts partially contributing to the partnership’s dis-
solution prevented that partner from collecting damages for wrong-
ful dissolution.195  Wyller, along with Madsen and three other indi-
viduals, formed a partnership to manage a single office building.196
The partnership authorized approximately $120,000 in improve-
ments to the office building.197  However, Madsen subsequently ap-
proved repairs in addition to those authorized, with the cost of im-
provements totalling $257,000.198  In response, Wyller refused to
authorize payment for any of the improvements, including those
approved by the partnership.199  Consequently, the contractor
brought suit and the court ordered the partnership to dissolve.200
The supreme court held that the superior court did not clearly err
in finding Wyller partially responsible for the dissolution, as Wyl-
ler’s unjustified denial of responsibility for the authorized im-
provements contributed to the contractor’s suit and the subsequent
dissolution of the partnership.201  The fact that unauthorized im-
provements were made did not excuse Wyller from responsibility
for those improvements the partnership had approved.202  There-
fore, as Wyller’s own acts were partially responsible for the dissolu-
189. 593 P.2d 247 (Alaska 1979).
190. Id. at 251.
191. Skaflestad, 76 P.3d at 396.
192. Id. at 397.
193. Id. at 398.
194. 69 P.3d 482 (Alaska 2003).
195. Id. at 482.
196. Id. at 483.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 483-84.
199. Id. at 484.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 487.
202. Id. at 486.
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tion, he could not collect damages from his partners for wrongful
dissolution under Alaska Statutes section 32.05.330(b).203
IV.  CIVIL PROCEDURE
In Fletcher v. Trademark Construction, Inc.,204 the supreme
court affirmed the dismissal of a contract action under Civil Rule
41(b).205  Alaska Electric, a subcontractor, brought suit against
Trademark, the general contractor, for an alleged $200,000 owed
under a construction subcontract.206 The trial judge granted Trade-
mark’s motion to dismiss, and Alaska Electric appealed.207  Alaska
Electric challenged the superior court’s interpretation of Civil Rule
41(b) on two grounds.  First, Alaska Electric argued that the supe-
rior court should have waited to rule until after Trademark had
presented its case.208  The court rejected this argument, holding that
Civil Rule 41(b) imposes no such requirement.209  Next, Alaska
Electric argued that the trial court must construe evidence in the
plaintiff’s favor when ruling on a motion to dismiss under Civil
Rule 41(b).210  The court rejected this interpretation, holding that
the superior court did not err in refusing to draw inferences in the
plaintiff’s favor.211  Accordingly, the court affirmed the superior
court’s dismissal under Civil Rule 41(b).212
In Alaska Wildlife Alliance v. State,213 the supreme court held
that a second lawsuit brought by the Alliance was barred by res ju-
dicata.214  The Alliance first sued the Alaska Board of Game
claiming that the composition of the board members violated the
Alaska Constitution.215  The superior court dismissed the Alliance’s
claim; immediately thereafter, the Alliance filed another suit
against the State.216  Although the superior court did not issue a
finding of fact or conclusions of law when it dismissed the Alli-
ance’s first claim, the supreme court found the dismissal still had
203. Id. at 488.
204. 80 P.3d 725 (Alaska 2003).
205. Id. at 733.
206. Id. at 727.
207. Id. at 729.
208. Id. at 732.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 732-33.
211. Id. at 733.
212. Id. at 724.
213. 74 P.3d 201 (Alaska 2003).
214. Id. at 209.
215. Id. at 203.
216. Id. at 204.
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res judicata effect.217  Next, the supreme court found that the supe-
rior court’s dismissal was an adjudication on the merits.218  Relying
upon Baker v. Carr,219 the court determined that the political ques-
tion doctrine was a substantive basis for dismissal.220  Finally, the
court found that the two suits involved the same parties.221  The
court stated that the Alliance could not defeat res judicata by sub-
stituting one state entity for another when the claim is based on the
same conduct.222  Therefore, the supreme court affirmed the supe-
rior court’s order granting the state’s motion to dismiss on res judi-
cata grounds.223
In Brandner v. Agre,224 the supreme court held that the district
court had jurisdiction over a case involving a contractor’s substan-
tial compliance with state licensing requirements.225  Plaintiff Mi-
chael Brandner brought suit as a cross-claim to Defendant James
Agre’s suit seeking payment for construction work performed for
Brandner.226  Brandner claimed that since Agre was not a licensed
contractor at the time they contracted for the work, he was barred
from bringing an action for compensation; in response, Agre
claimed that he was permitted to bring an action for compensation
because he substantially complied with the contractor licensing
statute.227  The district court judge then referred the case to a supe-
rior court judge who appointed the district court judge to complete
the trial.228  Brandner argued that it was improper to resume the
trial after its transfer to superior court.229  The supreme court held
that since resolving the question of Agre’s substantial compliance
was necessary and incidental to his compensation claim, it did not
become an equitable action and, therefore, the district court had
jurisdiction over the case.230
217. Id. at 206.
218. Id. at 207.
219. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
220. Alaska Wildlife Alliance, 74 P.3d at 207.
221. Id. at 208.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 209.
224. 80 P.3d 691 (Alaska 2003).
225. Id. at 691-92.
226. Id. at 692.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 693.
230. Id. at 693-94.
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In Cizek v. Concerned Citizens of Eagle River,231 the supreme
court upheld an award of enhanced partial attorney fee’s under
Civil Rule 82.232  Concerned Citizens filed suit against landowners,
including the Cizeks, for attempting to use their property as an air-
strip under a right held by the former owner.233  Concerned Citizens
prevailed in the suit and then filed a motion to receive attorney
fees.234  The trial court granted the motion and awarded Concerned
Citizens enhanced attorney’s fees under Civil Rule 82(b)(3).235  Ac-
cording to Civil Rule 82(b)(2), if a case goes to trial but does not
result in money damages, the court is to award the prevailing party
thirty percent of the “necessarily incurred” attorney fees.236  How-
ever, the court can award more than thirty percent under Civil
Rule 82(b)(3) if the court clearly states its reasons for doing so.237
In this case, the trial court awarded Concerned Citizens more than
thirty percent because Concerned Citizens had been “required to
participate in extensive and sometimes unduly repetitive motion
practice, most of it generated by the Cizek[s’] attorney.”238  The su-
preme court affirmed the trial court’s decision because the trial
court stated its reasons for the enhancement and did not abuse its
discretion.239
In Conservatorship Estate of K.H. v. Continental Insurance
Co.,240 the supreme court held that actions for breach of fiduciary
duty and fraud were not barred by the statute of limitations.241  De-
fendants acted as conservators for K.H., a mentally ill veteran who
inherited a significant sum of money.242  When the Office of Public
Advocacy (“OPA”) took over as K.H.’s conservator, it discovered
that his funds had been severely depleted.243  OPA initiated suit
against the defendants for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.244
OPA filed these claims over one year after it took over as conser-
231. 71 P.3d 845 (Alaska 2003).
232. Id. at 851, 854.
233. Id. at 848.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 850.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 848, 851.
239. Id. at 851.
240. 73 P.3d 588 (Alaska 2003).
241. Id. at 589.
242. Id. at 589-90.
243. Id. at 591.
244. Id.
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vator.245  The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing
that the six month statute of limitations had expired.246  The supe-
rior court granted the motion and dismissed all claims.247  On K.H.’s
appeal, the supreme court found that the claims were not time
barred because the defendants had not filed a final report disclos-
ing all financial matters.248  Accordingly, the court reversed the su-
perior court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants.249
In Crosby v. Hummell,250 the supreme court held that the lower
court’s ruling on a negligence per se claim did not need to be over-
turned on the basis of jury instructions, its summary judgment deci-
sion, or admittance of evidence.251  Plaintiff Crosby appealed from a
judgment denying a wrongful death claim for the loss of her son,
which was based on the allegation that defendant Hummell had
been negligent per se by permitting Crosby’s son to drive in viola-
tion of Alaska Statutes section 28.15.281(b).252  Crosby argued first
that the lower court had committed error by listing all elements of
negligence per se in its jury instruction instead of specifying that
only one element of the claim was in dispute.253  The supreme court
upheld the lower court’s instruction, reasoning that more than one
element of the claim actually remained in dispute254 and, even ab-
sent that fact, that a complete description of a claim only aids the
jury in properly applying the facts before it.255  The supreme court
also rejected Crosby’s second argument that a portion of Hum-
mell’s answer to Crosby’s complaint constituted a binding judicial
admission concerning the issue of permission, which necessitated
summary judgment of the negligence claim in her favor.256  The su-
preme court held that Hummell’s answer was ambiguous and thus
failed to qualify as a judicial admission,257 which must be a “clear,
deliberate, and unequivocal statement of fact.”258  In addition, the




248. Id. at 592.
249. Id. at 596.
250. 63 P.3d 1022 (Alaska 2003).
251. Id. at 1028.
252. Id. at 1024.
253. Id. at 1025.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1027.
257. Id. at 1028.
258. Id. at 1027-28.
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the lower court had been entitled to apply Civil Rule 15(b), which
allows courts to treat litigated issues as under dispute even if such
issues are not disputed in the pleadings. 259
In Doxsee v. Doxsee,260 the supreme court held that a jury in-
struction on aggravation of injuries that does not specifically de-
scribe the plaintiff’s burden of proof does not qualify as reversible
error in an aggravation case.261  In July 1996, Autumn Doxsee un-
derwent neck surgery to alleviate her neck pain.262  The next month,
her husband Adrian Doxsee was driving Autumn to a doctor’s ap-
pointment and rear-ended another vehicle.263 Autumn suffered
more neck pain and filed a negligence suit against Adrian and his
insurer, Progressive Insurance Company.264  The trial court held
that, as admitted, Adrian was negligent, but awarded Autumn only
$9,358 in damages.265  After granting Progressive’s motion for at-
torney’s fees, the court entered a final judgment against Autumn
for $24,763.53.266  Autumn appealed, arguing that: (1) the trial court
improperly failed to give a jury instruction explaining the standard
of proof for claims of “aggravation of pre-existing injury;”267 (2) the
trial court “erroneously denied her motions for additur or a new
trial;”268 and (3) the attorney’s fees award was erroneously large be-
cause it included Progressive’s legal fees, and not just Adrian’s.269
After review by the court of appeals, the supreme court held that
the jury instructions were sufficient and that Autumn’s proposed
instruction would not have affected the verdict.270  The court also
held that the trial court should not have granted her motion for ad-
ditur because there was no abuse of discretion by that court,271 and
that the attorney’s fees must include the costs of both Adrian’s and
Progressive’s defenses.272  The supreme court affirmed the trial
court’s defense verdict and award.273
259. Id. at 1028.
260. 80 P.3d 225 (Alaska 2003).
261. Id. at 228-29.
262. Id. at 226.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 227.
265. Id. at 228.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 229.
269. Id. at 231.
270. Id. at 229.
271. Id. at 230.
272. Id. at 231.
273. Id.
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In Freitas v. Alaska Radiology Associates, Inc.,274 the supreme
court held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by admit-
ting testimony at trial about a clinic’s mammogram procedures.275
The Freitases sued a radiology clinic for medical malpractice,
claiming that it negligently failed to detect cancerous lesions on
Mrs. Freitas’ mammograms.276  During trial, the judge admitted tes-
timony by a doctor about breast positioning during mammograms
at the clinic.277  The Freitases argued that it was error to permit this
testimony because it was opinion evidence that unfairly raised a
new defense, and that the testimony should have been disclosed be-
fore trial.278  The supreme court held that the superior court did not
abuse its discretion, because the doctor’s testimony was primarily
factual and the expert opinions offered were not core liability is-
sues in this case.279  The Freitases further argued that the superior
court erred when it gave a jury instruction that set out a potential
basis for finding medical malpractice, claiming that the instruction
was incomplete because it did not inform the jurors that they could
find negligence if the doctor possessed the necessary knowledge
and skill but acted in the wrong way.280  The court held that there
was no plain error because the Freitases failed to object at trial and
the instruction was not misleading.281
In Friends of Cooper Landing v. Kenai Peninsula Borough,282
the supreme court held that a ruling by a borough board of adjust-
ment concerning a decision about land use by a local planning
commission was a judicial decision and thus reviewable by a supe-
rior court.283  Friends of Cooper Landing (“Friends”) appealed the
Kenai Peninsula Borough Planning Commission Plat Committee’s
(“Planning Commission”) approval of a piece of land for develop-
ment.284  The decision was appealed to the Borough Board of Ad-
justment (“Board”), back to the Planning Commission, and subse-
quently back to the Board.285  In each case the original decision was
274. 80 P.3d 696 (Alaska 2003).
275. Id. at 697.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 698.
279. Id. at 699-700.
280. Id. at 701.
281. Id. at 701-02.
282. 79 P.3d 643 (Alaska 2003).
283. Id. at 644.
284. Id. at 643.
285. Id. at 643-44.
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upheld.286  Friends then appealed the last decision by the Board to
the superior court.287  The superior court, however, dismissed the
case, claiming that Friends lacked jurisdiction to bring the appeal
because the Board’s decision was legislative, not judicial.288  Ac-
cording to Cabana v. Kenai Peninsula Borough,289 a decision by a
legislative body is only subject to review if the decision is quasi-
judicial and not legislative.290 However, on appeal to the supreme
court, the court ruled that the purpose of the Board’s review was to
render an adjudicative response to the Planning Committee’s deci-
sion; thus, the decision was quasi-judicial.291  Therefore, the su-
preme court reversed and remanded the superior court’s holding.292
In Genaro v. Municipality of Anchorage,293 the supreme court
held that a court has an obligation to inform a pro se litigant who
clearly indicates her desire to withdraw deemed admissions of the
proper procedures for doing so and should permit the litigant to
withdraw those admissions.294  Brenda Genaro, acting pro se, filed a
lawsuit against the Municipality of Anchorage.295  Subsequently, she
declared bankruptcy and failed to respond to any court requests.296
Believing that her bankruptcy trustee, who had previously been
substituted as the real party in interest in the case before aban-
doning it, had already complied with the Municipality’s discovery
requests, Genaro failed to respond to the requests for admissions.297
The superior court granted the Municipality’s subsequent motion
for summary judgment, stating that Genaro’s failure to respond to
the requests meant that the requests were deemed admitted.298
While Genaro never made an express request of help from the su-
perior court, the supreme court found that her timely opposition to
the summary judgment motion and her numerous statements at
pretrial conference sufficiently demonstrated her effective desire to
withdraw her deemed admissions.299  Therefore, it was an abuse of
286. Id.
287. Id. at 644.
288. Id.
289. 21 P.3d 883 (Alaska 2001).
290. Friends of Cooper Landing, 79 P.3d at 644.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. 76 P.3d 844 (Alaska 2003).
294. Id. at 847.
295. Id. at 844.
296. Id. at 845.
297. Id. at 846.
298. Id. at 845.
299. Id. at 846.
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discretion not to inform her of the proper procedures for the action
she was attempting to accomplish.300  The supreme court reversed
the grant of summary judgment and remanded to the superior
court with direction to permit Genaro to withdraw her deemed
admissions.301
In Gilbert v. Nina Plaza Condo Ass’n,302 the supreme court
held that it is an abuse of a court’s discretion to dismiss a pro se
litigant’s case for failure to adhere to pretrial procedure if the court
has not first explained the basics of the procedure to the litigant.303
Gilbert, a resident at Nina Plaza Condominiums, filed a pro se law
suit against the Nina Plaza Condominium Association and several
of its residents for wrongfully excluding Gilbert from ownership
privileges and decision-making because of Gilbert’s sex and dis-
ability.304  While preparing for trial, Gilbert made multiple attempts
to obtain discovery documents from Nina Plaza, but the association
did not comply with Gilbert’s requests.305  Gilbert informed the su-
perior court on multiple occasions that Nina Plaza was withholding
discovery.306  When the case came before the superior court, the
judge dismissed the case, finding that both parties had failed to
comply with the pretrial scheduling order.307  The superior court
stated that Gilbert should have filed a motion to compel Nina Plaza
to produce the discovery.308 Gilbert asserted that she was “unaware
of this legal procedure.”309  The supreme court reversed the supe-
rior court’s holding.310  The superior court had a duty to relax pro-
cedural requirements and to inform Gilbert of proper procedure
because Gilbert was a pro se litigant and she had informed the su-
perior court that she was having trouble with discovery.311
In Inman v. Inman,312 the supreme court held that a court may
relieve a party from a final divorce judgment that is void313 and hold
300. Id. at 847.
301. Id.
302. 64 P.3d 126 (Alaska 2003).
303. Id. at 129.
304. Id. at 127.
305. Id. at 128.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 127.




312. 67 P.3d 655 (Alaska 2003).
313. Id. at 658.
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a new trial to equitably divide the estate.314  Homer Inman filed for
divorce from Peggy Inman in November 1982, and a default di-
vorce decree was entered in Peggy’s absence.315  In September 1999,
Peggy filed a motion seeking partition of Homer’s retirement bene-
fits, which the trial court granted.316  The Court upheld the judg-
ment, reasoning that the 1982 divorce decree was void for want of
personal jurisdiction and that therefore Peggy may be relieved
from that judgment317 under Civil Rule 60(b)(4).318  The court fur-
ther held that the trial court did not err by holding a new trial in
order to equitably divide the estate after setting aside the divorce
decree as void.319  Despite the delay in filing Peggy’s motion for re-
lief, the court held that the trial court did not err in denying
Homer’s laches defense as a matter of equity.320
In Lawson v. Helmer,321 the supreme court held that defama-
tory testimony of a witness in a judicial proceeding, which is rele-
vant to the suit, is “absolutely privileged,” and that such witnesses
are immune from subsequent suits for libel or slander.322  Ernie and
Linda Helmer, former friends of Lawson, testified against Lawson
in a custody proceeding concerning Lawson’s child.323  Later, Law-
son filed a defamation suit against the Helmers, claiming that they
had lied during their testimony in the earlier custody proceeding.324
The supreme court affirmed the ruling of the lower court, holding
that Lawson’s claim failed as a matter of law.325  The court reiter-
ated the long-standing rule that “defamatory testimony is privi-
leged, and the witness granted immunity,” even if the testimony is
intentionally false and malicious.326  The court noted that good
public policy favors this outcome, considering that the rule pro-
vides witnesses with the confidence to participate in a proceeding
and allows them to speak freely and honestly in court.327  On the
other hand, the court found that parties are adequately protected
314. Id. at 659.
315. Id. at 657.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 658.
318. Id. at 664.
319. Id. at 659.
320. Id.
321. 77 P.3d 724 (Alaska 2003).
322. Id. at 727.
323. Id. at 725-26.
324. Id. at 726.
325. Id. at 725.
326. Id. at 727.
327. Id.
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from “witness misconduct” by the devices of cross-examination and
perjury claims.328
In Marx v. Benzel,329 the supreme court held that an attorney
who has discussed a legal issue with one party cannot represent the
opposing party concerning that legal issue.330  Marx sued Benzel
seeking to set aside the deed of a house that Marx conveyed to
Benzel.331  Benzel’s attorney, Brattain, had previously met with
Marx concerning a different legal matter.332  However, at that
meeting, Marx also informed Brattain about her dispute concern-
ing the house she conveyed to Benzel.333  Subsequently, Brittain
wrote a letter to both Marx and Benzel stating that in the event of
an actual controversy regarding the conveyance of property, he
would not represent either Marx or Benzel.334  Nevertheless, Brit-
tain represented Benzel when Marx brought suit.335  The superior
court denied a motion seeking to disqualify Brittain as counsel for
Benzel.336  The supreme court, applying Rule 1.9(a) of the Alaska
Rules of Professional Conduct, held that Brittain should have been
disqualified as Benzel’s counsel.337  “[A] lawyer may not represent a
new client in a substantially related matter in which the new client’s
interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former cli-
ent.”338  Even though Brittain was not retained as Marx’s attorney,
the supreme court held that the relationship was effectively the
same as that covered by the rule.339  Therefore, the supreme court
reversed the superior court’s order denying the motion for disquali-
fication and remanded the case for further proceedings.340
In Register v. State,341 the court of appeals affirmed the superior
court’s denial of the defendants’ motions to withdraw their pleas.342
The defendants were indicted for first-degree assault in connection
with a stabbing.343  As a result of a plea arrangement, they were al-
328. Id.
329. 66 P.3d 735 (Alaska 2003).
330. Id. at 736.




335. Id. at 736.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. (citing Griffith v. Taylor, 937 P.2d 297, 301 (Alaska 1997)).
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. 71 P.3d 337 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
342. Id. at 338.
343. Id.
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lowed to plead no contest to second-degree assault.344  The victim
sued the defendants in civil court.345  As a result of their no-contest
plea, the defendants were estopped from contesting that they had
assaulted the victim.346  The defendants moved to withdraw their
no-contest pleas, but the superior court denied their motions.347
The defendants asserted that they had entered their pleas under a
mistaken understanding that their pleas could not be used against
them in civil litigation.348  The record indicated conflicting testi-
mony regarding whether or not the defendants’ attorneys had in-
formed them that their no-contest pleas could be used against them
in civil litigation.349  The superior court decided that the testimony
of the attorneys that they had properly informed their clients was
more credible.350  Additionally, the superior court was unconvinced
that the threat of civil liability would be enough to make the de-
fendants reject the “rather lenient deal” offered to them in the plea
arrangement.351  The court of appeals found that these conclusions
were not clearly erroneous.352  Accordingly, the denial of the defen-
dants’ motions to withdraw their pleas was affirmed.353
In Turner v. Alaska Communications Systems Long Distance,
Inc.,354 the supreme court held that absent parties in a class action
cannot be held liable for attorney’s fees upon an adverse judg-
ment.355  Three former subscribers sued Defendants Alaska Com-
munications Systems Long Distance, Inc. and Alaska Communica-
tions Systems Group, Inc. after they cancelled a long distance plan,
claiming breach and fraud.356  The court held that one factor limit-
ing absent parties’ liability is the fact that the potential recovery
from a favorable judgment is so small.357  Imposing liability would
encourage opt-outs and “have a chilling effect on the important use






349. Id. at 340.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 341.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 342.
354. 78 P.3d 264 (Alaska 2003).
355. Id. at 265.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 268.
358. Id.
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rulings on this issue helped guide the decision here.359  Overall, the
court determined that holding such parties liable would create inef-
ficiencies in the class action system.360
In Williams v. Engen,361 the supreme court held that the pur-
pose of Civil Rule 27 is to preserve known evidence, not to aid
searches for causes of action.362  Shortly after purchasing a home in
Juneau, the Engens discovered cracks in the foundation and
brought suit against the real estate agent, Williams, and the estate
for misrepresentation.363  The parties entered mediation on the mat-
ter and Williams offered to settle for $25,000.364  Meanwhile, the es-
tate settled and allowed the sale to be rescinded, stating that the
Engens were still allowed to accept Williams’ settlement.365  Having
second thoughts, however, the Engens agreed to purchase the
home, and applied for refinancing.366  After the refinancing on the
home was completed,367 Williams sought the letter from the engi-
neer who certified the problem in the foundation, but the Engens
refused to disclose the letter.368  Williams then petitioned the
Alaska superior court under Civil Rule 27 in order to compel the
production of the letter, but was denied by the court.369  On appeal,
the supreme court upheld the decision, stating that Rule 27’s pur-
pose is to preserve evidence rather than be used as a tool to dis-
cover causes of action, and that Williams’ case presented no excep-
tional reason to go beyond this purpose of preserving known
evidence.370
In Wyatt v. State,371 the supreme court held that an agreement
reached in exchange for a stay of a wrongful death lawsuit was en-
forceable.372  Appellant Wyatt was convicted of first-degree murder
for the death of his wife.373  The estate of Wyatt’s late wife initiated
a wrongful death suit against him.374  As Wyatt appealed his crimi-
359. Id. at 269.
360. Id. at 270.
361. 80 P.3d 745 (Alaska 2003).
362. Id. at 746.
363. Id. at 745-46.





369. Id. at 746-47.
370. Id. at 747, 750.
371. 65 P.3d 825 (Alaska 2003).
372. Id. at 830.
373. Id. at 827.
374. Id.
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nal conviction, he sought a stay of the civil proceedings against
him.375  The estate agreed to the stay, and in exchange Wyatt agreed
to transfer all of the property to the estate if his criminal appeal
was unsuccessful.376  Wyatt’s conviction was affirmed by the court
of appeals and the supreme court.377  The superior court then or-
dered that the property be transferred to the estate.378  Wyatt ob-
jected on the grounds that the agreement did not encompass all of
the property.379  He also claimed that the written agreement did not
accurately reflect the oral agreement reached in open court.380  The
superior court found against Wyatt on these points and denied his
motion for reconsideration.381  The supreme court examined the re-
cord and found that the oral agreement did encompass all of the
property and was accurately reflected by the written agreement.382
Accordingly, the court affirmed the superior court’s decisions.383
V.  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In Anderson v. State,384 the supreme court held that Alaska
Statutes section 09.17.020(j) is constitutional.385  Anderson was
awarded $600,000 in punitive damages in a wrongful discharge and
defamation suit.386  The state claimed it was owed half of the puni-
tive damages award under Alaska Statutes section 09.17.020(j).387
Anderson then filed a motion seeking that the statute be declared
unconstitutional.388  The court upheld the statute, holding specifi-
cally that the statute did not violate the takings clause or substan-
tive due process.389  The court found that there was no takings claim
because Anderson’s claim accrued after the date of the statute’s
enactment390 and that she had no reasonable expectations to the




378. Id. at 828.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 828-29.
382. Id. at 829.
383. Id. at 832.
384. 78 P.3d 710 (Alaska 2003).
385. Id. at 714.
386. Id. at 712.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 714.
389. Id. at 714-20.
390. Id. at 714-15.
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time her claim accrued.391  The court found that the statute did not
violate substantive due process because it was rationally related to
several legitimate interests.392
In Brandon v. State,393 the supreme court held that a prison dis-
ciplinary hearing conducted by a single hearing officer is not a vio-
lation of a prisoner’s due process rights.394  Brandon, a prison in-
mate, was charged with violating an administrative regulation
against possession of tobacco.395  A disciplinary hearing was held by
a single officer, after which Brandon was found guilty and sen-
tenced to punitive segregation.396  Brandon argued that the hearing
violated his due process rights because a single hearing officer can-
not guarantee fair and impartial adjudication.397  The court found
no violation of due process under the principle that single hearing
officers are not presumed to be biased in prison disciplinary pro-
ceedings.398  Brandon further argued that the disciplinary hearing
violated the final settlement agreement of Cleary v. Smith,399 a
class-action case settlement governing numerous aspects of prison
conditions in Alaska.  The court held that Brandon’s hearing was
not prejudiced by any violation of that agreement.400
In Evans v. Native Village of Selawik IRA Council,401 the su-
preme court held that failure to provide notice to a parent prior to
the resolution of adoption is a denial of the parent’s due process
rights.402  Evans, an unwed father, was denied paternal rights over
his son, K.D., when the Native Village of Selawik passed a resolu-
tion of adoption in favor of K.D.’s guardians without providing no-
tice to Evans prior to the resolution.403  The court held that notice
to a parent whose parental rights may be terminated is an essential
element of due process under the Alaska Constitution.404
391. Id. at 715.
392. Id. at 718.
393. 73 P.3d 1230 (Alaska 2003).
394. Id. at 1231.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 1232.
397. Id. at 1233.
398. Id. at 1235.
399. 24 P.3d 1245 (Alaska 2003).
400. Brandon, 73 P.3d at 1248.
401. 65 P.3d 58 (Alaska 2003).
402. Id. at 60.
403. Id. at 59.
404. Id. at 60.
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In Herreid v. State,405 the court of appeals held that Alaska’s
Sex Offender Registration Act406 (“SORA”) does not constitute an
improper infringement by the legislative branch into the duties of
the judicial branch.407  As part of a plea bargain, Herreid pled no
contest to a misdemeanor count of attempted third-degree sexual
assault.408  Herreid was subsequently required to register as a sex
offender for fifteen years because his offense was considered a “sex
offense” under SORA.409  Herreid contested the application of the
Act to his situation, claiming that the registration requirement was
a punishment and that it was therefore unconstitutional for the
legislature not to allow the courts to modify the length of the regis-
tration requirement based on the circumstances of Herreid’s of-
fense.410  However, the court of appeals followed recent rulings by
the United States Supreme Court and held that the Act did not im-
pose punishment but was a “civil regulatory measure.”411  There-
fore, the court of appeals held that the Act did not “violate the
separation of powers between the legislative and judicial
branches.”412
In Holding v. Municipality of Anchorage,413 the supreme court
held that a lessor prevented from advertising adult-oriented busi-
nesses by a code provision barring such advertising by those who
did not own the businesses is not exempt from the provision if he
leases space to parties authorized to advertise such businesses.414
Anchorage issued five citations to Holding for advertising adult-
oriented businesses that operated on premises owned by Holding
but were leased by the business owners, who had the proper li-
censes and operated these businesses.415 The supreme court held
that the provision prohibiting non-owners from advertising applied
to Holding for two reasons.416 First, Holding did not have any
“grandfather right” to advertise simply because he owned the
premises.417 Second, the provision did not deprive Holding of his
405. 69 P.3d 507 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
406. ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.100(6)(C)(i) (Michie 2002).
407. Herreid, 69 P.3d at 509.
408. Id. at 507.
409. Id. at 507-08.
410. Id. at 508.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 509.
413. 63 P.3d 248 (Alaska 2003).
414. Id. at 249.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id. at 251.
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constitutionally-protected right of commercial free speech because
the law directly advances the interests of Anchorage in a manner
that is not more restrictive than necessary.418 Therefore, the cita-
tions issued by Anchorage were proper.419
In Holz v. Nenana City Public School District,420 the Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed the district court’s finding that the School District
(“District”) was an “arm of the state” and therefore entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity.421  Rather, the District was akin to
a municipal corporation or other political subdivision without
Eleventh Amendment protection.422  Holz, an Alaskan Native, ap-
plied for a job with the Nenana City Public School as a classroom
aide.423  “The position was funded partially by an Indian Education
grant that included an Indian employment preference require-
ment.”424  Although Holz was considered the best qualified appli-
cant by the classroom teacher, the position went to the wife of the
School Board President and a non-Alaskan native.425  Holz subse-
quently filed suit against the District and its officials, alleging that
they violated the Federal Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act and federal and state civil rights laws by failing to
hire her for several school district positions.426  The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that
the District satisfied the five-factor test articulated in Mitchell v.
Los Angeles Community College District427 and was immune from
suit.428  The Ninth Circuit’s application of the Mitchell factors
yielded a different result.  Regarding the first and most important
factor (whether a money judgment will be satisfied out of state
funds) the court noted that the relevant inquiry was whether
Alaska would be legally liable for money judgments against the
District.429  Because Alaska state law explicitly provides that the
State is not responsible for judgments against school districts, the
court found that the first Mitchell factor weighed against finding
418. Id. at 254.
419. Id. at 249.
420. 347 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 2003).
421. Id. at 1177.
422. Id. at 1177, 1180.




427. 861 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1988).
428. Holz, 347 F.3d at 1178.
429. Id. at 1182.
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the District to be an arm of the state.430  The court also found that
the district court went “too far” in holding that under the second
Mitchell factor (whether the District performs central government
functions), education is an essential state function in Alaska.431  The
duty to operate public schools and thus to provide education is not
the duty of the state but is the duty of home rule cities such as Ne-
nana.432  The last three Mitchell factors (whether the District has the
power to sue and be sued, whether the District has the power to
take property in its own name, and whether the District is an entity
distinct from the state) weighed against a determination that the
District was an arm of the state.433  The court thus concluded that
the District was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.434
In Jacobus v. State,435 the court of appeals evaluated the consti-
tutionality of certain amendments to Alaska Statutes section
15.13.010 et seq., which prescribe Alaska’s election campaign fi-
nance laws,436 and held that the statutes’ restriction on soft money
contributions to political parties by both individuals and corpora-
tions is constitutional,437 but that the statute’s limitation of volun-
teer professional services by individuals is an unconstitutional in-
fringement of First Amendment rights.438  The Alaska legislature
enacted amendments to the law of campaign finance in 1996 in or-
der to “restrict the influence of money on politics and prevent easy
evasion of the barriers set up by the reforms.”439  Party activists
later filed suit, challenging the constitutionality of the new limita-
tions imposed by the amendments on campaign contributions.440
The court of appeals first held that the amendments’ limitation of
an individual’s right to contribute soft money to a political party is
not an unconstitutional infringement of First Amendment rights.441
The court held that the state has a sufficiently important govern-
mental interest in “preventing corruption, avoiding the appearance
of corruption, and averting the circumvention of provisions in-
tended to combat corruption,” and that the amendments were
430. Id. at 1185.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 1187.
433. Id. at 1188-89.
434. Id. at 1189.
435. 338 P.3d 1095 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
436. Id. at 1099.
437. Id. at 1105-06.
438. Id. at 1099.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 1098.
441. Id. at 1105.
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closely tailored to further that interest.442  Second, the court held
that the amendments’ prohibition of corporate soft money contri-
butions was constitutional because it was a closely tailored solution
to the governmental interests of avoiding the “danger of corruption
and the corrosive effects of wealth accumulated with the aid of the
corporate structure.”443  Finally, the court held that the amend-
ments’ limitation of volunteer professional services by individuals
to political parties was unconstitutional because the State provided
no sufficient governmental interest to override individuals’ First
Amendment rights.444
In Malabed v. North Slope Borough,445 the Ninth Circuit held
that an ordinance granting preference in employment to members
of federally recognized Indian tribes violated the Alaska Constitu-
tion’s guarantee of equal protection.446  The North Slope Borough,
a political division of the State of Alaska, enacted an ordinance
giving preference in employment to Native Americans.447  The non-
native plaintiffs claimed they were denied employment because of
this ordinance.448  The Ninth Circuit asked the supreme court to de-
termine whether the ordinance violated the Alaska Constitution.449
The supreme court held that the ordinance violated the Alaska
Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection because the borough
lacked “a legitimate governmental interest” and because the pref-
erence was “not closely tailored to meet its goals.”450  The Ninth
Circuit thus declared the ordinance invalid and declined to reach
plaintiffs’ federal constitutional claims.451
In Myers v. Alaska Housing Finance Corp.,452 the supreme
court held that selling the right to receive future revenue from a
tobacco lawsuit settlement is constitutional.453  Alaska settled its
claims against tobacco manufacturers in exchange for annual pay-
ments.454  The legislature then sold the rights to this revenue stream
442. Id. at 1110.
443. Id. at 1122.
444. Id. at 1124-25.
445. 335 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2003).
446. Id. at 874.
447. Id. at 866.
448. Id. at 866-67.
449. Id. at 867-68.
450. Id. at 868 (citing Malabed v. North Slope Borough, 70 P.3d 416 (Alaska
2003)).
451. Id.
452. 68 P.3d 386 (Alaska 2003).
453. Id. at 394.
454. Id. at 387.
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for its present value and appropriated the proceeds for school im-
provements.455  Myers, a taxpayer, sought a declaratory judgment
that this action violated the anti-dedication clause of the state con-
stitution.456  The superior court held that the legislature’s action was
constitutional, and the supreme court affirmed.457  However, the
court did hold that the revenue from the tobacco settlement was
subject to the anti-dedication clause.458  The court then held that the
legislature’s sale of the right to this revenue stream was not an un-
constitutional dedication.459  The court found the legislature’s ac-
tion permissible for four reasons.460  First, the lawsuit settlement
was non-recurring, unlike other traditional sources of state reve-
nue.461  Second, the periodic nature of the settlement was a matter
of chance.462  A lump sum settlement would have freed the legisla-
ture to appropriate the funds.463  Third, lawsuit settlements are con-
sidered to be assets unlike taxes or licenses.464  Finally, the legisla-
ture must be allowed to manage these assets so as to control risk.465
In Smith v. Doe I,466 the Supreme Court of the United States
held that the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (“SORA”),467
which applies retroactively, is nonpunitive, and thus does not vio-
late the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.468
Respondents John Doe I and John Doe II were convicted of sexual
abuse and were later required to register under SORA even
though they were convicted prior to its passage.469  SORA requires
a convicted sex offender to register personal and identifying infor-
mation with the State Department of Corrections or local law en-
forcement authorities.470  The State Department of Public Safety
then makes much of the information public via the Internet, in-
cluding the offender’s name, place of employment, and crime for
455. Id. at 388.
456. Id. at 389.
457. Id. at 388, 393.
458. Id. at 390.
459. Id. at 391.
460. Id.





466. 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
467. ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.010 (Michie 2000).
468. Smith, 538 U.S. at 105-06.
469. Id. at 91.
470. ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.63.010(a), (b).
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which the offender was convicted.471  Writing for the Court, Justice
Kennedy applied the rule that a retroactively-applied law violates
the Ex Post Facto Clause if either its purpose is punitive or its ef-
fects are so punitive as to negate the legislature’s nonpunitive in-
tent.472  The Court first concluded that the legislature’s intent in en-
acting SORA was to protect the public from sex offenders, which is
a civil and nonpunitive purpose.473  Then, in determining whether
SORA’s effects are punitive, the Court referred to various factors
outlined in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.474  In particular, the
Court focused on whether the regulatory scheme: (1) has been his-
torically regarded as a punishment; (2) imposes an affirmative dis-
ability or restraint; (3) promotes the traditional aims of punish-
ment; (4) has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or (5)
is excessive with respect to this purpose.475  The Court resolved
each of these issues in favor of a finding that SORA’s effects are
nonpunitive.476  Accordingly, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s
decision and held that SORA does not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause.477
In State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission v. Carlson,478
the supreme court held that Alaska’s practice of charging nonresi-
dents more than residents for commercial fishing licenses does not
violate the United States Constitution.479  The supreme court also
held, however, that the formula for determining the rate charged to
non-residents should consider the revolving loan fund that supports
developing fish enhancement projects: the “hatchery loan fund
subsidy.”480  This class action was brought by a group of non-
resident commercial fishers who complained that they were being
charged three times the price for a commercial fishing permit as
were resident commercial fishers.481  The supreme court explained
that “[t]he class has failed to present any valid arguments as to why
we should reconsider” the position that residents and non-residents
can be charged unequally for permits.482  The supreme court ad-
471. Smith, 538 U.S. at 90-91.
472. Id. at 92.
473. Id. at 93, 96.
474. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
475. Smith, 538 U.S. at 97.
476. Id. at 97-105.
477. Id. at 105-06.
478. 65 P.3d 851 (Alaska 2003).
479. Id. at 875.
480. Id. at 867.
481. Id. at 853-54.
482. Id. at 875.
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justed the previously adopted formula used to calculate the rate
charged to non-residents to include consideration of the hatcheries
loan fund subsidy.483
VI.  CRIMINAL LAW
A. Procedure
In Baxter v. Alaska,484 the court of appeals upheld the allow-
ance of certain evidence at trial, which was used to convict defen-
dants of conspiracy to manufacture drugs, reasoning that such evi-
dence was legally obtained.485  Johnson was stopped by police for
driving with a burnt-out headlight and gave police permission to
search her car and person.486  The police discovered drugs in John-
son’s pockets, but arrested her only for driving without a license.487
At the police station, the police again searched Johnson and ex-
amined her wallet, in which it found a piece of paper containing a
list of items needed to manufacture methamphetamine.488  Based on
this evidence, the police obtained a search warrant for Johnson’s
home, where the police found a methamphetamine lab.489  At trial
for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, Johnson and her
co-defendants argued first that the evidence was barred because
Johnson had not “knowingly and voluntarily” consented to the
search when stopped by the police.490  The court of appeals ruled
that based on the “totality of the circumstances,” Johnson validly
consented to the search.491  The defendants next argued that even if
consent had been given, Johnson later withdrew her consent when
she hesitated before emptying her pockets for police.492  The court
of appeals denied this argument as well, holding that “[o]nce volun-
tary consent has been given . . . the person’s ‘lack of objection to
subsequent closely related entries and searches’ implies that the de-
fendant’s consent was not withdrawn.”493  The defendants also ar-
gued that the police’s search of Johnson’s wallet following her ar-
rest was invalid because Johnson was arrested for driving without a
483. Id.
484. 77 P.3d 19 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
485. Id. at 21-22.
486. Id. at 21.
487. Id.
488. Id. at 22.
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. Id. at 23.
492. Id. at 25.
493. Id. (quoting Phillips v. State, 625 P.2d 816, 818 (Alaska 1980)).
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license and searches “incident to arrest [are] limited to . . . evidence
of the crime for which the arrest was made.”494  The court ruled,
however, that police are not limited to searching for evidence of
only the particular crime for which the defendant is arrested, but
also for “any crime for which the police have probable cause,” and
thus, this search was valid.495  Finally, the court held that the police
also had authority to read the paper inside Johnson’s wallet be-
cause the police had reason to believe that the item contained evi-
dence of drug possession; specifically, the court held that the police
could validly search for evidence identifying the source of the
drugs.496
In Bingaman v. State,497 the court of appeals held that though
Evidence Rule 404(b)(4) allows the admission of character evi-
dence in domestic violence trials, a trial judge is still to act as a
gatekeeper to ensure that the proffered evidence is not irrelevant
or prejudicial.498  Bingaman was charged with assaulting his live-in
companion and sexually abusing her daughter.499  At trial, the judge
admitted, under Rule 404(b)(4), evidence of sixty prior instances of
Bingaman’s misconduct.500  However, only twenty percent of the in-
stances dealt with the acts for which he was charged (assault and
sexual abuse of a minor), while the remainder dealt with unrelated
acts, such as degradation and intimidation of women.501  On appeal,
the court held that the trial judge violated Evidence Rules 402 and
403 by admitting irrelevant evidence and evidence of which its pro-
bative value is outweighed by its prejudicial harm.502  Accordingly,
the decision of the superior court was reversed.503
In Black v. State,504 the court of appeals held that a challenge is
not filed when it is mailed, but rather when it is received by the
clerk of court.505  Black was charged with driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol.506  Before his trial he tried to file a peremptory
challenge by mailing it within the five day window required by
494. Id.
495. Id. at 26.
496. Id. at 28-29.
497. 76 P.3d 398 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
498. Id. at 401.
499. Id.
500. Id.
501. Id. at 402.
502. Id.
503. Id. at 417.
504. 76 P.3d 417 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
505. Id. at 418.
506. Id.
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Criminal Rule 25(d)(2), but the court rejected the attempt, stating
that it was untimely.507  The appellate court upheld the ruling, citing
the Alaska common law rule that a document is filed only when re-
ceived by the court.508
In Carter v. State,509 the court of appeals held that a hotel guest
who fails to meet the check-out deadlines suffers diminution of pri-
vacy only with respect to the right of the hotel management, not
the police independently, to enter the room.510  Carter and three
other individuals occupied a hotel room.511  Police officers legally
entered the hotel room to arrest one of the other individuals.512
However, two officers investigating Carter remained behind in the
room and ordered Carter to vacate the room, as it was one o’clock,
the hotel’s stated check-out deadline.513  While observing Carter
gather his belongings, the police observed illicit drug parapherna-
lia.514  The court of appeals held that, depending on both the hotel’s
customary check-out policy and the specific factual circumstances
of the individual situation, a hotel guest may suffer a diminution of
his expectation of privacy with respect to the right of hotel man-
agement to enter the room.515  However, the guest neither loses all
expectation of privacy nor does the guest suffer a diminution of
privacy with respect to police, independently.516  Here, the hotel
policy was to provide guests with leeway after the one o’clock
deadline, the clerk had specifically granted Carter such leeway, and
Carter continued to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
hotel room after one o’clock.517  Therefore, the police officers re-
mained in the hotel room without proper authority.518  The evi-
dence was therefore discovered illegally and could not be justified
under the plain view doctrine.519  The court ordered the evidence
suppressed and the conviction reversed.520
507. Id.
508. Id. at 419.
509. 72 P.3d 1256 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
510. Id. at 1260.
511. Id. at 1257.
512. Id. at 1258.
513. Id.
514. Id.
515. Id. at 1260.
516. Id.
517. Id. at 1261-62.
518. Id. at 1262.
519. Id. at 1263.
520. Id. at 1257.
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In Cole v. State,521 the court of appeals held that for an attorney
to be found incompetent, a prima facie case must be made demon-
strating that she acted unreasonably in comparison with other at-
torneys skilled in criminal law and that her incompetence contrib-
uted to her client’s conviction.522  Cole was convicted of first-degree
murder.523  Subsequently, Cole applied for post-conviction relief on
the grounds that his lawyer was incompetent in two ways: (1) she
did not retain a forensic pathologist to explain the victim’s death;
and (2) she did not explain the parole he might have had if he had
instead pled guilty to second-degree murder.524  The superior court
found that, by neglecting to obtain a pathologist, Cole’s lawyer had
made a tactical choice which did not prejudice Cole’s case; conse-
quently, it was no abuse of discretion for the superior court to deny
Cole’s ineffective counsel claim.525  Also, the court held that an at-
torney is not required to advise a client about the eligibility for pa-
role under different plea options, and thus Cole failed to establish
his attorney’s incompetence in this regard as well.526
In Coles v. State,527 the court of appeals found that there was
sufficient evidence in the record to support the sentencing judge’s
finding that the defendant was a “worst offender” and, therefore,
merited the maximum sentence for felony driving while intoxicated
(“DWI”).528  A judge may only impose a maximum sentence on an
offender when there is sufficient evidence to find that the offender
is a “worst offender.”529  Evidence regarding the present offense
and prior similar offenses determine when a defendant is a “worst
offender.”530  Based on Coles’ nine DWI convictions within a ten-
year period, the court of appeals found that the sentencing judge
was authorized to invoke the maximum sentence of five years in
prison.531
In Copeland v. State,532 the court of appeals rejected a defen-
dant’s evidentiary claims and upheld his sentence as a valid exer-
521. 72 P.3d 322 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
522. Id. at 323.
523. Id. at 322.
524. Id. at 322-23.
525. Id. at 323-24.
526. Id. at 324.
527. 64 P.3d 149 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
528. Id. at 149.
529. Id.
530. Id. at 151.
531. Id. at 151-52.
532. 70 P.3d 1118 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
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cise of judicial discretion.533  Copeland was convicted of contribut-
ing to the delinquency of a minor and nine counts of second-degree
sexual abuse of a thirteen-year-old girl.534  On appeal, Copeland
first challenged five evidentiary rulings from the lower court.535
Three of these claims were not raised at trial and failed plain-error
review by the court of appeals.536  Of the remaining claims, Cope-
land argued that the trial court erred by denying his request for ac-
cess to the whole of the minor’s diary.537  The court of appeals af-
firmed the lower court’s ruling, finding that Copeland was unable
to prove that the lack of access to the full diary was prejudicial to
him.538  The court also noted that Copeland had rejected the trial
court’s offer of an alternative way to check the diary for physical
tampering.539  Copeland also argued that the trial court erred by re-
fusing to allow evidence from a previous trial that the minor may
have falsely accused someone of a similar crime.540  Applying
Morgan v. State,541 the court of appeals held that “before evidence
of a prior false accusation of sexual misconduct can be admitted,
the proponent of this evidence must convince the trial judge by a
preponderance of the evidence that the prior accusation was both
actually and knowingly false.”542  The court found that although the
defendant had been acquitted in the earlier trial, the evidence of a
false accusation was still insufficient under this standard to allow
the testimony.543  Finally, the court of appeals upheld the lower
court’s sentence.544  Though the sentence exceeded the State v.
Jackson545 benchmark range, the court found that the longer sen-
tence was reasonable considering the unusual seriousness of
Copeland’s offense.546
In Crawford v. State,547 the court of appeals held that a search
of a car’s center console cannot be justified as a search incident to
533. Id. at 1120.
534. Id. at 1127.
535. Id. at 1120.
536. Id. at 1122-27.
537. Id. at 1120.
538. Id. at 1121.
539. Id.
540. Id. at 1124.
541. 54 P.3d 332 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
542. Copeland, 70 P.3d at 1124.
543. Id.
544. Id. at 1128.
545. 776 P.2d 320 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
546. Copeland, 70 P.3d  at 1127-28.
547. 68 P.3d 1281 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
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arrest, as the console is not associated with the defendant’s per-
son.548  Such a search is only justified if it is a search for hidden
weapons.549  During a traffic stop for reckless driving, the police
searched Crawford’s car and found a controlled substance in the
center console.550  This led to a charge of fourth-degree misconduct
involving a controlled substance.551  Crawford moved to suppress
the evidence found in the console, arguing that the search was not a
lawful search incident to the arrest.552  The superior court denied
the motion.553  The court of appeals held that, because the console
was a closed container not associated with Crawford’s person, it
could only be opened if the police reasonably believed it contained
weapons or evidence of the crime for which Crawford was ar-
rested.554
In Crouse v. Municipality of Anchorage,555 the court of appeals
held that a trial judge did not err in allowing a jury to revise its ver-
dict when it had mistakenly filled out the wrong jury form.556
Crouse was mistakenly convicted for reckless driving instead of a
more severe charge of driving under the influence because the jury
filled out the wrong verdict form.557  Upon receiving the form, the
judge immediately recognized this error and sent the jury back with
the correct forms.558  Crouse argued that the court erred in inquir-
ing into the jurors’ intent.559  She further argued that allowing the
court staff to contact the jury regarding the verdict form deprived
her of her constitutional right to be present at every stage of her
trial.560  The court held that the district court did not err because a
trial court has discretion to question a jurors’ intent to ensure that
the judgment accurately reflects the jury’s verdict.561  The court
therefore declined to reverse the decision.562
548. Id. at 1283.
549. Id.
550. Id. at 1282.
551. Id.
552. Id. at 1283.
553. Id.
554. Id.
555. 79 P.3d 660 (Alaska. Ct. App. 2003).
556. Id. at 661-62.




561. Id. at 663-64.
562. Id. at 665.
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In Dague v. State,563 the supreme court held that a trial court
erred in prohibiting a criminal defendant from reexamining the
State’s expert witness as to whether she had acted knowingly in the
death of a child.564  Dague admitted that she was responsible for the
death of a ten-month old child in her care; the issue at trial was
whether she acted knowingly.565  At trial, the superior court refused
to allow the defense to recall the State’s expert witness to substan-
tiate his earlier testimony about how abusive situations arise.566
The court of appeals remanded to allow questioning of the state
expert as to whether he was qualified to answer the defense’s ques-
tioning and what he would have answered at trial.567  After receiv-
ing the superior court’s findings, the court of appeals determined
that the exclusion of his testimony was harmless error because it
would have only provided marginal support to the defense.568  On
appeal, the supreme court held that the mere fact that another wit-
ness testified on an issue does not foreclose the defendant’s right to
introduce substantiating testimony.569  Therefore, the court re-
versed the decision of the court of appeals, reasoning that the ex-
clusion of the state expert’s testimony was reversible error because
of its potential to appreciably affect the jury’s verdict.570
In Fowler v. State,571 the court of appeals held that an amend-
ment to Alaska law making driving while intoxicated a felony with
two prior offenses within the past ten years was effective the day
after the governor signed it when the date specified by the legisla-
ture had already passed.572  The Alaska legislature passed an
amendment to the driving while intoxicated statute that increased
the “look back” period to ten years; the amendment was to become
effective on the specified date of July 1, 2001.573  Under Alaska law,
a bill takes force on the ninetieth day after the governor signs it,
unless the legislature specifies otherwise.574  The governor, however,
did not sign the bill until July 3, two days after the legislature’s
563. 81 P.3d 274 (Alaska 2003).
564. Id. at 275.
565. Id.
566. Id. at 277.
567. Id. at 279.
568. Id. at 281.
569. Id. at 282.
570. Id. at 284.
571. 70 P.3d 1106 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
572. Id. at 1109.
573. Id. at 1107 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(n) (Michie 2002)).
574. Id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.070(a) (Michie 2002)).
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specified date.575  The next day, July 4, Fowler was arrested for
driving while intoxicated; he had two prior offenses within the pre-
ceding ten years but none within the preceding five years.576  His of-
fense would be a felony if the bill were effective on or before July
4.  Fowler argued that because the governor did not sign the bill
until after the date specified by the legislature, the bill did not take
effect until the ninetieth day after the governor signed it.577  The
court noted that when the legislature intended the law to be en-
acted on a specified date, it normally could anticipate that the gov-
ernor would sign the law with time to spare, thus eliminating the
need for the ninety-day forewarning period.578  When the specified
date has already transpired by the time the governor signed the
bill, the court believed it was reasonable to assume that the legisla-
ture would want the law to take force as soon as possible.579  This
conclusion was consistent with the later-enacted Alaska Statutes
section 01.10.070(d), which was amended to say “if the specified . . .
effective date is in or before the day the governor signs the Act, . . .
the Act becomes effective at 12:01 a.m., Alaska Standard Time, on
the day after the governor signs the Act. . . .”580  Thus, the law took
effect at 12:01 A.M. on July 4, 2001, and governed Fowler’s of-
fense.581
In Grinols v. State,582 the supreme court held that a defendant
has a constitutional right to effective counsel in a first application
for post-conviction relief and therefore must be given the opportu-
nity to challenge the effectiveness of counsel in a second petition
for post-conviction relief.583  Grinols, convicted for sexual abuse of
a minor, claimed he received ineffective assistance of counsel when
he litigated his first application for post-conviction relief.584  The
supreme court held that the due process clause of the Alaska Con-
stitution requires the right to counsel in a first application for post-
conviction relief.585  Therefore, as the right to counsel would be
meaningless if that counsel was ineffective, the supreme court held




578. Id. at 1108-09.
579. Id. at 1109.
580. Id. at 1108.
581. Id. at 1109.
582. 74 P.3d 889 (Alaska 2003).
583. Id. at 896.
584. Id. at 891.
585. Id. at 894.
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a chance to challenge the effectiveness of counsel in a second peti-
tion for post-conviction relief.586  Furthermore, the court held that
as the right to effective counsel is based in the Alaska Constitution,
not the United States Constitution, the reach of the federal due
process clause was irrelevant to the case at hand.587
In Hart v. State,588 the court of appeals affirmed an earlier deci-
sion that it was unnecessary for a pre-sentence investigator to ob-
tain permission from the superior court before using records of in-
formal involvement with the juvenile justice system to prepare a
pre-sentence report.589  Hart was convicted of third-degree assault,
and he had previous contacts with the juvenile justice system that
did not lead to formal adjudications of delinquency.590  His pre-
sentence report included information regarding these informal
complaints.591  Hart argued that on the basis of Alaska Statutes sec-
tion 47.12.310(a), which states that all agency records concerning a
minor “are privileged and may not be disclosed . . . without a court
order,” it was improper for his pre-sentence report to include juve-
nile records.592  The court noted that the statute contains excep-
tions; for example, a minor’s records must be disclosed “to any fed-
eral, state, or municipal law enforcement agency when those
records are pertinent to a ‘specific investigation being conducted by
that agency.’”593
In James v. State,594 the court of appeals held that a defendant
validly invoked his Fifth Amendment protection against self-
incrimination and had a Fifth Amendment privilege not to be re-
quired to discuss the details surrounding charges of which he was
convicted.595  James was on probation for convictions of sexual
abuse of a minor in the second degree and second-degree sexual
assault.596  He was required, as a condition of his probation, to par-
ticipate in sex offender treatment during his incarceration.597  While
the denial of James’ application for post-conviction relief was on
appeal, James’ probation officer attempted to revoke his probation
586. Id. at 895.
587. Id.
588. 75 P.3d 1073 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
589. Id.
590. Id.
591. Id. at 1073-74.
592. Id.
593. Id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.310(b)(1) (Michie 2003)).
594. 75 P.3d 1065 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
595. Id. at 1066.
596. Id. at 1067.
597. Id.
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because he failed to participate in the sex offender therapy pro-
gram.598  James invoked the Fifth Amendment, declining to discuss
the charges in therapy because his case was on appeal.599  The Of-
fice of the Attorney General declared that the privilege against
self-incrimination did not excuse James from participating in the
therapy.600  The court of appeals held that James did have a Fifth
Amendment right to refuse to discuss the charges of which he was
convicted.601  Due to James’ collateral attack on his conviction, he
demonstrated a valid reason to believe that his compelled state-
ments might incriminate him.602  His Fifth Amendment right
trumped the state’s interest in enforcing a condition of his proba-
tion.603  Therefore, his probation could not be revoked when he re-
fused to discuss the charges.604
In Jones v. State,605 the court of appeals held that a defendant’s
admission, if given after an officer’s guarantee that the conversa-
tion is “off the record,” is involuntary.606  Jones was arrested for
multiple counts of sexual assault and abuse of a minor.607  Officers
questioned Jones unsuccessfully until one of the officers agreed
with Jones that the conversation was “off the record.”608  After that
agreement, Jones admitted that he had had sex with the victim and
that he knew she was fourteen years old.609  The supreme court held
that the totality of the circumstances showed that Jones’ statements
were induced by the agreement with the officer and thus were in-
voluntary.610  Consequently, the supreme court reversed Jones’
conviction.611
In Larson v. State,612 the court of appeals held that the admissi-
bility of jurors’ affidavits as evidence turned on the type of impro-
priety alleged of the jurors, not the timing of that impropriety.613




601. Id. at 1068.
602. Id. at 1068-69.
603. Id. at 1069.
604. Id. at 1072.
605. 65 P.3d 903 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
606. Id. at 909.
607. Id. at 904.
608. Id. at 905.
609. Id.
610. Id. at 909.
611. Id. at 910.
612. 79 P.3d 650 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
613. Id. at 653.
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count of burglary, after which he petitioned for post-conviction re-
lief, alleging misconduct by the jury at his trial.614  The superior
court dismissed his petition, concluding that Larson’s allegations
did not constitute a valid exception to Evidence Rule 606(b)’s pro-
hibition of juror affidavits as admissible evidence.615  On appeal,
Larson argued that the juror affidavits were admissible because
they described misconduct that occurred before the jury’s formal
deliberations.616  He also alleged that the jurors’ misconduct de-
prived them of their status as jurors under Rule 606(b) and that the
alleged misconduct was so egregious that it constituted an obstruc-
tion of justice and a denial of due process.617  The court of appeals
affirmed the holding of the superior court,618 reasoning that Rule
606(b) applied to Larson’s allegations of juror misconduct even
though the misconduct occurred before the jury commenced for-
mal deliberations.619  The court further held that jurors who engage
in misconduct do not forfeit their status as jurors620 and that Rule
606(b) did not violate Larson’s constitutional rights.621
In Magee v. State,622 the court of appeals held that a contingent
search warrant was unconstitutional, violating the Fourth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution because the triggering
event was not defined precisely enough to ensure judicial control
over the search process.623  When police were attempting to investi-
gate a possible methamphetamine laboratory at Donald Wares’
residence, they applied for a “contingent” warrant to search
Magee’s property.624  The proposed warrant allowed for a search of
Magee’s property upon the finding of any evidence of illegal drug
activity at Wares’ residence.625  In allowing such anticipatory war-
rants, the triggering event must be strictly and precisely defined,626
in order to prevent “premature” execution of the warrant.627  Such
warrants must be drawn such that the judicial officer’s “role in de-
614. Id. at 652.
615. Id.
616. Id.
617. Id. at 652-53.
618. Id. at 660.
619. Id. at 655.
620. Id. at 659.
621. Id.
622. 77 P.3d 732 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
623. Id. at 733.
624. Id.
625. Id.
626. Id. at 734.
627. Id. at 735.
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tecting the occurring of [the triggering] event is essentially ministe-
rial.”628  Because the warrant here did not clearly define the trig-
gering event, it was unconstitutional.629  The police were given too
much discretion, rendering the warrant unlawful.630
In McGee v. State,631 the court of appeals held that the police
do not have reasonable suspicion to remove a package from the
normal stream of commerce if the State does not present evidence
explaining why the package was singled out for removal.632  On
January 11, 1999, a policeman intercepted a suspicious package ad-
dressed to McGee at a Federal Express facility, tested it, and dis-
covered traces of a controlled substance on it.633  The officer then
obtained a search warrant, opened the package, and found seven
ounces of cocaine inside.634  Convicted at his first trial, McGee then
appealed and won a remand and a reversal in a trial court.  The
State then appealled McGee’s second trial.635  The State explained
that the policeman intercepted the package because he thought
that the name “Sam McGee” was comical and likely fictitious, the
double-wrapping of the package looked suspicious, and, among
other things, the airbill, addressed by hand, had no phone number
on it.636  The trial judge, however, concluded that the police’s rea-
sons to find this package suspicious were not sufficient to give the
police reasonable suspicion to test the package.637  The court of ap-
peals affirmed the trial court’s reversal of McGee’s earlier convic-
tion, holding that the record provided no evidence “to support a ra-
tional inference that the package contained contraband.”638
In McGuire v. State,639 the court of appeals held that cocaine
found during a pat-down for weapons was admissible.640  A police
officer responded to a fight outside of a bar and patted down sev-
eral people for weapons.641  When McGuire was patted down, the
police officer felt a plastic bag and rectangular corners of a con-
628. Id.
629. Id. at 736.
630. Id. at 737.
631. 70 P.3d 429 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
632. Id. at 432.
633. Id. at 431.
634. Id. at 430-31.
635. Id.
636. Id. at 431.
637. Id.
638. Id. at 432.
639. 70 P.3d 1114 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
640. Id. at 1115.
641. Id.
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tainer traditionally used to carry narcotics.642  The police officer was
“absolutely certain” that McGuire possessed narcotics.643 McGuire
stated that it was marijuana, so the officer seized what was later
found to be cocaine.644  At trial, McGuire moved to suppress the
cocaine, arguing that the search exceeded the permissible scope of
a pat-down for weapons.645  The State argued that the search was
permissible under the “plain feel” doctrine.646  The State then filed
a notice of supplementary authority citing Minnesota v. Dicker-
son,647 a United States Supreme Court case endorsing the plain feel
doctrine.648  The superior court denied McGuire’s motion to sup-
press.649  The superior court also denied a second motion asking the
court to reconsider on the grounds that Dickerson had not been
made known to McGuire prior to the hearing.650  On appeal, the
court of appeals affirmed the decision to admit the cocaine as evi-
dence.651  The court stated that McGuire’s admission that he pos-
sessed a narcotic justified the police officer’s search.652  The court
also upheld the denial of the motion to reconsider because Dicker-
son had been decided more than five years before the hearing, and
the State had informed the defendant that it would rely on the
plain feel doctrine.653  Thus, the decision to deny reconsideration
was not an abuse of discretion, and the decision of the superior
court was affirmed.654
In Nelson v. State,655  the supreme court held that the superior
court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to dismiss an en-
tire jury panel after one juror was dismissed during the selection
process after admitting her distrust of the defense attorney.656
During jury selection for Nelson’s trial, a juror stated that she had a
“very strong opinion” of the defense attorney.657  The juror ex-




645. Id. at 1114.
646. Id. at 1115.
647. 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
648. McGuire, 70 P.3d at 1115.
649. Id.
650. Id. at 1116.
651. Id.
652. Id. at 1117.
653. Id.
654. Id.
655. 68 P.3d 402 (Alaska 2003).
656. Id. at 405.
657. Id. at 403.
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previous trial for which she had been a juror.658  The juror was dis-
missed.659  Nelson then moved to dismiss the entire panel, arguing
that it was “tainted” by the dismissed juror’s comments.660  The
court denied Nelson’s motion.661  The supreme court upheld this
decision, stating that the entire panel was not prejudiced by the
comments, and the defense could have easily objected.662  The supe-
rior court’s provision of a limiting instruction was held to be an ap-
propriate control on any prejudice.663
In Perrin v. State,664 the court of appeals overruled the trial
court’s decision to bar a defendant’s defense testimony on the rea-
soning of Gerlach v. State,665 which precludes a necessity defense in
custodial interference cases.666  The court of appeals held that, even
if the trial court was concerned that the defendant would claim ne-
cessity without meeting the requirements of the affirmative de-
fense, it could have instructed the jury that the defendant would
have to utilize obtainable legal remedies before assuming unlawful
self-help.667  After he left the state for approximately three months
with his daughter without notifying the child’s mother, who had
primary physical custody of the child, Perrin was indicted for cus-
todial interference.668  To obtain a custodial interference conviction,
the State had to prove that the defendant was a relative of the
child, and, knowing that he had no right to do so, took or kept the
child from his or her lawful custodian with the intent to withhold
the child for a protracted period.669  At trial, Perrin intended to in-
troduce evidence that he took his daughter out of state because he
feared his daughter was being abused by her mother’s compan-
ion.670  The trial court concluded that self-help was not an accept-
able defense for custodial interference because to allow self-help in
to demonstrate lack of intent essentially established the necessity
defense.671  Barring Perrin’s testimony denying he had the requisite
658. Id.
659. Id.
660. Id. at 404.
661. Id.
662. Id. at 405.
663. Id.
664. 66 P.3d 21 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
665. 699 P.2d 358 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
666. Perrin, 66 P.3d at 25.
667. Id.
668. Id. at 22-23.
669. Id. at 24.
670. Id.
671. Id.
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intent to withhold his daughter for a protracted period both re-
lieved the State of its burden of proof as to that element of the
crime and deprived Perrin of his constitutional right to testify in his
own behalf.672  For these reasons, the court of appeals reversed Per-
rin’s conviction.673
In Phillips v. State,674 the court of appeals held that a defendant
had not been unfairly convicted of murder, escape, robbery, as-
sault, and vehicle theft, but remanded the case for re-sentencing,
finding that the murder sentence was in error.675  Phillips committed
a series of crimes the day after being released from prison.676  Phil-
lips stole a cab in his escape attempt following commission of an
armed robbery, and, on later being discovered and pursued by a
police officer, engaged in a struggle with the officer that led to the
officer’s death.677  On appeal, Phillips argued that his trial had been
unfair and that his resulting sentence was excessive.678  The court
held that evidence of crimes that Phillips committed at the begin-
ning of the sequence of events did not improperly prejudice the
jury’s findings on later crimes.679  The court of appeals further held
that, although the presence of a number of uniformed officers at
the beginning of the trial may have affected the jury, the lower
court did not abuse its discretion by denying Phillips’ requests for a
mistrial or for a complete ban on the officers’ presence in the
courtroom.680  Addressing another claim that the trial had been un-
fair, the court of appeals held that although the introduction of the
deceased officer’s widow to the jury may have been erroneous, it
did not prejudice the proceeding.681  Finally, reviewing Phillips’
challenge that his sentence was excessive, the court of appeals held
that the lower court had incorrectly applied Gustafson v. State682 in
its determination of the sentence for second-degree murder.683  Ac-
cordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded the case
for re-sentencing.684
672. Id. at 25.
673. Id. at 26.
674. 70 P.3d 1128 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
675. Id. at 1145.
676. Id. at 1130.
677. Id.
678. Id. at 1130-31.
679. Id. at 1135.
680. Id. at 1138.
681. Id. at 1140.
682. 854 P.2d 751 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
683. Phillips, 70 P.3d at 1145.
684. Id.
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In Porterfield v. State,685 the court of appeals upheld the admis-
sion to evidence of recorded statements made to a third party by a
criminal defendant’s wife implicating her and her husband’s in-
volvement in the commission of a crime.686  Todd Porterfield was
convicted of first-degree murder and first-degree arson based on
recordings of statements made by his wife Michele to a third
party.687  Todd argued that the lower court abused its discretion be-
cause Michele’s statements were inadmissible as statements against
interest, and such admission violated his confrontation rights.688
The court of appeals held that the statements by Michele were ad-
missible under Evidence Rule 804(b)(3) because, in the context of
all her statements, her admission “tended to subject her to criminal
liability” as an accomplice, and “a reasonable person in [her] posi-
tion would not have made the statement unless believing it to be
true.”689  The court of appeals further held that Todd’s confronta-
tion rights were not violated because nothing in the circumstances
of the statements indicated why Michele would falsely implicate
herself, and the third party offering the testimony was subject to
cross-examination at trial.690
In Register v. State,691 the court of appeals affirmed the superior
court’s denial of defendants’ motions to withdraw their pleas.692
The defendants were indicted for first-degree assault in connection
with a stabbing, but were allowed to plead no contest to second-
degree assault.693  The victim sued the defendants in civil court.694
As a result of their no contest plea, the defendants were estopped
from contesting that they had assaulted the victim.695  The defen-
dants moved to withdraw their no contest pleas, but the superior
court denied their motions.696  The defendants asserted that they
had entered their pleas under a mistaken understanding that their
pleas could not be used against them in civil litigation.697  The rec-
ord indicated conflicting testimony regarding whether or not the
685. 68 P.3d 1286 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
686. Id. at 1288.
687. Id. at 1287.
688. Id. at 1288.
689. Id.
690. Id. at 1291.
691. 71 P.3d 337 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
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defendants’ attorneys had informed them that their no contest
pleas could be used against them in civil litigation.698  The superior
court decided that the testimony of the attorneys that they had
properly informed their clients was more credible.699  Additionally,
the superior court was unconvinced that the threat of civil liability
would be enough to make the defendants reject the “rather lenient
deal” offered to them in the plea arrangement.700  The court of ap-
peals found that these conclusions were not clearly erroneous.701
Accordingly, the denial of the defendants’ motions to withdraw
their pleas was affirmed.702
In Smith v. State,703 the court of appeals held that a non-
appearing witness’ statements must be separated into inculpatory
and non-inculpatory segments, and only the inculpatory segments
of the testimony are admissible under the “declarations against in-
terest” exception to the hearsay rule.704  Smith was convicted of
murder, robbery, and assault, based on an alleged incident in which
Smith and an accomplice invaded the trailer of a man and four
friends.705  Zachary Brown had made statements to his girlfriend
that Smith and his accomplice had borrowed his shotgun and re-
turned the gun with blood on it.706  When the gun was returned,
Brown removed the gun’s handle and cleaned off the blood.707  At
trial, Brown’s statements were admitted as statements against in-
terest, which are allowed under the hearsay rule if the statements
are against the declarant’s interests or may submit him to criminal
or civil liability.708  Brown exercised his Fifth Amendment right not
to testify and thus incriminate himself based on his cleaning of the
gun.709  In holding that admission of Brown’s entire statement con-
stituted reversible error, the court of appeals held that a court must
evaluate a declarant’s statements and sever the non-inculpatory
portion.710  Brown’s statements were only admissible under the
hearsay exception (and thus did not violate the Confrontation
698. Id. at 340.
699. Id.
700. Id. at 341.
701. Id. at 341-42.
702. Id. at 342.
703. 81 P.3d 304 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
704. Id. at 308.
705. Id. at 305-06.
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Clause of the federal and Alaska State constitutions) if they were
“reliable” (i.e., firmly rooted in a hearsay rule exception).711  The
court held that Brown’s statements were not sufficiently reliable to
be admitted without violating Smith’s right to cross-examine
Brown under oath.712  Smith’s convictions were therefore re-
versed.713
In Sproates v. State,714 the court of appeals held that a criminal
defendant was entitled to be released from custody when no pre-
liminary examination was held and the State presented no evidence
that the defendant committed an offense.715  Sproates, a criminal
defendant charged with first-degree sexual abuse of a minor, was
denied a preliminary examination as to whether he should remain
in custody because he had already been indicted by a grand jury.716
The State argued that the district court can refuse to schedule a
preliminary examination so long as the decision is made within ten
days of the defendant’s initial appearance.717  The court of appeals
held that Sproates was unlawfully detained and therefore entitled
to release.718
In State v. Jack,719 the court of appeals held that Alaska Stat-
utes section 44.03.010 does not grant Alaska criminal jurisdiction
over Canadian territorial waters.720  Jack was indicted by an Alas-
kan grand jury for committing sexual assault aboard an Alaskan
ferry traveling through Canadian territorial waters.721  The superior
court dismissed the case, holding that Alaska did not have jurisdic-
tion.722  The State appealed, arguing that section 44.03.010 granted
it jurisdiction over the incident.723  The statute provides that Alaska
jurisdiction extends to “water offshore from the coast of the state,”
including “the marginal sea” and “the high seas to the extent
claimed by the United States” or recognized by international law.724
The court of appeals held that the “marginal sea” does not include
711. Id. at 309.
712. Id. at 310.
713. Id. at 320.
714. 81 P.3d 301 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
715. Id. at 302.
716. Id.
717. Id. at 303.
718. Id. at 302.
719. 67 P.3d 673 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
720. Id. at 677.
721. Id. at 674.
722. Id.
723. Id. at 675.
724. ALASKA STAT. § 44.03.010  (Michie 2002).
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Canadian territorial waters, and thus Alaska did not have jurisdic-
tion under this clause.725  The State argued that “high seas” should
be interpreted to include “all the ocean offshore of Alaska up to
the low-water mark of all countries.”726  The court rejected this in-
terpretation of the statute, finding it overly broad and beyond the
“water offshore” contemplated by the statute.727  Instead, the court
held that even if the United States possessed jurisdiction over
crimes committed in foreign waters, Alaska jurisdiction did not
necessarily extend this far.728  Accordingly, the court affirmed the
decision of the superior court in favor of the defendant.729
In State v. Simpson,730 the court of appeals held that a defen-
dant’s prior convictions for driving while intoxicated are admissi-
ble, even if those convictions occurred in other states where inde-
pendent chemical tests are not available.731  Simpson was charged
with felony driving while intoxicated.732  Though such an offense is
normally a misdemeanor, it can be elevated to felony status with
evidence of prior similar convictions.733  The right of a defendant to
an independent blood alcohol level test is protected by due process
in Alaska.734  Though guarded, the right to this independent test is
not absolute and does not merit the same protection as the right to
counsel or right to a jury trial.735  Further, practical considerations
limit the extent of this right, in that situations which make such a
test impractical or exceedingly burdensome can justify its omis-
sion.736  Here, because the prior convictions were only challenged
on the basis that the other states did not provide an independent
test, they could be admitted to elevate the current charge from
misdemeanor to felony.737
In State v. Wagar,738 the supreme court held that “an officer
conducting a pat-down search for weapons during an investigatory
stop who feels an object that he reasonably believes might be used
725. Jack, 67 P.3d at 676.
726. Id.
727. Id.
728. Id. at 677.
729. Id.
730. 73 P.3d 596 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
731. Id. at 600.
732. Id. at 597.
733. Id.
734. Id.
735. Id. at 599.
736. Id. at 599-600.
737. Id. at 600.
738. 79 P.3d 644 (Alaska 2003).
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as a weapon may examine the object to confirm that it is not a po-
tential weapon.”739  During a sting operation, a police officer frisked
Wagar and, upon feeling an unidentifiable object, discovered a
glass vial containing cocaine.740  At trial, the judge denied Wagar’s
motion to suppress the cocaine seized by the officer on grounds
that his search was unjustified, and Wagar was convicted.741  The
court of appeals reversed Wagar’s conviction on the grounds that
the police officer “exceeded the allowable scope of a pat-down
search for weapons when [he] looked into [the defendant’s] t-shirt
pocket in order to determine what the unknown object was.”742
The court of appeals also required specific facts to show that the
officer’s suspicion was reasonable.743  The supreme court reversed
the court of appeals, affirming Wagar’s convictions by refining the
test for determining whether a further examination is justified.744
The court held: “[W]hat is needed to justify a further examination
of an unknown object felt in a frisk for weapons is a reasonable be-
lief on the part of the officer, based on ‘specific and articulable
facts . . . taken together with rational inferences from those facts,’
that the object may be used as a weapon.”745
In Stavenjord v. State,746 the court of appeals held that the su-
perior court had not abused its discretion in denying the defen-
dant’s motions to suppress evidence and change venue.747  Staven-
jord was convicted of first-degree murder in a jury trial.748
Stavenjord appealed, claiming that the superior court should have
granted his motion to suppress certain evidence, which he claimed
had been acquired using search warrants that should not have been
issued.749  In deciding Stavenjord’s motion, the superior court ap-
plied the test outlined in State v. Malkin.750  After finding that cer-
tain misstatements or omissions had been made in the application
for the search warrants, the superior court found that none had
been an intentional attempt to mislead the court.751  Identifying cer-
739. Id. at 645.
740. Id. at 646.
741. Id. at 646-47.
742. Id.
743. See id. at 648.
744. Id.
745. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
746. 66 P.3d 762 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
747. Id. at 764.
748. Id.
749. Id.
750. 722 P.2d 943 (Alaska 1986).
751. Stavenjord, 66 P.3d at 766.
YEAR IN REVIEW.DOC 05/18/04  2:19 PM
172 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [21:1
tain misstatements or omissions that may have been reckless, the
superior court found that none of these had been material to the
decision to grant the warrant, and thus the court denied Staven-
jord’s motion.752  The court of appeals found that the superior court
had not abused its discretion in making this decision.753  Stavenjord
also appealed the superior court’s denial of his motion to change
venue, claiming that pre-trial publicity may have prejudiced the
jury.754 The court of appeals found that the lower court could have
reasonably concluded, under the “substantial likelihood” test out-
lined in Mallot v. State,755 that the pretrial publicity did not threaten
Stavenjord’s right to a fair trial.756  The court of appeals thus af-
firmed the superior court’s decision.757
In Strumsky v. State,758 the court of appeals held that a ten-
year-old’s out of court statements to others indicating that she had
been sexually abused by the defendant were not hearsay and that
the defendant had not been barred from putting his own admission
in context.759  Strumsky was accused of sexually abusing a ten-year-
old girl in October 2000.760  Before trial, Strumsky told the girl’s fa-
ther that the girl would never lie.761  At trial, the prosecution was
allowed, over Strumsky’s objections, to call witnesses who had
heard the victim describe her assault.762  The prosecution also
played a tape that showed Strumsky saying about the victim, “No,
she doesn’t lie.”763  Strumsky appealed, arguing that the witnesses
who heard the victim describe her assault should have been pre-
vented from testifying because their testimony was inadmissible
hearsay.764  The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling,
explaining that the trial judge properly concluded that the evidence
had sufficient probative value as prior-consistent-statement evi-
dence from a child sexual abuse victim to outweigh its prejudicial
impact.765  Strumsky also argued that he was entitled to play the en-
752. Id.
753. Id. at 767.
754. Id. at 764.
755. 608 P.2d 737 (Alaska 1980).
756. Stavenjord, 66 P.3d at 770.
757. Id.
758. 69 P.3d 499 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
759. Id. at 505.
760. Id. at 501.
761. Id.
762. Id. at 502-03.
763. Id. at 504.
764. Id. at 501.
765. Id. at 504.
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tire tape to put his comments about the victim’s truthfulness into
context without having testified.766  The court of appeals held that
the trial judge gave Strumsky an opportunity to have the tape
played in full when he testified; since Strumsky did not ask to have
the tape played then, he did not preserve this issue for appeal.767
In Thompson v. State,768 the court of appeals held that where
criminal defendants are held jointly and severally liable for restitu-
tion to an assault victim, a single defendant’s ability to pay should
be judged by the entire amount due to the victim.769  Thompson and
three accomplices were convicted of assault, and were held jointly
and severally liable for restitution to the victim.770  Thompson ar-
gued that he would be unable to pay the entire restitution amount,
and asked for a reduction of the amount under Alaska Statutes
12.55.045(f), given his inability to pay.771  The superior court held
that Thompson had failed to prove by clear and convincing evi-
dence that he would be unable to pay his one-fourth share of the
restitution amount.772  The court of appeals vacated the superior
court’s restitution order, holding that Thompson’s ability to pay
must be judged against the entire restitution amount.773  The court
held that on remand Thompson could be held jointly and severally
liable only if the superior court set a payment schedule based on
Thompson’s foreseen ability to pay, or if the court found that
Thompson failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he
was unable to pay the full restitution amount.774
In Tipikin v. Municipality of Anchorage,775 the court of appeals
held that a composite long sentence for a defendant with both a
conviction for assault and a history of violence was justified.776  Ti-
pikin was convicted of assault for slapping his step-daughter and of
disorderly conduct for fighting with his wife, and was sentenced to
730 days in prison.777  Tipikin argued that there was insufficient evi-
dence for his conviction and that his sentence was excessive.778  The
766. Id. at 505.
767. Id.
768. 64 P.3d 132 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
769. Id. at 135.
770. Id. at 133.
771. Id.
772. Id.
773. Id. at 135.
774. Id.
775. 65 P.3d 899 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
776. Id. at 903.
777. Id. at 900.
778. Id. at 901.
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court of appeals held first that there was sufficient evidence for Ti-
pikin’s conviction, determining that he slapped his step-daughter
out of anger and not because it was “reasonably necessary and ap-
propriate.”779  The court of appeals then held that the composite
sentence was not excessive because of Tipikin’s history of domestic
violence, his conduct in committing the current offenses, and his
repeated failures to rehabilitate himself.780
In Tuttle v. State,781 the court of appeals held that the trial court
applied the incorrect standard of proof on the issue of whether a
defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of a robbery
for purposes of determining his presumptive term.782  At trial, Tut-
tle was found guilty of robbery, and at sentencing the court an-
nounced that it applied the “preponderance of the evidence” stan-
dard of proof in deciding that Tuttle carried a firearm during the
robbery.783  Thus, Tuttle was sentenced to a seven year presumptive
term, rather than a five year presumptive term, under Alaska Stat-
utes section 12.55.125(c).784  The court of appeals reversed, finding
that the trial judge erred in applying this standard.  While the leg-
islature had specified the “beyond the reasonable doubt” standard
for proving a defendant’s prior felonies, the legislature had not
specified the appropriate burden of proof when the presumptive
term determination rests on other factors, such as the defendant’s
possession of a firearm during the offense.785  In Huf v. State,786 the
court reasoned that the legislature must have intended the reason-
able doubt standard to apply to these other situations.787  Therefore,
the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant possessed a firearm during the robbery.788
In Vaska v. State,789 the court of appeals held that a sexual
abuse victim’s statements identifying her attacker are admissible
hearsay even if the victim does not remember the events at the
time of the trial.790  At defendant Vaska’s sexual abuse trial, the vic-
tim testified that she could not remember the alleged assault, nor
779. Id. at 902.
780. Id.
781. 65 P.3d 884 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
782. Id. at 891.
783. Id. at 888.
784. Id.
785. Id.
786. 675 P.2d 268 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
787. Tuttle, 65 P.3d at 888.
788. Id. at 891.
789. 74 P.3d 225 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
790. Id. at 230.
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anything else that had happened more than a year earlier.791  How-
ever, testimony from the victim’s mother and the doctor who ex-
amined the victim immediately after the alleged assault supported
the allegations against Vaska.792  Vaska appealed his conviction on
the grounds that allowing the statements of the mother and doctor
was an erroneous admission of hearsay793 and that the admission
violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.794  The court of ap-
peals held that the statements were hearsay, yet were properly ad-
missible as prior inconsistent statements.795  The court also held
that, because the Confrontation Clause only requires that the ac-
cused be allowed to confront and cross-examine the declarant,796
not necessarily the original speaker, Vaska’s right to confrontation
was not violated.797  Therefore, the court affirmed Vaska’s convic-
tion.798
In Waters v. State,799 the court of appeals held that the defen-
dant’s confession was voluntary, that the prior conviction of a state
witness was not admissible, and that a defendant’s sentence was not
excessive.800  Waters participated in the robbery of a community
store and was convicted of second-degree burglary, second-degree
theft, and second-degree criminal mischief.801  The court of appeals
first upheld the superior court’s ruling that Waters’ confession was
voluntary, in part because Waters’ cell was heated, Waters slept the
night before the confession, and Waters, not the officer, introduced
the option for a deal.802  Second, the court of appeals upheld the su-
perior court’s decision not to admit evidence that the State’s wit-
ness had a criminal conviction ten years ago, noting that the record
did not show that the evidence was required for a fair trial.803
Third, the court of appeals upheld the superior court’s enhance-
791. Id. at 226.
792. Id. at 226-27.
793. Id. at 227.
794. Id. at 226.
795. Id. at 228.
796. Id.
797. Id. at 229.
798. Id. at 230.
799. 64 P.3d 169 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
800. Id. at 172-73, 175.
801. Id. at 170.
802. Id. at 171-72.
803. Id. at 172-73.
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ment of Waters’ sentence because the superior court’s findings
showed that Waters was a threat to public.804
In Watt v. State,805 the court of appeals reversed the superior
court’s decision that a criminal defendant’s challenge to remove a
superior court judge was untimely.806  Watt was charged with first-
degree sexual abuse of a minor.807  Watt appeared before Judge
Bolger and reached a plea agreement with the prosecution in which
he would waive indictment and plead guilty in superior court to
two counts of sexual abuse for a limited sentence.808  On August 30,
2002, Watt filed a request to preempt Judge Bolger in further supe-
rior court proceedings under Criminal Rule 25(d), which provides
peremptory disqualification procedures within five days after a
judge is first assigned to a case.809  Judge Bolger denied the chal-
lenge as untimely because he was first assigned to the case on July
7.810  Alaska Statutes section 22.20.022 grants a party the substan-
tive right to disqualify a judge peremptorily; a party must exercise
that right “within five days after the case is at issue upon a question
of fact, or within five days after the issue is assigned to a judge,
whichever event occurs later.”811  The court of appeals held that,
under the statute, an issue is under a question of fact when jurisdic-
tion of the case is transferred to the superior court for a defen-
dant’s plea upon return of the indictment.812  Therefore, Watt’s
challenge was timely and his right to a peremptory challenge upon
entry of a plea in superior court was not extinguished.813
In Wilson v. State,814 the court of appeals held that there was
insufficient evidence to warrant a court-ordered search of the ap-
pellant’s home.815  Wilson appealed the district court’s authoriza-
tion of a warrant leading to the seizure of marijuana, claiming that
the evidence presented in the search warrant application did not
establish probable cause.816  The evidence provided by the State
comprised of statements from three individuals, two of whom were
804. Id. at 175.
805. 61 P.3d 446 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
806. Id. at 448.
807. Id. at 446.
808. Id.
809. Id. at 447.
810. Id.
811. ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.022 (Michie 2002).
812. Watt, 61 P.3d at 447.
813. Id. at 448.
814. 82 P.3d 783 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
815. Id. at 787.
816. Id. at 783.
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known informants while the third was an unknown friend of one of
the informants.817  The court noted that the State’s one credible in-
formant had no first-hand knowledge of the appellant’s allegedly
criminal activities.818  Instead, that informant was simply relaying
information he received from a friend whose identity he would not
disclose.819  The court refused to treat the unidentified friend as a
credible informant because he did not know that his statements
were against his penal interest.820  Therefore, the court reversed the
district court’s granting of a search warrant and deemed the evi-
dence seized thereunder suppressed.821
In Winfrey v. State,822 the court of appeals held that the district
court did not err in including as evidence the results of a breath test
after state troopers interfered with a defendant’s right to make a
phone call, or in excluding as evidence a decision by the troopers to
stop videotaping breath-testing procedures.823  Winfrey was ar-
rested for driving while intoxicated after failing two sobriety tests
and a breathalyzer test.824  During his trial, Winfrey argued that the
district court erred when it included the results of the breathalyzer
test because state troopers had violated Winfrey’s right to make a
phone call under Alaska Statutes section 12.25.150(b).825  The court
of appeals rejected this argument, holding that Winfrey failed to
prove that the denial of his right to make a phone call interfered
with his constitutional right to prepare a defense.826  Winfrey fur-
ther argued that the district court erred when it excluded evidence
that the state troopers had made a policy decision to stop video-
taping subjects during breath-test processing because such video-
tapes made it harder to prosecute alleged drunk drivers.827  The
court of appeals held that such evidence was relevant but that the
exclusion was harmless in this case.828
In Young v. State,829 the court of appeals held that the police
had illegally searched a defendant’s property, where the police had
817. Id. at 783-84.
818. Id. at 785.
819. Id. at 786.
820. Id.
821. Id. at 787.
822. 78 P.3d 725 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
823. Id. at 726-27.
824. Id. at 727.
825. Id.
826. Id. at 730.
827. Id.
828. Id. at 730-31.
829. 72 P.3d 1250 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
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no search warrant and the defendant’s conduct constituted an at-
tempt to conceal, rather than an actual abandonment of, the prop-
erty.830  While investigating an unconnected disturbance at a hotel,
a police officer observed Young shoved a small object underneath
a locked closet door.831  The officer subsequently removed the ob-
ject from under the door, and, upon discovering it to be a bundle of
crumbled tissue paper, opened the tissue to discover an illegal con-
trolled substance.832  The court of appeals first noted it was likely
the officer did not have authority to reach under the door and seize
Young’s property, as the officer did not first have probable cause.833
Moreover, the officer had no authority to open the tissue bundle
without a warrant, unless the officer knew that the bundles were
“distinctive, single-purpose containers used for carrying illicit
drugs.”834  The court of appeals rejected the State’s contention that
issues of search and seizure were irrelevant, as Young had “aban-
doned” the property.835  The court noted that abandonment re-
quires that a person’s conduct objectively manifest the intent to
give up any and all expectation of privacy in that property.836  Nei-
ther a person’s temporary relinquishment of possession or control
of an object nor a person’s actions to conceal the property suffi-
ciently demonstrates abandonment.837  Here, Young’s placement of
the bundles under the door indicated an intent to conceal rather
than to abandon them.838  Further, Young’s denial of his having
placed any object under the door was not equivalent to an express
denial of ownership, as required for abandonment.839  Therefore, as
the property had been illegally opened, the court ordered the evi-
dence suppressed and Young’s conviction reversed.840
B. Substantive Law
In Alto v. State,841 the court of appeals held that an individual
who is found not guilty by reason of insanity could be convicted of
escape for fleeing the custody of the psychiatric institute to which
830. Id. at 1250-51.
831. Id. at 1251.
832. Id.
833. Id.  at 1252.
834. Id.
835. Id.
836. Id. at 1253.
837. Id. at 1254.
838. Id.
839. Id. at 1255.
840. Id. at 1251.
841. 64 P.3d 141 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
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the individual had been committed.842  Alto was found not guilty of
murder by reason of insanity and was committed to the Alaska
Psychiatric Institute, from which he successfully escaped.843  The
court of appeals held that Alto could properly be convicted of es-
cape under Alaska Statutes section 11.56.310(a)(1)(B).844  The court
found that a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity contains
within it the finding that the defendant had actually committed the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.845  Therefore, as Alto’s detention
was clearly connected with the commission of a felony offense,
Alto had removed himself from “official detention for a felony” as
required under section 11.56.310(a)(1)(B).846  Additionally, the
court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s jury instructions, find-
ing that Alto had waived any objection to a stipulation voluntarily
entered into at trial847 and that the State did not need to prove Alto
was aware that the offense resulting in his detention was a felony.848
Finally, the court held that Alto’s sentence of six years was not ex-
cessive, because the murder for which he was found not guilty by
reason of insanity was properly considered an aggravating factor
for sentencing.849
In Anchorage Police & Fire Retirement System v. Gallion,850 the
supreme court upheld a finding of indirect criminal contempt
against the Board of Trustees of the Anchorage Police & Fire Re-
tirement System (“Board”).851  In 2000, the superior court approved
both a class action settlement with regard to the use of surplus fund
monies and an award of attorney’s fees to class counsel.852  Due to
criticisms of the award of attorney’s fees, the court explicitly ex-
plained its reasons for rejecting objections and the calculation of
fees.853  Furthermore, the court ordered the Board to send a written
copy of the court’s oral order to all members when it distributed
the funds.854  The court subsequently found the Board in criminal
contempt due to its actions in resisting the court order and its three
842. Id. at 142.
843. Id.
844. Id. at 145.
845. Id. at 144.
846. Id. at 145.
847. Id. at 146.
848. Id. at 147.
849. Id. at 148.
850. 65 P.3d 876 (Alaska 2003).
851. Id. at 877.
852. Id. at 878.
853. Id.
854. Id.
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week delay in distributing the order after funds were paid.855  The
supreme court upheld this ruling based on a finding that failure to
follow the trial court’s unambiguous order was sufficient for a
showing of a willful failure to comply.856  Moreover, the court found
that despite the absence of an explicit analysis of the reasonable
doubt standard of proof as applied to the facts of the case, the trial
court ruling should be affirmed.857
In Bertilson v. State,858 the court of appeals held that the State,
in a prosecution for driving while intoxicated, must prove a defen-
dant is either impaired or has the prohibited blood alcohol level at
the time the vehicle was being operated by or under the control of
the defendant.859  After being alerted by a phone call describing a
possible drunk driver, the police stopped Bertilson and adminis-
tered typical field sobriety tests.860  Bertilson was convicted of fel-
ony driving while intoxicated.861  The court of appeals reversed Ber-
tilson’s conviction, as it was based on incorrect jury instructions
that improperly asserted that Bertilson’s guilt hinged on the test re-
sults and not on his actual blood alcohol level at the time he was
driving.862  The court held that under Alaska Statutes section
28.35.030(a)(2), an individual’s guilt for driving while intoxicated
must hinge on the blood alcohol content at the time of operating or
controlling the vehicle.863  Therefore, the court reversed Bertilson’s
conviction.864
In Brandon v. State,865 the supreme court held that a prison dis-
ciplinary hearing conducted by a single hearing officer is not a vio-
lation of a prisoner’s due process rights.866  Brandon, a prison in-
mate, was charged with violating an administrative regulation
against possession of tobacco.867  A disciplinary hearing was held by
a single officer, after which Brandon was found guilty and sen-
tenced to punitive segregation.868  Brandon argued that the hearing
855. Id. at 879.
856. Id. at 882.
857. Id. at 884.
858. 64 P.3d 180 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
859. Id. at 186.
860. Id. at 181-82.
861. Id. at 182.
862. Id. at 183.
863. Id. at 182.
864. Id. at 186.
865. 73 P.3d 1230 (Alaska 2003).
866. Id. at 1247.
867. Id. at 1232.
868. Id.
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violated his due process rights because a single hearing officer can-
not guarantee fair and impartial adjudication.869  The court found
no violation of due process under the principle that single hearing
officers are not presumed to be biased in prison disciplinary pro-
ceedings.870  Brandon further argued that the disciplinary hearing
violated the final settlement agreement of Cleary v. Smith,871 a
class-action settlement governing numerous aspects of prison con-
ditions in Alaska.  The court held that Brandon’s hearing was not
prejudiced by any violation of that agreement.872
In Cruz-Reyes v. State,873 the court of appeals held that the
elements of theft of services are satisfied if the alleged thief has
mere access to the services, even if he did not use them.874  Alaska
State Troopers found an electronic device in Cruz-Reyes’ residence
that allowed him to view premium cable channels even though he
only paid for standard service.875  At trial, the judge instructed the
jury that, to find Cruz-Reyes guilty of third-degree theft of services,
it would have only to find that he had access to the extra channels
and not that he had actually used them.876  Because a subscriber’s
fee depends on the channels available to him, not the channels he
actually watches, the court held that the jury instruction was cor-
rect and that the evidence was sufficient to convict Cruz-Reyes
even though it only showed that he had access to the premium
channels, not that he actually watched them.877  Therefore, the
court affirmed Cruz-Reyes’ conviction.878
In Dailey v. State,879 the court of appeals held that a defendant
is required to sign quarterly reports under the Alaska Sex Offender
Registration Act (“SORA”) and that the statute is not unconstitu-
tionally vague.880  Daily was a convicted sex offender and as such
was required under SORA to file quarterly reports.881  Neverthe-
less, Dailey refused to sign three such reports and he was convicted
869. Id. at 1235.
870. Id.
871. 24 P.3d 1245 (Alaska 2003).
872. Brandon, 73 P.3d at 1248.
873. 74 P.3d 219 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
874. Id. at 222.
875. Id. at 220.
876. Id. at 221.
877. Id. at 222.
878. Id. at 225.
879. 65 P.3d 891 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
880. Id. at 894-95.
881. Id. at 893.
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of criminal offenses for non-compliance.882  Daily claimed that the
charges should be dismissed because failure to sign the reports did
not constitute a criminal offense and because the statute was un-
constitutionally vague.883  The court of appeals affirmed the convic-
tion.884  The court held that Alaska Statutes section 12.63.010 re-
quires that the quarterly reports be signed, and that the statue was
not unconstitutionally vague.885
In Dandova v. State,886 the court of appeals found that the de-
fendant was not entitled to a “heat of passion” defense for the at-
tempted murder of her former lover, because on the day of the
shooting the victim had not provoked the defendant sufficiently to
create a serious provocation to cause such a violent response.887
Dandova attempted to kill her former lover by shooting him and
was consequently indicted for attempted murder and first degree
assault.888  During her trial, Dandova asked to have the jury in-
structed on a defense of heat of passion, which is codified in Alaska
Statutes sections 11.41.115(a) and (f).889  The trial judge denied
Dandova’s request.890  Under the Alaska statute, a defendant must
have acted in the heat of passion, resulting from serious provoca-
tion, when there had not been reasonably sufficient time for the
passion to cool.891  On appeal, the court first stated that the defense
of heat of passion is available for those indicted of attempted mur-
der.892  However, the court also found that the Alaska statute, in
codifying the common law, does not extend the heat of passion de-
fense to “extreme emotional disturbance”; instead it uses a more
restrictive “heat of passion” methodology.893  Under this more re-
strictive process, the court found that the events that had provoked
Dandova had occurred too far in the past, thus allowing a reason-
able person time to cool.894  Furthermore ,the court found that the
alleged provoking actions immediately preceding the crime were
882. Id.
883. Id.
884. Id. at 899.
885. Id. at 895.
886. 72 P.3d 325 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
887. Id. at 326-27.
888. Id. at 326.
889. Id.
890. Id. at 326-27.
891. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.115(a)(1) (Michie 2002).
892. Dandova, 72 P.3d at 332.
893. Id. at 334.
894. Id. at 335.
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not directed toward the defendant; therefore, they did not count as
provocation under the statute.895
In J.R. v. State,896 the court of appeals held that a juvenile who
induces another juvenile to commit homicide with a firearm should
not be judged by an adult standard of care.897  Evan Ramsey
brought a shotgun to his high school and murdered the principal
and a fellow student.898  J.R., who taught Ramsey how to use the
gun and encouraged Ramsey to carry out his plan, was convicted
on two counts of murder on the theory that “J.R. had knowingly
engaged in conduct manifesting an extreme indifference to the
value of human life.”899  The state argued that because J.R. was in-
volved in an adult activity, the use of a firearm, he should be held
to an adult standard of care in determining his recklessness.900  The
court rejected the State’s argument because J.R. did not actually
use the firearm, but instead incited another to do so.901  The court
therefore reversed J.R.’s convictions, holding that J.R. could not be
held to an adult standard of care based on his conversations and ac-
tions showing Ramsey how to use the shotgun, because doing so
would effectuate a broad usage of the adult standard of care in ju-
venile cases.902
In Lee v. Municipality of Anchorage,903 the court of appeals
held that under Alaska Municipal Code section 8.65.060, the Mu-
nicipality must show that a defendant knowingly maintained
premises on which prostitution occurred and that the defendant in-
tended for such prostitution to occur on such premises.904  Lee was
charged with “knowingly maintain[ing] or operat[ing] a place,
building, structure or part thereof, . . . for the purpose of prostitu-
tion. . . .”905  The trial judge applied only the “knowingly” mental
state, and Lee was convicted, despite Lee’s argument that the ordi-
nance has two mental states, “knowingly” and “intentionally.”906
On appeal, Lee claimed that the language “for the purpose of” re-
quired specific intent and that the Municipality had to prove two
895. Id. at 338-39.
896. 62 P.3d 114 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
897. Id. at 119.
898. Id. at 114.
899. Id.
900. Id. at 115 (citing Ardinger v. Hummell, 982 P.2d 727 (Alaska 1999)).
901. See id. at 119.
902. Id.
903. 70 P.3d 1110 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
904. Id. at 1113.
905. Id. at 1111.
906. Id.
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elements: (1) that she knowingly operated a place of prostitution;
and (2) that she intended prostitution to occur in the place.907  The
court of appeals reversed, agreeing with Lee.908  The court noted
that federal courts have held, when interpreting statutory language,
that knowledge and intent are two separate mental elements, with
purpose denoting intent.909  Reasoning that, under the Model Penal
Code and majority views of accomplice liability, an alleged accom-
plice would have to “seek by [her] action to make it succeed,” thus
requiring a showing of intent, the court of appeals concluded that
the trial judge erred in applying only the “knowingly” standard in
Lee’s case.910
In Morton v. State,911 the court of appeals held that a criminal
defendant cannot be convicted of possession of burglary tools
merely for possessing ordinary tools that have not been adapted.912
Morton was convicted of several crimes, including possession of
burglary tools under Alaska Statutes section 11.46.315, for posses-
sion of an ordinary screwdriver and rubber mallet.913  Since the
tools had not been adapted or designed for use in committing a
burglary, they did not qualify as “burglary tools” under section
11.46.315; therefore, the prosecution confessed error and the court
of appeals vacated the conviction.914
In Olson v. State,915 the court of appeals reversed an inmate’s
conviction for violation of a long-term domestic violence protective
order, holding that because he had never received notice of the
hearing for the petition for a protective order, his conviction was
void.916  Olson was convicted of violating a long-term domestic vio-
lence protective order by coming within three hundred feet of
Larry Jackson’s residence.917  The court agreed with Olson that un-
der Alaska Statutes section 18.66.100, which governs long-term
domestic violence protective orders and requires notice and an op-
portunity to be heard, Olson’s conviction was void.918  Olson was
not required to obey the protective order despite being aware of its
907. Id.
908. Id.
909. Id. at 1112.
910. Id. at 1112-13.
911. 68 P.3d 1285 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
912. Id. at 1286.
913. Id.
914. Id.
915. 77 P.3d 15 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
916. Id. at 19.
917. Id. at 16.
918. Id. at 17.
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terms, because a person need not comply with an order that issued
ex parte if that person had no notice before the order was issued.919
Finally, the court stated that the statutory language regarding re-
quirements for issuing long-term domestic violence orders should
have alerted Olson’s attorney that any order issued without notice
would be void.920  The court concluded that Olson’s attorney pro-
vided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to challenge the
lack of jurisdiction to issue the order.921
In Parrott v. Municipality of Anchorage,922 the court of appeals
held that a prospective customer can be prosecuted for prostitu-
tion.923  Parrott was convicted of soliciting prostitution, after, ac-
cording to him, an undercover police officer initially approached
his vehicle.924  The evidence that Parrott invited the officer into his
vehicle for oral sex sufficiently supported the finding that Parrott
did in fact “solicit” prostitution as the applicable statute requires.925
Though Parrott attempted to raise defenses of entrapment, due
process violation and equal protection, none of these were consid-
ered because they were raised too late.926  Lastly, the court held that
the sentence imposed, including a fine and required essay, was ap-
propriate to effect rehabilitation and did not impose upon a right
against self-incrimination.927
In State v. Combs,928 the court of appeals reversed a superior
court ruling that upheld a supplemental order barring the Depart-
ment of Corrections from housing a defendant in the same correc-
tional facility as another inmate who had previously assaulted
him.929  Upon conviction for attempted first-degree assault and the
approval of Combs’ motion for special housing, the Department of
Law challenged the order, arguing that the Department of Correc-
tions had sole discretion in determining where to house prisoners.930
Despite the fact that there was no mandate regarding which par-
ticular facility Combs was to be housed in, the court of appeals
found that the separation of powers would be violated were the ju-
919. Id. at 18.
920. Id. at 19.
921. Id.
922. 69 P.3d 1 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
923. Id. at 3.
924. Id. at 2.
925. Id. at 4-5.
926. Id. at 5.
927. Id. at 6.
928. 64 P.3d 135 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
929. Id. at 137.
930. Id. at 136-37.
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dicial branch permitted to interfere in a determination over which
the Department of Corrections had sole executive discretion.931
Further, the court found that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did
not preclude a challenge to the superior court’s order because the
Department of Corrections was not in privity with the prosecutor’s
office when he assented to Combs’ original motion.932
In State v. Strane,933 the supreme court held that the Alaska
statute criminalizing violations of domestic violence restraining or-
ders934 did not require proof of the defendant’s actual knowledge
that his actions were illegal.935  Rather, the statute required the
State to show only that the defendant knew of the order’s existence
and contents and recklessly disregarded a substantial and unjustifi-
able risk that his conduct violated such order.936  Police stopped
Strane for speeding and discovered a domestic violence victim in
his car, two weeks after the victim obtained an order restraining
Strane from having any contact with her.937  Strane attempted to de-
fend by stating that the victim had consented to be in his pres-
ence.938  The supreme court held that a restraining order’s no-
contact restrictions apply regardless of the protected person’s con-
sent to have contact.939  The court rejected the interpretation that
the statute’s culpable mental state of “knowingly” extended in
scope to require that Strane must understand that the order pro-
hibited his actions, citing a sister provision to the statute which ex-
pressly provided that the protected person’s willingness to have
contact with the defendant did not nullify or waive the order.940
Further, Strane’s order warned that any invitation to contact the
victim would not invalidate the order.941
VII.  EMPLOYMENT LAW
In Alaska State Employees Ass’n v. State,942 the supreme court
held that an arbitrator’s ruling that a public employee’s termination
was not for just cause could be vacated on appeal if it was deter-
931. Id. at 137.
932. Id. at 140.
933. 61 P.3d 1284 (Alaska 2003).
934. ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.740(a) (Michie 2002).
935. Strane, 61 P.3d at 1292.
936. Id.
937. Id. at 1285.
938. Id. at 1285, 1286.
939. Id. at 1292.
940. Id. at 1288.
941. Id.
942. 74 P.3d 881 (Alaska 2003).
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mined that the arbitrator made an obvious and significant mistake
in applying the facts of the case to the arbitrator’s own definition of
“just cause.”943  An administrative clerk of the Alaska Child Sup-
port Enforcement Division was fired after her employer learned
that she had recently pled guilty to felony theft of public money.944
The Alaska State Employees Association filed a grievance seeking
reinstatement of the clerk.945  Per a collective bargaining agreement
between the state and the employer, the dispute was submitted to
an arbitrator, who ruled that the clerk was not terminated for just
cause, and ordered that the grievance be reinstated.946  Upholding
the vacation of the arbitrator’s award, the supreme court held that
the arbitrator committed gross error in applying her own definition
of just cause.947  The court refused to decide whether the arbitrator
was obligated to follow state law precedent on the definition of just
cause, as suggested by the superior court decision, and instead held
that the arbitrator committed gross error under her own definition
of just cause.948  Given the clerk’s position of trust, access to confi-
dential information, and conviction of a felony, the court held that
substantial evidence existed to show just cause for the employee’s
termination.949
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. DeShong,950 the supreme
court held that if an employee presents clear and convincing evi-
dence that she has not reached medical stability, then she is eligible
for Temporary Total Disability (“TTD”), provided that she reim-
burses any unemployment benefits received during that time.951
Further, an employee does not waive “procedural rights to seek
compensation” unless she is fully appraised of her rights.952  De-
Shong, an employee of Alyeska, alleged that job-related computer
use resulted in right elbow joint pain and filed a report of occupa-
tional injury or illness with the Alaska Workers Compensation
Board (“Board”).953  DeShong consulted a doctor, who prescribed
physical therapy.954  Further, this doctor had her evaluated by a
943. Id. at 884.
944. Id. at 881.
945. Id.
946. Id.
947. Id. at 884.
948. Id.
949. Id. at 885.
950. 77 P.3d 1227 (Alaska 2003).
951. Id. at 1228.
952. Id. at 1233.
953. Id. at 1228.
954. Id.
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hand surgeon, who found her to have reached “medical stability.”955
In December 1998, DeShong was laid off by Alyeska.956  In August
1999, DeShong received a second opinion, without Alyeska’s per-
mission.957  Alyeska alleged that DeShong was not entitled to a sec-
ond opinion without its approval, further arguing that she had al-
ready seen a specialist.958  The second doctor recommended
surgery, which was later successfully performed.959  After being laid
off, DeShong was paid unemployment benefits, but later received
TTD benefits after the surgery.960  In July 1999, De Shong filed for
TTD from the time of being laid off through that date, and stated
that she wanted to repay the unemployment benefits.961  Alyeska
denied this request, stating that she was ineligible for TTD, as she
had reached medical stability.962  However, the Board found other-
wise, and held that if she repaid the unemployment benefits, she
would be eligible for TTD.963  On appeal, the supreme court held
that DeShong produced clear and convincing evidence that she had
not attained medical stability before surgery, thus entitling her to
TTD.964  Further, the court held that Alyeska’s referral of DeShong
to a specialist did not constitute a second opinion, and that any de-
lay in her seeking such opinion was a result of her not being clearly
informed of her rights.965  Lastly, the court held that an employee is
not barred from receiving TTD if she repays any unemployment
benefits she received in the interim.966
In Crawford & Co. v. Baker-Withrow,967 the supreme court
held that an employer was obligated to pay workers’ compensation
payments for all treatments provided after a plan was submitted, as
well as treatments made within fourteen days of submission.968
Baker-Withrow was injured while working for Crawford in 1990,
and after eight years of psychotherapy, she began Eye Movement
955. Id. at 1229.
956. Id.
957. Id. at 1230.
958. Id. at 1229-30.




963. Id. at 1231.
964. Id. at 1231-32.
965. Id. at 1232-33.
966. Id.
967. 73 P.3d 1227 (Alaska 2003).
968. Id. at 1228.
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Desensitization and Reprocessing therapy.969  Crawford refused to
pay for this therapy, claiming that a treatment plan had not been
submitted punctually.970  Such a treatment plan is outlined under
Alaska Statutes section 23.30.095(c), requiring a health care pro-
vider to notify the employer regarding the treatment within four-
teen days following treatment.971  Based on the statute’s purpose,
the court held that a plan submitted more than fourteen days after
treatment may bar coverage for any treatment received before the
submission, and that such a policy is consistent with the statutory
purpose.972  However, the court also held that it would be too se-
vere to ban coverage for all post-plan treatment due to untimely
submission of a plan.973  The only treatments that should be banned
for late submission are those past treatments deemed to be overly
frequent.974  Therefore, the court held that since the employer sub-
mitted a plan as soon as it realized the need, treatments received
after and within fourteen days of submission were the responsibil-
ity of the employer, and the specific date of submission was to be
determined on remand.975
In Denuptiis v. Unocal Corp.,976 the supreme court held that an
employer’s claim for reimbursement of benefits based on fraud was
subject to a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof, and
that such a standard was constitutional.977  Unocal alleged in a con-
troversion notice to the Alaska Worker’s Compensation Board
(“Board”) that its employee, Denuptiis, had falsely exaggerated
claims of injury in order to obtain disability pay.978  Unocal argued
that because the Alaska statutes imposing civil and criminal liabil-
ity for false statements made in connection with worker’s compen-
sation cases did not specify a standard of proof,979 the Board should
apply a preponderance standard, as opposed to a higher clear and
convincing standard.980  The Administrative Procedure Act,981 which
applies to the Board, calls for a default preponderance standard in
969. Id.
970. Id.
971. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.095(c) (Michie 2000).
972. Crawford, 73 P.3d at 1229.
973. Id. at 1230.
974. Id.
975. Id.
976. 63 P.3d 272 (Alaska 2003).
977. Id. at 280.
978. Id. at 275.
979. ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.30.250(a), (b), 23.30.170(b) (Michie 2002).
980. Denuptiis, 63 P.3d at 275.
981. ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.460(e) (Michie 2002).
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the absence of an expressly provided standard.982  The court held
that, because no standard of proof exists, the Board’s application of
a clear and convincing standard was not a reasonable interpretation
of the governing law.983
In Duncan v. Retired Public Employees of Alaska, Inc.,984 the
supreme court held that the Alaska constitutional protection for
state employee accrued benefits encompassed health insurance but
that, unlike other retirement benefits which are contractual rights,
health insurance policy changes should be analyzed with regard to
advantages and disadvantages by focusing on the entire group of
employees.985  Retirees filed suit against the State alleging that
changes made to the group health insurance plan for retired public
employees violated Article XII, section seven of the Alaska Consti-
tution by diminishing accrued benefits.986  The trial court granted
the retiree’s motion for summary judgment and held that the
changes violated the Alaska Constitution.987  On appeal, the su-
preme court affirmed the lower court’s summary judgment decision
in favor of the retirees based on the holding that health insurance
benefits were protected by the State constitution.988  Both Alaska
case law and the plain-meaning rule suggested that Article XII, sec-
tion seven’s “accrued benefits” should be broadly defined to in-
clude benefits provided by state retirement systems.989  The su-
preme court reversed the lower court’s summary judgment decision
in favor of the retirees, however, insofar as it held that the com-
parative analysis of disadvantages and compensating advantages of
health insurance policy changes was to focus on individuals rather
than on the entire group of retirees.990
In Robinson v. Municipality of Anchorage,991 the supreme
court held that in workers’ compensation cases, the claiming party
must establish such claims by a preponderance of the evidence
once the employer has rebutted the presumption that the injuries
are work-related with substantial evidence.992  Robinson, a bus
driver for the Municipality of Anchorage, filed an application with
982. Denuptiis, 63 P.3d at 278.
983. Id.
984. 71 P.3d 882 (Alaska 2003).
985. Id. at 888, 891-92.
986. Id. at 884.
987. Id. at 886.
988. Id. at 888.
989. Id.
990. Id. at 892.
991. 69 P.3d 489 (Alaska  2003).
992. Id. at 499.
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the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board (“Board”) for medical
expenses and “time loss” arising out of on-the-job accidents in 1992
and 1995.993  Robinson was also injured in an auto accident in 1993,
which led to a settlement in his favor for $47,000.994  Anchorage ar-
gued that Robinson had failed to establish that the work-related
injuries were a substantial factor in his ongoing back problems.995
In affirming the superior court’s ruling that the Board properly re-
jected Robinson’s claim, the supreme court applied the three-part
presumption analysis it established in Temple v. Denali Princess
Lodge.996  First, the employee must establish a link between the in-
jury and the employment, which creates a rebuttable presumption
in favor of the employee.997  Second, the employer may rebut this
presumption with substantial evidence that provides either an al-
ternative explanation for the injury or eliminates any reasonable
possibility that the injury was work-related.998  Third, once the pre-
sumption has been rebutted, the employee can prevail only if his
claims are proven by a preponderance of the evidence.999  Review-
ing the Board’s decision to determine whether there was substan-
tial evidence for it, the court held that in the case of both injuries,
the Municipality had successfully rebutted the presumption of va-
lidity, and that Robinson had failed to overcome the presumption
by a preponderance of the evidence.1000  Under a “clear error” stan-
dard, the court also held that the Board did not err in denying
Robinson’s motion for reconsideration of his claims.1001
In University of Alaska v. Alaska Community Colleges Federa-
tion of Teachers,1002 the supreme court held that the arbitrator erred
in finding a violation of a collective bargaining agreement’s nondis-
crimination clause when there was no evidence of illegal discrimi-
nation.1003  Pursuant to a commissioned study’s findings regarding
underpaid employees, the University of Alaska authorized a pay
adjustment for non-union workers to remedy salary disparities be-
tween union and non-union employees.1004  In response, the union
993. Id. at 492.
994. Id. at 490.
995. Id.
996. 21 P.3d 813 (Alaska 2001).
997. Robinson, 69 P.3d at 494.
998. Id.
999. Id.
1000. Id. at 499.
1001. Id.
1002. 64 P.3d 823 (Alaska 2003).
1003. Id. at 827.
1004. Id. at 824.
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filed a grievance alleging that the university violated its collective
bargaining agreement’s non-discrimination clause by failing to in-
clude union members in the study and resulting salary increases.1005
After arbitration and subsequent appeal, the university was or-
dered to undertake a separate but similar study of union faculty
and apply the pay increase to correct any identified inequalities.1006
The supreme court, in finding error, left open the question of the
appropriate standard of review for compulsory arbitration deci-
sions, holding that even the more deferential “gross error” stan-
dard was met.1007  Violation of the agreement depended on a finding
of discrimination as prohibited by law; however, differing treat-
ment based on union membership was not prohibited by law absent
any anti-union animus.1008  Because the arbitrator found no such
animus or discrimination in the university’s acts, it was gross error
to find a violation of the nondiscrimination clause.1009
In Witt v. State, Department of Corrections,1010 the supreme
court held that making a public employee’s permanent employ-
ment contingent on a probationary period does not transform the
employment contract  from an at-will contract into one in which
the employee can only be dismissed for good cause.1011  Witt was
hired by the Department of Corrections in the summer of 1998 and
put on six months’ probation.1012  A collective bargaining agreement
between the Alaska Public Employees Association, of which Witt
was a member, and the Department of Corrections, restricted the
state’s ability to contract with private vendors if such a contract
would lead to layoffs of Department employees.1013  The day fol-
lowing Witt’s last day of work, the Department accepted a bid for
services from an outside contractor to perform some of the func-
tions that Witt had fulfilled for the Department.1014  The supreme
court affirmed summary judgment for the Department, holding
that because Witt’s contract of employment did not explicitly re-
quire performance evaluations, Witt was an at-will employee dur-
ing the initial probationary period.1015  The court further held that
1005. Id.
1006. Id. at 825.
1007. Id. at 826.
1008. Id.
1009. Id. at 827.
1010. 75 P.3d 1030 (Alaska  2003).
1011. Id. at 1033.
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Witt failed to present material facts to establish that the Depart-
ment had violated the covenants of good faith and fair dealing in
hiring him.1016  The court therefore affirmed the superior court’s
grant of summary judgment, holding that Witt had failed to raise
any genuine issues of material fact.1017
VIII.  FAMILY LAW
In In re Adoption of L.E.K.M.,1018 the supreme court held that
the grant of primary physical and legal custody of an orphan to
friends of the child’s mother and not to her biological grandparents
or aunt and uncle was proper.1019  Lucy M. was orphaned at three
months of age when her mother was shot and killed.1020  Friends of
Lucy’s mother, Elsa and Dillon C., took custody of her and pro-
ceeded to file a petition for adoption.1021  Lucy’s family members on
cross-petition for adoption argued that Alaska Statutes section
47.14.100(e)(1), which prohibits foster placement when relatives
are willing to take custody of a child, should apply.1022  The court
found that Alaska Statutes section 25.23.120(d), which provides
that adoption procedures need only look to what is in the best in-
terests of the child and give no preference to blood-relatives, was
the only appropriate and applicable statute.1023  As such, the court
reviewed several criteria and found that there had been no abuse of
discretion by the trial court in determining that Elsa and Dillon C.
should be awarded full custody and that Lucy’s relatives should be
given continued visitation rights.
In A.J. v. State,1024 the supreme court held that it was appropri-
ate for the superior court to take all of a parent’s past conduct into
account when determining whether children have been subjected
to conduct or conditions warranting the termination of parental
rights under Alaska Statutes section 47.10.011.1025  Ann Jackson’s
parental rights over her daughters were terminated on the dual
bases of her history of substance abuse and her failure to protect
her children from sexual abuse.1026  Jackson claimed that the supe-
1016. Id. at 1036.
1017. Id. at 1037.
1018. 70 P.3d 1097 (Alaska 2003).
1019. Id. at 1099.
1020. Id. at 1100.
1021. Id.
1022. Id. at 1101.
1023. Id.
1024. 62 P.3d 609 (Alaska 2003).
1025. Id. at 613.
1026. Id. at 611.
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rior court should not have relied on events prior to the termination
proceedings in making a determination under section
47.10.011(a)(1)1027 and that termination of parental rights should
rest upon a determination that the children are in need of aid.1028
The court held that consideration of a mother’s past conduct is ap-
propriate and adequate in terminating parental rights.1029
In Bailey v. Bailey,1030 the supreme court held that the superior
court’s calculations of arrearages and the prospective support obli-
gation were clearly erroneous.1031  Raymond Bailey appealed the
superior court’s order excusing Charmaine Bailey from paying
child support arrearages.1032  Raymond argued that the superior
court should not have retroactively modified Charmaine’s child
support obligation.1033  The supreme court disagreed, stating that
the structure of the original order provided for discretion in future
calculations of child support.1034  Raymond also argued that the su-
perior court’s calculation of Charmaine’s arrearage was clearly er-
roneous.1035  The supreme court agreed, pointing out mathematical
and factual errors in the superior court’s calculation.1036  Lastly,
Raymond argued that the superior court failed to consider evi-
dence of his earnings in calculating his prospective obligation.1037
The supreme court agreed that this was erroneous.1038  Accordingly,
the supreme court vacated the superior court’s order regarding
these calculations and remanded for appropriate findings and re-
calculation of the amount due.1039
In Connor v. Connor,1040 the supreme court held that retire-
ment benefits must be separated from disability benefits in a di-
vorce proceeding.1041 Jerry Connor contested the lower court’s divi-
sion of assets in his divorce from Margaret.1042 The court reasoned
that retirement benefits are earned during the marriage, thus be-
1027. Id. at 612.
1028. Id. at 613.
1029. Id.
1030. 63 P.3d 259 (Alaska 2003).
1031. Id. at 260.
1032. Id.
1033. Id. at 262.
1034. Id.
1035. Id. at 263.
1036. Id.
1037. Id.
1038. Id. at 264.
1039. Id.
1040. 68 P.3d 1232 (Alaska 2003).
1041. Id. at 1235.
1042. Id. at 1234.
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coming marital property, while disability benefits are regarded as
the separate property of the spouse.1043 The court also held that
these retirement benefits could be considered mature on Jerry’s fif-
tieth birthday,1044 because the United States Code holds the age of
fifty to be one way to reach retirement benefit eligibility.1045  This
calculation has been found to protect the nonemployee spouse
adequately.1046  Furthermore, the court held that rehabilitative sup-
port, given to assist a spouse in acquiring employable skills, may be
appropriate in this proceeding.1047
In Corbin v. Corbin,1048 the supreme court addressed the issue
of the calculation of child support when some of the children are
being cared for by third parties.1049  The parties in this action had
three children; upon separating, the two oldest children were cared
for by their grandparents and the youngest child was jointly cared
for by the mother and father.1050  The father appealed a calculation
by the trial court that both parents owed child support based on a
fifty-fifty shared custody agreement for all three children.1051  The
supreme court found that the trial court’s calculation of support
based on shared custody of all three children was incorrect.1052  Civil
Rule 90.3(i)(2) directs the court to “calculate the support obliga-
tion without consideration of the third party custodian or any chil-
dren in the custody of the third party custodian.”1053  Therefore, the
trial court should have used the shared custody method for one
child found in Rule 90.3(i)(2).1054  The supreme court reversed the
trial court’s calculations and remanded the case with directions to
follow the new calculations.1055
In Duffus v. Duffus,1056 the supreme court held that a party
must object to a master’s calculation of child support at trial in or-
der to preserve the argument for appeal.1057  The court further held
1043. Id. at 1235.
1044. Id. at 1236.
1045. 5 U.S.C. § 8412(e) (2002).
1046. Connor, 68 P.3d at 1237.
1047. Id.
1048. 68 P.3d 1269 (Alaska 2003).
1049. Id. at 1270.
1050. Id.
1051. Id. at 1271.
1052. Id.
1053. Id. (emphasis added).
1054. Id.
1055. Id. at 1274.
1056. 72 P.3d 313 (Alaska 2003).
1057. Id. at 319.
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that the prohibition of retroactive modification of child support
awards under Civil Rule 90.3(h) does not apply when no “final
child support award” yet exists.1058  Juliann Duffus divorced Ken-
neth Duffus in 1990 but did not file a motion to establish child sup-
port until 1999.1059  The standing master calculated the amount
owed by Kenneth for back child support for 1990 and recom-
mended that this amount should apply to all intervening years until
1999, when Juliann’s motion was filed, in order to comply with
Rule 90.3(h).1060  Juliann did not object to the trial court’s 1990 cal-
culation, but did object to freezing that amount for all payments
owed until 1999.1061  The supreme court held that under Civil Rule
53(d)(2), Juliann’s failure to object to the master’s 1990 calculation
at trial precluded her from raising the issue on appeal.1062  However,
the supreme court found that the superior court did err in its appli-
cation of Rule 90.3(h).1063  Because no final child support award was
entered until 1999, calculations of amounts owed before that date
did not qualify as prohibited “retroactive modifications” of an
award.1064
In Erica A. v. DFYS,1065 the supreme court upheld the lower
court’s decision to terminate the plaintiff’s parental rights to her
two children under Alaska Statutes section 47.10.088, finding that
the superior court had committed no clear error.1066  In May 2000,
DFYS filed a petition to terminate Erica A.’s parental rights with
regard to her two children, Kevin and Amy.1067  DFYS had a
lengthy and well-documented history assisting Erica A., who was
first reported to it in 1989 for the abuse and neglect of previous
children and later for mistreatment of Kevin and Amy.1068  The su-
preme court ruled that for a court to terminate parental rights, it
must find by clear and convincing evidence that the parent had
failed, within a reasonable time, to remedy conditions that placed a
child at risk.1069  A court must also find by a preponderance of the
evidence that DFYS had made reasonable efforts to assist and re-
1058. Id. at 320.
1059. Id. at 315.
1060. Id. at 315-16.
1061. Id. at 316.
1062. Id. at 318.
1063. Id. at 320.
1064. Id.
1065. 66 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2003).
1066. Id. at 2.
1067. Id. at 6.
1068. Id. at 2-5.
1069. Id. at 6.
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unite the family but that termination of parental rights was subse-
quently in the children’s best interests.1070  The supreme court ap-
plied a “clearly erroneous” standard of review to the superior
court’s findings regarding the DFYS’s reasonable efforts and the
best interests of the children and found that no error had oc-
curred.1071  Accordingly, the lower court’s decision was affirmed.1072
In Ford v. Ford,1073 the supreme court held that the results of a
divorce mediation session were binding on a plaintiff because he
participated meaningfully and was not ill during the session.1074
Both parties were represented by counsel and the parties recorded
a settlement at the conclusion of the mediation session, without the
presence of court personnel.1075  In this settlement, the plaintiff
agreed to vacate his marina by December 21, 2000.1076  Upon the
plaintiff’s failure to vacate the marina, the defendant moved to en-
force the settlement agreement.1077  The plaintiff opposed this mo-
tion, arguing that he was not aware that the settlement agreement
was binding and that had he been in good health, he would have
“vigorously opposed” the sale of the marina.1078  The superior court
concluded that the mediation had produced a binding settlement.1079
The supreme court affirmed the enforcement of the settlement
agreement for two reasons. First, the court rejected the plaintiff’s
claim that his illness prevented him from meaningfully participat-
ing in the mediation.1080  Second, although the mediator did not ask
the parties whether the agreement was entered into voluntarily, the
court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that he was unaware that the
mediation constituted a binding agreement.1081
In G.C. v. DFYS,1082 the supreme court held that due to evi-
dence of child abandonment, there were sufficient grounds to ter-
minate the father’s parental rights.1083  Gary Carson never saw, had
contact with, or supported his ten-year-old son Daniel, and upon
1070. Id. at 6-7.
1071. Id. at 7-9.
1072. Id. at 11.
1073. 68 P.3d 1258 (Alaska 2003).
1074. Id. at 1267.
1075. Id. at 1261.




1080. Id. at 1265.
1081. Id. at 1266.
1082. 67 P.3d 648 (Alaska 2003).
1083. Id. at 655.
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his incarceration in Colorado, DFYS filed a petition to terminate
his parental rights.1084  First, the court affirmed the superior court’s
determination that the child had been abandoned and was in need
under Alaska Statutes section 47.10.011(1), based on clear and
convincing evidence that Carson’s actions demonstrated a willful
disregard of his parental responsibility.1085  Second, the court af-
firmed the finding that DFYS had made reasonable efforts to re-
unify Gary and Daniel to prevent out-of-home placement.1086  Due
to Carson’s incarceration, reasonable efforts were limited to con-
tacting the Colorado Department of Corrections and requesting
that any available classes and services be provided to him.1087  Ac-
cordingly, statutory requirements for parental rights termination
were satisfied.1088  The court affirmed the trial court’s decision that
it was in the best interests of the child to terminate Carson’s paren-
tal rights.1089
In Gurney v. Franks,1090 the supreme court held that the trial
court had not abused its discretion when it ordered that property
obtained during a voided marriage should be divided equally be-
tween the husband and wife.1091  Here, the wife had been married
previously and did not know whether that marriage had been dis-
solved before she married her new husband.1092  The trial court
therefore held the new marriage void and moved on to the issue of
division of property.1093  The trial court ruled that the property ob-
tained during the “cohabitation” should be divided equally be-
tween the husband and wife because it perceived that their intent
had been to share ownership of such property.1094  The trial court
did not find that the wife had committed fraud.1095  The supreme
court held that the trial court’s refusal to find fraud was not clearly
erroneous and thus that the division of property in this manner was
not an abuse of the court’s discretion.1096
1084. Id. at 650.
1085. Id. at 651-52.
1086. Id. at 653-54.
1087. Id. at 654.
1088. Id. at 655 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.088 (Michie 2002)).
1089. Id.
1090. 80 P.3d 223 (Alaska 2003).
1091. Id. at 224-25.




1096. Id. at 225.
YEAR IN REVIEW.DOC 05/18/04  2:19 PM
2004] YEAR IN REVIEW 199
In Harrower v. Harrower,1097 the supreme court held that the
required elements of the theory of transmutation or the theory of
appreciation must be individually demonstrated in order to show
that a spouse’s separately owned property had become marital
property.1098  During divorce proceedings, Delores Harrower
claimed that stock separately acquired by her husband, James Har-
rower, was marital property.1099  The superior court found for
Delores, holding that the stock was marital property in its en-
tirety.1100  The supreme court, however, held that the superior
court’s finding was in error, because the lower court failed to ad-
dress whether the necessary elements of either transmutation or ac-
tive appreciation were met, improperly blurring the two separate
theories.1101  The record did not support a finding that transmuta-
tion had occurred because there was no evidence of intent to
transmute the stock or evidence of significant managerial involve-
ment by both spouses.1102  However, the court found that the record
may support active appreciation and remanded for further pro-
ceedings.1103  In so doing, the supreme court explicitly adopted the
majority rule that the spouse in opposition to the finding of active
appreciation bears the burden of showing an absence of causation,
while the spouse in favor of active appreciation retains the burden
of showing marital contribution and appreciation.1104
In Hixson v. Sarkesian,1105 the supreme court held that a modi-
fication of child support in response to a reduction in the parent’s
income, when the reduced income remained above the specified
cap amount, should be calculated according to the terms of the ex-
isting settlement agreement, rather than the income cap under
Civil Rule 90.3.1106  Hixson and Sarkesian divorced and subse-
quently entered into a settlement agreement.1107  Several years later,
Sarkesian filed a motion to modify the child support payments
based upon a decline in his income.1108  The superior court found
that Sarkesian’s decrease in income exceeded the fifteen percent
1097. 71 P.3d 854 (Alaska 2003).
1098. Id. at 858.
1099. Id. at 856.
1100. Id.
1101. Id. at 858-60.
1102. Id. at 858-59.
1103. Id. at 860.
1104. Id. at 859.
1105. 66 P.3d 753 (Alaska 2003).
1106. Id. at 759.
1107. Id. at 756.
1108. Id.
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requirement under Rule 90.3(h)(1); consequently, the court im-
posed the $84,000 income cap specified under the Rule.1109  On ap-
peal, the supreme court held that the modification of child support
should not have been based on the income cap, but rather on the
terms of Hixson’s and Sarkesian’s settlement agreement.1110  Spe-
cifically, the court held that when an existing settlement agreement
waived the income cap and provided for child support above the
Rule’s requirement, a fifteen percent change in income does not
necessarily result in imposition of the income cap.1111  As Sarke-
sian’s reduced income remained above the cap, the fact that the in-
come was close to the cap was irrelevant.1112  The court remanded
for determination of child support based on Sarkesian’s actual re-
duced income, rather than the income cap.1113
In In re Adoption of Bernard A.,1114 the supreme court held
that in weighing the interests of an adopted child, it is not an abuse
of discretion for a lower court to weigh the length that the adoptee
was with foster parents more heavily than other factors.1115  Bernard
A., an Indian child, was born in 1999 and was quickly thereafter
removed from the care of his biological parents and placed with
two foster parents.1116  Both Bernard’s grandparents and his parents
filed petitions to adopt Bernard in 2001.1117  A Special Master re-
ported that it would be in Bernard’s best interests for his foster
parents legally to adopt Bernard, based on their parenting skills
and the fact that Bernard had been with them between ages seven
months and three years.1118  In affirming the lower court’s adoption
of the Special Master’s recommendation, the supreme court held
that the lower court gave proper weight to the amount of time that
Bernard had spent with his foster parents.1119  While one factor may
not outweigh all others in a “best-interests” analysis, a court may
choose within its discretion to give more weight to certain fac-
tors.1120
1109. Id. at 756-57.
1110. Id. at 759.
1111. Id.
1112. Id.
1113. Id. at 762.
1114. 77 P.3d 4 (Alaska 2003).
1115. Id. at 5.
1116. Id.
1117. Id. at 6.
1118. Id. at 7.
1119. Id. at 8.
1120. Id.
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In In re Adoption of Keith M.W.,1121 the supreme court af-
firmed the adoption of an Indian child by non-Indian parents, as
the biological Indian mother’s consent to the adoption constituted
good cause to deviate from the Indian Child Welfare Act’s
(“ICWA”) placement preferences.1122  Andrea, a member of the
Native Village of Napaimute, initially agreed to the adoption of her
son, Keith, by the Wilsons, a non-Indian family.1123  However, be-
fore the adoption was finalized, Andrea withdrew consent, but then
subsequently reaffirmed her consent for the adoption to occur.1124
In affirming the lower court’s decree of adoption, the supreme
court found that Andrea’s consent, ultimately reaffirmed after an
initial change of mind, along with the open nature of the adoption
and the already established bond between the child and the adop-
tive parents, constituted good cause to deviate from ICWA’s
placement preferences for Indian parents.1125
In Inman v. Inman,1126 the supreme court held that a court may
relieve a party from a final divorce judgment that is void and hold a
new trial to equitably divide the estate.1127  Homer Inman filed for
divorce from Peggy Inman in November 1982, and a default di-
vorce decree was entered in Peggy’s absence.1128  In September
1999, Peggy filed a motion seeking partition of Homer’s retirement
benefits, which the trial court granted.1129  The court upheld the
judgment,1130 reasoning that the 1982 divorce decree was void for
want of personal jurisdiction and therefore Peggy may be relieved
from that judgment under Civil Rule 60(b)(4).1131  The court further
held that the trial court did not err in holding a new trial in order to
equitably divide the estate.1132  Despite the delay in filing Peggy’s
motion for relief, the court held that the trial court did not err in
denying Homer’s laches defense as a matter of equity.1133
1121. 79 P.3d 623 (Alaska 2003).
1122. Id. at 632.
1123. Id. at 624.
1124. Id. at 625.
1125. Id. at 630-32.
1126. 67 P.3d 655 (Alaska 2003).
1127. Id. at 658-59.
1128. Id. at 657.
1129. Id.
1130. Id. at 664.
1131. Id. at 658.
1132. Id. at 659.
1133. Id. at 658-59.
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In Jack C. v. DFYS,1134 the supreme court upheld the lower
court’s decision to terminate the plaintiff’s parental rights to his
two children, finding that the return of the children would place
them at risk of harm.1135  Jack C. was reported to DFYS for sexual
abuse of his two daughters in 19991136 and was incarcerated for such
behavior in 2001.1137  In November 2001, DFYS filed a petition for
termination of Jack C.’s parental rights.1138  The superior court
ruled for the state, and Jack C. appealed, claiming that DFYS had
not proven by “clear and convincing evidence” that he had failed to
remedy the conduct placing his children at risk within a reasonable
time under Alaska Statutes section 47.10.088.1139  The supreme
court considered the lower court’s findings that Jack C. had failed
to complete any of the programs proposed by DFYS and remained
“essentially untreated.”1140  Applying  a “clearly erroneous” stan-
dard of review, the supreme court ruled that the superior court had
not clearly erred in ruling that Jack C. had failed to remedy his
conduct or in terminating his parental rights.1141  Accordingly, the
lower court’s decision was affirmed.1142
In Koller v. Reft,1143 the supreme court vacated the trial court’s
determination of a prospective child support award when the fa-
ther’s obligation was based on past earnings and not his current in-
come.1144  Unable to establish an amicable relationship with Reft,
his child’s mother, for visitation, Koller sought primary custody of
his son.1145  He initially filed a child support guidelines affidavit
which reflected his earnings as a physician in New Mexico, al-
though he was living in Alaska and underemployed.1146  The court
granted joint custody and ordered Koller to pay $1,000 per month
in child support, plus attorney’s fees and court costs.1147  Koller ap-
pealed on grounds that the court lacked sufficient evidence to
make the child support obligation determination and that the court
1134. 68 P.3d 1274 (Alaska 2003).
1135. Id. at 1275.
1136. Id.
1137. Id. at 1277.
1138. Id. at 1278.
1139. Id. at 1278-79.
1140. Id. at 1280.
1141. Id. at 1281.
1142. Id.
1143. 71 P.3d 800 (Alaska 2003).
1144. Id. at 811.
1145. Id. at 803.
1146. Id.
1147. Id.
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erred in awarding costs and fees to Reft.1148  The court struck down
the child support award for lack of the evidentiary support re-
quired by Civil Rule 90.3(c), given Koller’s changed employment
circumstances.1149  The matter was remanded for consideration of
additional evidence concerning local job availability, earnings of
similarly situated doctors, and Koller’s historical and actual earn-
ings.1150  Because the issues so closely resembled a divorce case, the
court upheld the fees and costs award to Reft, which was based on
the relative economic situations and earning powers of both par-
ties.1151
In Martin v. State,1152 the supreme court upheld a superior court
ruling that an incarcerated father’s parental rights were properly
terminated under Alaska Statutes section 47.10.088.1153  Petitioner
Martin was incarcerated for attacking the mother of his child.1154  A
superior court eventually ruled that Martin’s parental rights to his
daughter should be terminated.1155  The supreme court reviewed the
decision and stated that it would only overrule the superior court’s
findings if they were clearly erroneous.1156  The supreme court held
that: (1) Martin put the child in substantial risk of physical harm;
(2) Martin did not make sufficient progress in controlling his anger;
(3) the state made reasonable efforts to provide support services to
Martin; and (4) the termination of Martin’s rights were in the
child’s best interest.1157  In particular, the supreme court stated that
Martin’s violent behavior did not have to be directed at the child to
be considered and that the superior court’s consideration of place-
ment with one of Martin’s relatives was irrelevant to the termina-
tion proceedings.1158
In McElroy v. Kennedy,1159 the supreme court held that a non-
biological father’s second action seeking to vacate a Child Support
Enforcement Division (“CSED”) order to recover such previously
paid child support was barred according to the principle of res judi-
1148. Id. at 803-04.
1149. Id. at 805.
1150. Id. at 811.
1151. Id. at 809-10.
1152. 79 P.3d 50 (Alaska 2003).
1153. Id. at 57.
1154. Id. at 51.
1155. Id. at 53.
1156. Id.
1157. Id. at 53-56.
1158. Id. at 54, 57.
1159. 74 P.3d 903 (Alaska 2003).
YEAR IN REVIEW.DOC 05/18/04  2:19 PM
204 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [21:1
cata.1160  When Kennedy found that he was not the biological father
of McElroy’s son, he attempted to terminate his legal obligations
for support and obtain reimbursement for those monies previously
paid.1161  The trial court legally terminated Kennedy’s future pater-
nity and custody obligations, but refused to grant reimbursement
from McElroy or to set aside a CSED order, dismissing Kennedy’s
action with prejudice.1162  Subsequently, Kennedy instituted a sec-
ond action to vacate the CSED order and gain restitution of all
child support monies previously paid.1163  Res judicata bars subse-
quent claims when “the prior judgment was: (1) a final judgment
on the merits; (2) from a court of competent jurisdiction; [and] (3)
in a dispute between the same parties (or their privies) about the
same cause of action.”1164  Therefore, the court found that Ken-
nedy’s second claim for restitution was barred from litigation.1165
In O’Connell v. Christenson,1166 the supreme court held that the
trial court’s failure to make specific findings justifying its determi-
nation to impute income to a father rendered the question of
whether the trial court erred impossible.1167  O’Connell appealed a
court order that imputed income to him and thereby modified his
child support obligation to Christenson.1168  Relying upon Civil Rule
90.3, the trial court imputed an income of $43,550.13 to O’Connell,
despite his claim that his adjusted annual income was $8,185.38.1169
Civil Rule 90.3 permits a trial court to calculate child support on a
determination of the potential income of a parent who voluntarily
and unreasonably is unemployed or underemployed.1170  This de-
termination should be based upon the parent’s work history, quali-
fications, and job opportunities.1171  The supreme court stated that
the trial court has a duty to enter findings adequate for rational ap-
pellate review when it sets a child support obligation.1172  The court
then determined that the trial court did not provide any rationale
1160. Id. at 904.
1161. Id. at 905.
1162. Id.
1163. Id. at 906.
1164. Id. at 907.
1165. Id. at 909.
1166. 75 P.3d 1037 (Alaska 2003).
1167. Id. at 1041.
1168. Id. at 1038.
1169. Id.
1170. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 90.3.
1171. O’Connell, 75 P.3d at 1039.
1172. Id. at 1040.
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for its decision as to the amount of imputed income.1173  Since the
trial court did not provide any rationale for imputing income, the
supreme court could not effectively determine whether the trial
court had erred; therefore, the supreme court vacated the child
support award and remanded the question of imputed income.1174
In Richard B. v. State,1175 the supreme court held that the supe-
rior court abused its discretion in allowing a law firm to represent a
child’s mother at trial, even though the same firm had represented
the child’s father in an earlier criminal trial.1176  The law firm repre-
sented Richard in a sexual assault case in 2000.1177  The same firm
represented Leslie, the mother of Richard’s children, when the
State successfully petitioned to terminate Leslie’s and Richard’s
parental rights.1178  The supreme court remanded the case, holding
that the court must determine if Richard was adversely affected by
the firm’s representations of Leslie because the firm was conflicted
and Leslie’s interests were adverse to Richard’s.1179
In Riddell v. Edwards,1180 the supreme court held that, despite a
finding that Riddell had “ingratiated himself” to the deceased with
an underlying motive to attain her assets, it was inequitable for the
superior court to establish a constructive trust and deprive Riddell
of his statutory rights to marital property on mere moral
grounds.1181 The court held that athough the deceased had suffered
from Alzheimer’s-related dementia, was physically isolated and
abused by Riddell, and had snuck away to marry him secretly,
these facts were legally insufficient for a post-mortem claim to in-
validate the marriage on grounds of gross fraud.1182  Because Rid-
dell’s unconscionable conduct neither invalidated the marriage nor
proximately caused the statutory benefits of the marriage to vest,
the supreme court held that the superior court’s establishment of a
constructive trust did not vest in proper legal grounds.1183  Moreo-
ver, the supreme court found that upholding the establishment of a
constructive trust would be inequitable on the grounds that it
1173. Id. at 1041.
1174. Id.
1175. 71 P.3d 811 (Alaska 2003).
1176. Id. at 833.
1177. Id. at 815.
1178. Id.
1179. Id. at 818-21, 824.
1180. 76 P.3d 847 (Alaska 2003).
1181. Id. at 849.
1182. Id. at 849, 851.
1183. See id. at 855.
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“would impermissibly expand the court’s equitable powers at the
expense of established positive law.”1184
In Sherry R. v. DFYS,1185 the supreme court upheld a termina-
tion of parental rights because Sherry R. continued to place her
children at substantial risk of harm by failing to remedy her con-
duct or the conditions under which they lived.1186  Sherry R. had a
long history of choosing abusive partners, succumbing to substance
abuse, and demonstrating an inability to comply with substance
abuse treatment programs.1187  The trial court agreed with DFYS
that Sherry R.’s children had not only suffered developmental dis-
orders as a result of their mother’s detrimental behavior, but that
they would be placed at substantial risk of experiencing further
emotional or physical harm if they were permitted to remain in
Sherry R.’s custody.1188  The supreme court affirmed, basing its de-
cision on the facts that: (1) a mere one year period of sobriety was
insufficient to prove that substance abuse was no longer a problem;
(2) the continued romantic involvement with an individual con-
victed of child sexual assault demonstrated poor judgment; and (3)
there existed evidence that Sherry was unable to care for her chil-
dren’s special needs.1189  The court upheld the trial court’s determi-
nation that Sherry R. had failed to change her lifestyle within a rea-
sonable period of time.1190
In Smith v. Weekley,1191 the court held that a decision regarding
child custody was presumptuous and that the lower court improp-
erly relied on just one factor in its placement determination.1192  Si-
vers and Weekley split custody of their child, Dalton, in Anchorage
for most of his life.1193 After Sivers decided to move to Wasilla,
Weekley filed for permanent custody.1194  Before receiving a reply
from Sivers, the superior court judge granted Weekley interim cus-
tody, which was affirmed a month later after an evidentiary hear-
ing, and again five months later after trial.1195  Because the later
findings were based on “stability” that developed in Dalton’s living
1184. Id.
1185. 74 P.3d 896 (Alaska 2003).
1186. Id. at 903.
1187. Id. at 898-01.
1188. Id. at 901.
1189. Id. at 902-03.
1190. Id. at 903.
1191. 73 P.3d 1219 (Alaska 2003).
1192. Id. at 1227.
1193. Id. at 1220.
1194. Id.
1195. Id. at 1221-22.
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arrangement with Weekley after the superior court judge’s deci-
sion, and Sivers never had a chance to reply to the original com-
plaint, the supreme court found error in the use of “stability” act-
ing as a driving factor.1196 The supreme court held that the relevant
statutory factors should have also been considered to determine
the best interest of the child.1197  Therefore, the court remanded the
case for a new determination on Dalton’s custody.1198
In Teseniar v. Spicer,1199 the supreme court held that a court
must follow Civil Rule 90.3 when setting the amount of child sup-
port owed by a defendant and that the court cannot, except in spe-
cial circumstances, retroactively modify a child support order.1200
Spicer had moved to modify the child support agreement she had
with Teseniar concerning their two children.1201  The superior court
granted the increase basing the new calculation on Teseniar’s child
support obligations for two children from a previous marriage.1202
In addition, the court awarded retroactive child support for a pe-
riod before Spicer had filed her motion.1203  The supreme court re-
versed the superior court’s modification of child support because
the superior court had abused its discretion when it did not follow
Rule 90.3 in calculating the increase.1204  The supreme court noted
that it was “unlikely that Teseniar’s obligation to his two children
with Spicer would be identical to the children from his earlier mar-
riage. . . .”1205  In addition, the supreme court held that the change in
child support should only have been effective from the time that
Spicer filed her motion.1206
In Vivian P. v. DFYS,1207 the supreme court held that the trial
court did not err in terminating parental rights when it determined
that the child was in need of aid and that reasonable efforts to re-
unite the family were unnecessary.1208  DFYS assumed emergency
custody of a child who was hospitalized for a third time for mental
1196. Id. at 1224.
1197. Id. at 1227.
1198. Id.
1199. 74 P.3d 910 (Alaska 2003).
1200. Id. at 915.
1201. Id. at 912.
1202. Id.
1203. Id.
1204. Id. at 915.
1205. Id.
1206. Id.
1207. 78 P.3d 703 (Alaska 2003).
1208. Id. at 710.
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and physical harm.1209  The mother challenged the trial court’s de-
termination that her child was in need of aid and that DFYS made
reasonable efforts to reunite the family, or in the alternative, was
not required to do so.1210  The supreme court held that there was
clear and convincing evidence supporting the trial court’s determi-
nation that the child was in need of aid.1211  The court further held
that, although DFYS did not make reasonable efforts to reunite the
family and should have sought the court’s approval before doing
so, the trial court did not err in determining that reasonable efforts
were unnecessary because of the physical and mental harm to
which the child was subjected.1212
IX.  INSURANCE LAW
In Blood v. Kenneth Murray Insurance,1213 the supreme court
found that Blood neither waived his claim to arbitration by filing
suit over an insurance claim nor impliedly waived his coverage.1214
However, the court did find that it was proper for the trial court to
rule against Blood at summary judgment over his policy coverage,
as an issue of fact.1215  Blood was injured in an auto accident and
filed a claim with his insurance company.1216  The insurer denied
Blood coverage, stating that his coverage had lapsed.1217  Further-
more, the company denied his arbitration request, claiming that
Blood waived the option.1218  Blood then sued the insurance com-
pany and agent, claiming that the company was negligent in han-
dling his policy renewal and that the coverage was not termi-
nated.1219  The trial court found for the insurance company.1220  The
supreme court found that Blood did not waive arbitration because
a failure to plead arbitration is not equivalent to a waiver.1221  Also,
Blood did not impliedly waive arbitration because such a waiver
must be direct and unequivocal enough to indicate waiver to a rea-
1209. Id. at 705.
1210. Id. at 706.
1211. Id.
1212. Id. at 708-10.
1213. 68 P.3d 1251 (Alaska 2003).
1214. Id. at 1255.
1215. Id. at 1258.
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sonable person.1222  Additionally, the court found that the district
court properly decided the issue of coverage at summary judgment,
because though a jury could find the insurer negligent in handling
the policy renewal and cancellation, this is a factual determination
that a judge can make at summary judgment.1223
In Bradbury v. Chugach Electric Ass’n,1224 the supreme court
held that Dennis Bradbury’s wife did not die from injuries caused
by her employment, and therefore he could not collect workers’
compensation for her death.1225  While working at Chugach, Linda
Bradbury died from a ruptured cyst in her liver that caused a fatal
anaphylactic reaction.1226  Her husband filed for worker’s compen-
sation, stating that the rupture was caused by her employment ac-
tivities, but was denied by the Workers’ Compensation Board,
which held that the injuries were not work-related.1227  The supreme
court held that in order for Chugach to successfully dispute a claim
for workers’ compensation by Bradbury for his wife’s death, the
Workers’ Compensation Association must: (1) rebut the presump-
tion for compensation with substantial evidence eliminating the
worker’s employment as a cause of injury; and (2) survive an at-
tempt by the injured employee to prove her claim by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.1228  Chugach overcame this presumption both
by providing sustainable alternative explanations for Linda Brad-
bury’s injury, and by presenting substantial evidence that her inju-
ries were caused by reasons other than those given by Dennis
Bradbury.1229  Furthermore, Dennis Bradbury failed to prove his
claim by a preponderance of the evidence.1230
In Coughlin v. Government Employees Insurance Co.,1231 the
supreme court held that an injured driver’s claims against the op-
posing driver’s insurance company will be considered exhausted
where the injured driver negotiates a settlement equal to the face
value of the opposing driver’s coverage.1232  Coughlin, who was in-
sured by GEICO for $10,000 in medical payments and $50,000 in
underinsured motorist coverage, was injured in an automobile ac-
1222. Id.
1223. Id. at 1258.
1224. 71 P.3d 901 (Alaska 2003).
1225. Id. at 909.
1226. Id. at 903.
1227. Id. at 904.
1228. Id. at 905-07.
1229. Id. at 906-08.
1230. Id. at 909.
1231. 69 P.3d 986 (Alaska 2003).
1232. Id. at 989.
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cident with Babosky, who had a $50,000 policy with Colonial In-
surance.1233 GEICO paid $10,000 of Coughlin’s medical expenses,
which created a lien for that amount against any recovery that
Coughlin garnered against Babosky and Colonial.1234  Coughlin filed
suit against Babosky, and ended up settling the action against Ba-
bosky and Colonial for $40,000 cash and responsibility for the
$10,000 medical lien granted to GEICO.1235  GEICO settled its
$10,000 subrogated claim for Coughlin’s medical expenses with
Colonial for $5,000.1236 Coughlin later requested that GEICO pay
the $50,000 due to her under her underinsured motorist coverage,
and filed suit when GEICO refused.1237  Alaska Statutes section
28.20.445(e)(1) requires that a claimant exhaust the underlying
policy limits before pursuing underinsured motorist benefits.1238
GEICO argued that Coughlin did not exhaust Babosky’s policy
limits, because the settlement of the medical lien for $5,000 meant
that Colonial only paid out $45,000 of the $50,000 policy.1239
GEICO argued alternatively that Colonial was required to pay
costs, interest and attorney’s fees, and that because Couglin re-
ceived none of these, the policy limit was not exhausted.1240  In re-
versing the superior court’s grant of summary judgment, the court
dismissed both arguments and held that the limits of liability re-
ferred to in the statute refer only to the face value of coverage.1241
In Great Divide Insurance Co. v. Carpenter ex rel. Reed,1242 the
supreme court upheld a jury verdict awarding compensatory dam-
ages to an insured’s assignee, but reversed an award of punitive
damages.1243  In September 1993, Carpenter suffered serious per-
manent injuries and brain damage as the result of being struck by a
tree.1244  Subsequently, Carpenter asserted a claim to recover dam-
ages against Dan Gowdy, joint owner of Gowdy & Sons
(“Gowdy”), for actions of his employee in negligently felling
trees.1245  Settlement via arbitration ensued.1246  However, Great Di-




1237. Id. at 988.
1238. ALASKA STAT. § 28.20.445(e)(1) (Michie 2002).
1239. Coughlin, 71 P.3d at 989.
1240. Id.
1241. Id. at 992.
1242. 79 P.3d 599 (Alaska 2003).
1243. Id. at 602.
1244. Id.
1245. Id.
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vide disagreed as to Gowdy’s coverage and sought declaratory
judgment that it was not liable to Carpenter under Gowdy’s insur-
ance plan.1247  A jury found against Great Divide.1248  The supreme
court found that the jury’s verdict was legally and factually sup-
ported in finding that the accident was covered by the policy as
part of Gowdy’s business “operations”1249 and that Great Divide
failed to fulfill its obligations to defend its policyholder.1250  How-
ever, the court reversed an award of punitive damages based on a
finding that Great Divide was prejudiced by a lack of fair notice in
the pleadings and an abuse of discretion in instructing the jury to
consider the issue.1251
In In re Life Insurance Co. of Alaska,1252 the supreme court
held that the “automatic approval-by-inaction rule” of Alaska
Statutes section 21.78.293(b) only applies to insurance claims that
have already been approved by the receiver.1253  The Life Insurance
Company of Alaska (“LICA”) was involuntarily dissolved by the
State in 1994, and in 2001 Carpenter Financial filed a claim against
the company for $500,000 for repayment of a surplus note.1254  The
Alaska Division of Insurance, which had been appointed as the re-
ceiver of LICA, denied the claim, and Carpenter Financial filed for
reconsideration in April 2001.1255  The receiver filed a report with
the superior court on July 13, 2001, and before the court had ruled
on the issue, Carpenter Financial filed a motion for summary
judgment.1256  Carpenter Financial argued in its motion that under
section 21.78.293(b), the claim must be automatically approved,
because the court had not ruled on the claim within 120 days after
the report was filed.1257  The supreme court upheld the superior
court’s denial of the motion, holding that subsection (b) of the
statute only applies to claims that have already been approved by
the receiver, whereas the receiver in the present case had denied
1246. Id. at 604.
1247. Id.
1248. Id. at 605.
1249. Id. at 606.
1250. Id. at 610.
1251. Id. at 613.
1252. 76 P.3d 366 (Alaska 2003).
1253. Id. at 370.
1254. Id. at 367.
1255. Id.
1256. Id. at 368.
1257. Id.
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Carpenter Financial’s claim before submitting its report to the
court.1258
In O’Connor v. Star Insurance Co.,1259 the supreme court held
that there is no duty on licensing bond sureties to independently
investigate third-party claims against bonded contractors.1260  Star
Insurance Co. (“Star”) issued a licensing bond to Homestead
Builders, Inc. (“Homestead”) to satisfy the state registration re-
quirement for general contractors, which mandates the provision of
a bond or cash deposit.1261  The O’Connors, unhappy with Home-
stead’s construction work on their home, sued Homestead and
Star.1262  Subsequently, according to their indemnity agreement,
Star tendered defense of the suit to Homestead.1263  The O’Connors
then sued Star, claiming (1) that Star, as the surety, owed them a
legal duty to fairly, fully, and impartially investigate their claim
against the bond;1264 and (2) that Star’s tendering of the defense to
Homestead, without conducting its own investigation, violated this
duty in bad faith.1265  In rejecting the O’Connors’ claim, the court
first distinguished licensing bonds from performance and payment
bonds, which have a duty of good faith and fair dealing.1266  The
court also noted that no such duty is statutorily imposed upon li-
censing bond sureties.1267  Therefore, as licensing bond sureties have
no duty to independently investigate third-party claims against
bonded contractors, the court rejected the O’Connors’ bad faith
claim against Star.1268
In Therchik v. Grant Aviation, Inc.,1269 the supreme court held
that an insurance company’s endorsement limiting coverage of at-
torney’s fees not preapproved by the director of the Alaska Divi-
sion of Insurance (“Division”) is unenforceable unless it is nearly
identical to the model form adopted by the Division.1270 Therchik
and four other plaintiffs sued Grant Aviation after an airplane
owned by the company crashed, killing members of the plaintiffs’
1258. Id. at 369.
1259. No. S-10500, 2003 Alas. LEXIS 162 (Alaska Dec. 26, 2003).
1260. Id. at *17-18.
1261. Id. at *2-4.
1262. Id. at *4.
1263. Id. at *5.
1264. Id.
1265. Id. at *12.
1266. Id. at *15.
1267. Id. at *18.
1268. Id. at *21.
1269. 74 P.3d 191 (Alaska  2003).
1270. Id. at 196.
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families.1271  A provision of the insurance policy that Houston Casu-
alty Company had issued to Grant Aviation made Houston Casu-
alty potentially liable for unlimited attorney’s fees awarded in the
suit under Civil Rule 82.1272  Grant Aviation, on behalf of Houston
Casualty, argued that a provision in the insurance policy limited its
liability, including attorney’s fees, to the facial limits of the pol-
icy.1273  Therchick argued that the provision limiting attorney’s fees
was unenforceable because it did not include the exact language of
Notice A, a model form provided by the Division, and thus violated
Alaska Administrative Code section 26.550.1274  Under section
26.550, if Houston Casualty did not obtain written approval from
the director of the Division, the policy would have to conform with
Notice A.1275  The supreme court reasoned that since the alternative
to conforming with Notice A was preapproval by the director of
the Division, the standard for conforming with Notice A must be
“very close to identical.”1276  The court therefore reversed the supe-
rior court, holding that the insurance policy did not conform with
Notice A because it altered the model form’s language in ways that
were more than “minute deviations.”1277
X.  PROPERTY LAW
In Carr-Gottstein Properties v. Benedict,1278 the supreme court
upheld the validity of a liquidated damages clause in a covenant.1279
The clause imposed a twenty-five dollar per day fine on property
owners who failed to complete construction within one year.1280
The superior court held that the liquidated damages clause was an
impermissible penalty under Kalenka v. Taylor.1281  The supreme
court disagreed, holding that this liquidated damages clause was
valid because it met the two-part test adopted by the Restatement
of Contracts.1282  First, construction delays that cause injuries that
are difficult to quantify.1283  Second, the clause imposed a fine that
1271. Id. at 191.
1272. Id.
1273. Id.
1274. Id. at 192-93.
1275. Id. at 195.
1276. Id. at 196.
1277. Id.
1278. 72 P.3d 308 (Alaska 2003).
1279. Id. at 313.
1280. Id. at 310.
1281. Id. (citing 896 P.2d 222 (Alaska 1995)).
1282. Id. at 311.
1283. Id.
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was a “reasonable forecast of the damages.”1284  Therefore, the su-
preme court found that the clause was not a penalty.1285  Accord-
ingly, the court reversed the superior court’s grant of summary
judgment for Benedict and awarded liquidated damages to Carr-
Gottstein.1286
In Holding v. Municipality of Anchorage,1287 the supreme court
held that a lessor prevented from advertising adult-oriented busi-
nesses by Alaska Municipal Code section 10.40.050, which bars
such advertising by those who do not own the businesses, is not ex-
empt from the provision if he leases space to parties authorized to
advertise such businesses.1288  Anchorage issued five citations to
Holding for advertising adult-oriented businesses that operated on
premises owned by Holding but leased to business owners, who
had the proper licenses to operate these businesses.1289  The su-
preme court held that the provision prohibiting non-owners from
advertising applied to Holding for two reasons.1290  First, Holding
did not have any “grandfather right” to advertise simply because
he owned the premises.1291  Second, the provision did not deprive
Holding of his constitutionally-protected right of commercial free
speech because the law furthered substantial interests of Anchor-
age in a manner that was not more restrictive than necessary.1292
In National Bank of Alaska v. Ketzler,1293 the supreme court
held that a non-titled spouse may invalidate deeds or conveyances
under Alaska Statutes section 34.15.010 as long as the spouse has
an interest in the property separate from the statute and either files
suit in court or records his interest in a timely manner.1294  Nancy
Ketzler’s husband, Donald, executed a deed on their house to the
National Bank of Alaska in return for a loan, and forged Nancy’s
required signature.1295  Donald died approximately six months later,
and the bank sought to foreclose on the Ketzler’s home.1296  In re-
sponse, Nancy filed suit to have the deed declared void, and the
1284. Id.
1285. Id.
1286. Id. at 313.
1287. 63 P.3d 248 (Alaska 2003).
1288. Id. at 249.
1289. Id.
1290. Id.
1291. Id. at 251.
1292. Id. at 249.
1293. 71 P.3d 333 (Alaska 2003).
1294. Id. at 336.
1295. Id. at 333-34.
1296. Id. at 334.
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superior court ruled in her favor.1297  In affirming the superior
court’s holding, the supreme court found that, under section
34.15.010(d), the failure of a titled spouse to join in the conveyance
of the family home automatically invalidates the deed.1298  However,
the failure of a non-titled spouse to join in the conveyance of a
family home does not automatically invalidate the deed; rather, the
deed is valid unless the non-titled spouse, possessing an interest ac-
quired independent of section 34.15.010, either files suit to set the
deed aside or files a notice of interest in the property within one
year.1299  Therefore, because Nancy had a separate interest in the
family home and filed suit to set aside the deed within one year, the
supreme court affirmed the invalidation of the deed.1300
In Price v. Eastham,1301 the supreme court reversed a superior
court determination that under a repealed federal statute, Revised
Statute (“RS”) 2477,1302 a right-of-way existed over Price’s land, but
affirmed the finding that a prescriptive easement both existed and
superceded Price’s mere agricultural interests in the land.1303  Eas-
tham and ninety-one other plaintiffs claimed a right to a prescrip-
tive easement over a trail located on Price’s property that had been
used since 1956 for recreational purposes such as hunting and
camping.1304  Upon review of the superior court’s ruling, the su-
preme court made two findings.  First, because neither party had
noticed that an RS 2477 right-of-way was at issue, the superior
court’s sua sponte finding that such a right-of-way existed violated
Price’s due process rights.1305 Second, because Price did not own the
land in fee simple absolute and because Alaska Statutes section
38.95.010 precludes a prescriptive easement over government
property, a prescriptive easement was only valid against Price, but
could be terminated in the future if the government chose to ter-
minate Price’s interests.1306
In Rausch v. Devine,1307 the supreme court held that a transfer
of a defendant’s property by two quitclaim deeds was valid and re-
1297. Id.
1298. Id. at 336.
1299. Id.
1300. Id. at 337.
1301. 75 P.3d 1051 (Alaska 2003).
1302. Revised Statute § 2477 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 932) (repealed 1976).
1303. Price, 75 P.3d at 1059.
1304. Id. at 1053.
1305. Id. at 1056.
1306. Id. at 1057-58.
1307. 80 P.3d 733 (Alaska 2003).
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fused to impose trusts in his favor.1308  Rausch, an attorney, deliv-
ered two quitclaim deeds to Devine for properties in Anchorage
and Iowa during a ten-year relationship in which they lived to-
gether and had one child.1309  The couple separated in 2000, and
Devine filed suit, requesting that Rausch vacate the house in An-
chorage and that the other property in Iowa and Anchorage be dis-
tributed.1310  The trial court ruled in Devine’s favor, and Rausch ap-
pealed.1311  Rausch first challenged the validity of the deeds,
claiming that there had been no delivery because he did not truly
intend to transfer title to Devine.1312  The supreme court held that
“a recorded deed gives rise to a presumption of valid delivery that
may be rebutted by the party challenging delivery by clear and
convincing evidence.”1313  Here, the court upheld the trial court’s
finding that Rausch did not provide clear and convincing evidence
to surmount the presumption of validity.1314  The supreme court also
rejected Rausch’s argument that a resulting trust in his favor
should be found because he did not intend to transfer the prop-
erty.1315  Instead, the court upheld the trial court’s finding that the
transfer had been a gift and that a trust had thus not been
formed.1316  Finally, the supreme court refused to impose a con-
structive trust on the properties in Rausch’s favor.1317  The court
held that constructive trusts are appropriate only to prevent unjust
enrichment and affirmed the trial court’s findings that  Devine was
not unjustly enriched by the transfer.1318
In Reynolds v. Sisco Group, Inc.,1319 the supreme court held
that a creditor may enforce an execution or levy against a deceased
party’s estate if the execution or levy was formally made before the
party’s death.1320  Reynolds obtained a judgment in another suit
against Sisco Group (“Sisson”) and began to collect the judgment
by attempting to seize vans owned by Sisson.1321  Sisson transferred
1308. Id. at 735.
1309. Id. at 735-36.
1310. Id. at 736.
1311. Id. at 736-37.
1312. Id. at 737.
1313. Id. at 739.
1314. Id. at 740.
1315. Id. at 742.
1316. Id. at 742-43.
1317. Id. at 744.
1318. Id.
1319. 70 P.3d 388 (Alaska 2003).
1320. Id. at 390.
1321. Id. at 397.
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two of the vans to a friend who then sold them.1322  Reynolds then
attempted to seize the payments made by the person who bought
the vans.1323  During this process Sisson died, and his estate at-
tempted to regain possession of the vans and the payments under
Alaska Statutes section 13.16.505.1324  The superior court granted
the estate’s request, and Reynolds appealed.  The supreme court
held that section 13.16.505 did not apply to the van that Reynolds
had seized, and that Reynolds was therefore entitled to the van,
because the van was seized before Sisson died.1325  The supreme
court also held that there was still an issue as to whether the writ of
attachment to seize the payments was delivered to the party that
bought the two vans before Sisson died.1326  If Sisson died before the
writ was served, then the estate was entitled to the payments.1327
The supreme court remanded to the superior court to make a
finding of fact.1328
In Spinell Homes, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage,1329 the su-
preme court held that a municipality is within its authority to im-
pose conditions on a developer prior to the issuance of construc-
tion and occupation permits.1330  Spinell was in the business of
constructing homes on acquired property, and then selling the
homes to third parties.1331  The Municipality of Anchorage required
Spinell to obtain a building permit prior to constructing the homes,
and a certificate of occupancy prior to transferring the properties
to third parties.1332  The Municipality conditioned Spinell’s receipt
of the permits on a variety of tasks, including public improvements,
landscaping easements, and approval of a homeowner’s associa-
tion.1333  The Municipality also maintained that improvements re-
quired of the subdivider that sold the properties to Spinell ran with
the land, and thus required Spinell to complete the improve-
ments.1334  Spinell received all building permits, but afterward filed
suit, alleging that the Municipality’s conditional permits violated
1322. Id. at 389.
1323. Id.
1324. Id. at 398.
1325. Id. at 391
1326. Id. at 392.
1327. Id.
1328. Id.
1329. 78 P.3d 692 (Alaska 2003).
1330. Id. at 694.
1331. Id.
1332. Id.
1333. Id. at 695.
1334. Id.
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Spinell’s substantive due process and equal protection rights, and
effected a taking for which Spinell should be accorded compensa-
tion.1335  In affirming the superior court’s holding, the supreme
court held that the Municipality, in imposing conditions on the is-
suance of permits, was acting fully within its powers under the An-
chorage Municipal Code.1336  The court also held that the municipal
code empowered the city to enforce the conditions placed on the
previous owner against Spinell.1337  After determining that the Mu-
nicipality was permitted to issue such permits, the court concluded
that Spinell’s constitutional claims had no merit.1338  Because the
Municipality was under no mandatory duty to issue an uncondi-
tioned permit, Spinell did not have a property interest that was
protected under substantive due process.1339  The court also held
that the conditions imposed by the permits did not effect a taking,
because (1) the municipality did not invade Spinell’s property, (2)
there was no showing that the Municipality’s actions adversely af-
fected the value of Spinell’s property, and (3) Spinell did not show
that the exactions were not proportional to the properties’ poten-
tially adverse impact.1340
In Stanek v. Kenai Peninsula Borough,1341 the supreme court
upheld a borough taxation ordinance excluding a portion of resi-
dential property used as the owner’s permanent residence.1342  Sta-
nek, an Anchorage resident, challenged this ordinance on constitu-
tional and statutory grounds as discriminatory against nonresidents
of the borough.1343  Under an equal protection analysis, the supreme
court determined that the legitimate reason basis is used to deter-
mine if the distinction drawn is justifiable.1344  Here, the distinction
between owner-occupied homes and second homes was legitimate
to  promote home ownership.1345
In Tush v. Pharr,1346 the supreme court held that the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment against the defendants be-
cause genuine issues of material fact existed with regard to each of
1335. Id.
1336. Id. at 696
1337. Id. at 697.
1338. Id. at 702.
1339. Id.
1340. Id. at 702-03.
1341. 81 P.3d 268 (Alaska 2003).
1342. Id. at 269.
1343. Id.
1344. Id. at 270.
1345. Id. at 271.
1346. 68 P.3d 1239 (Alaska 2003).
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the various legal malpractice claims asserted.1347  As landlord for
several properties, Tush brought a claim for eviction against a ten-
ant.1348  In the action, the tenant prevailed and was awarded a
judgment of over $1.6 million for counterclaims of multiple inten-
tional torts.1349  After Tush’s insurance company refused to pay for
the claim because it was not tendered on a timely basis, Tush sued
her attorneys on several theories of malpractice: professional negli-
gence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract.1350  On ap-
peal of summary judgment, the supreme court found that several
issues of fact remained such that summary judgment was pre-
cluded.  First, the court stated that the “ambiguous nature” of
Tush’s responses to questions of insurance coverage may be cause
for malpractice if her attorney had a duty under the circumstances
to investigate further.1351  Second, the court agreed with Tush that
questions of fact remained as to whether insurance coverage would
still have been denied as a result of (1) her own actions in misrep-
resenting insurance application information, or (2) under the “in-
tentional acts exclusion” clause of her insurance policy.1352  Finally,
the court found that disputed issues existed as to whether Tush’s
insurance would have covered her claims regardless of her un-
timely submission.1353
In Vukmir v. Vukmir,1354 the supreme court held that a will
provision providing a purchase option on the testator’s home
clearly provided that the heirs were not responsible for the mort-
gage debt if the option was exercised.1355  Louis Vukmir’s will pro-
vided his daughter, Linda, with an option to purchase his home by
paying $80,000 to his estate, which would in turn be divided among
his four children.1356  Linda timely exercised her option, subse-
quently using the $80,000 payment to pay the home’s outstanding
mortgage and then depositing the remainder into the estate’s ac-
count for division among the heirs.1357  However, the lower court
found that, under the language of the will, Linda alone should be
responsible for the mortgage, and the full $80,000 should be di-
1347. Id. at 1251.
1348. Id. at 1241.
1349. Id. at 1243.
1350. Id.
1351. Id. at 1246.
1352. Id. at 1247-49.
1353. Id. at 1251.
1354. 74 P.3d 918 (Alaska 2003).
1355. Id. at 922.
1356. Id. at 920.
1357. Id. at 919.
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vided among the children.1358  The supreme court affirmed the
lower court’s finding that the words of the will itself clearly ex-
pressed Louis Vukmir’s intent to give Linda an option to purchase
his home in exchange for a gift of $80,000 to his four children.1359
Therefore, Linda was responsible for the mortgage.1360
XI.  TORT LAW
In Dayton v. State,1361 the court of appeals upheld a superior
court decision to deny reconsideration of a restitution claim, but
directed the superior court to reduce the amount of the award.1362
Dayton pled guilty to third-degree assault for breaking and enter-
ing the home of West and subsequently injuring her and destroying
her property.1363  Dayton argued that the superior court erred in
awarding restitution for the full original price of the hardware and
software,1364 ordering restitution for software installed on the com-
puter,1365 and denying Dayton’s motion for reconsideration.1366  The
court of appeals held that the restitution price should have been
discounted because of the age of the system and therefore directed
the superior court to reduce the award.1367  It further held that the
superior court properly awarded restitution on the software be-
cause it was necessary to make West whole.1368  Finally, the court of
appeals affirmed the superior court’s denial of Dayton’s motion for
reconsideration because Dayton had ample opportunity to produce
evidence during West’s cross-examination.1369
In Fletcher v. South Peninsula Hospital,1370 the supreme court
held that hospitals do not have a non-delegable duty to provide
non-negligent surgeons outside the emergency room context.1371  In
1997, Fletcher underwent unsuccessful medical treatment for ab-
dominal pains from Dr. Rene Alvarez at South Peninsula Hospital
1358. Id.
1359. Id. at 922.
1360. Id.
1361. 78 P.3d 270 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
1362. Id. at 271.
1363. Id. at 271-72.
1364. Id. at 272-73.
1365. Id. at 273.
1366. Id. at 274.
1367. Id. at 273.
1368. Id.
1369. Id. at 274.
1370. 71 P.3d 833 (Alaska 2003).
1371. Id. at 837.
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before being treated properly by another surgeon.1372  Fletcher sued
the hospital, claiming that it had a non-delegable duty to provide
non-negligent physician care.1373  The supreme court held that the
hospital only had a non-delegable duty to provide non-negligent
physician care in situations in which a patient seeks services at the
hospital as an institution and is treated by a physician that the pa-
tient did not select.1374  As Fletcher specifically sought out Alvarez
and was looking to him, as opposed to the hospital itself, for help,
the non-delegable duty did not apply.1375
In Getchell v. Lodge,1376 the supreme court held that a driver
who is negligent per se as a result of committing a traffic violation
can be excused for such negligence if the driver’s conduct is pre-
cipitated by an emergency that is independent of the driver’s con-
duct.1377  Getchell was injured when Lodge, in an attempt to avoid a
moose on an icy highway, hit her brakes and veered into oncoming
traffic.1378  Getchell brought a personal injury action against Lodge,
who was found not negligent by the jury.1379  Getchell appealed
following a denial of her motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict.1380  Getchell argued on appeal that Lodge’s violation of traf-
fic regulations, as a result of her crossing the center lane of traffic,
constituted negligence per se, thereby shifting the burden of proof
to Lodge to show that her conduct was excused, and that reason-
able jurors could not have concluded from the evidence that Lodge
met her burden.1381  In Ferrel v. Baxter,1382 the supreme court
adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ position on excused
violation of traffic regulations, which allows an excuse for violation
of traffic regulations when the actor is confronted by an emergency
that is not due to his misconduct. 1383  Therefore, the court held that
reasonable jurors could have found that Lodge met the burden of
proof for excuse, given that Lodge was confronted with an emer-
gency situation.1384
1372. Id. at 836.
1373. Id. at 837.
1374. Id. at 839.
1375. Id.
1376. 65 P.3d 50 (Alaska  2003).




1381. Id. at 53.
1382. 484 P.2d 250 (Alaska 1971).
1383. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §288(A) (1965).
1384. Getchell, 65 P.3d at 55.
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In Kiokun v. State,1385 the supreme court held that the decision
whether to initiate a search and rescue is protected by discretionary
function immunity.1386  Kiokun sued the State after three members
of her family died from freezing temperatures after their car was
stuck in deep snow.1387  Before the bodies were found, Alaska State
Troopers were notified of the abandoned vehicle beside which the
word “HELP” and an arrow were stamped in the snow.1388  The
Alaska State Troopers decided not to initiate a search and rescue
operation until temperatures rose.1389  To determine whether the
state’s actions were immune from a tort claim, the supreme court
distinguished between planning activities and operational activities,
which are not immune.1390  The court found that here, because
planning to delay the search and rescue operation until tempera-
tures rose was sufficiently based on resource allocation and public
policy considerations, it was better left to the immediate discretion
and expertise of the state officials.1391  Similarly, the supreme court
found that Alaska Statutes section 18.60.120 did not create a man-
datory duty to initiate a search and rescue operation regardless of
the circumstances.1392  Therefore, finding that the Alaska State
Troopers’ decision not to immediately initiate a search was pro-
tected by discretionary function immunity, the supreme court re-
versed the lower court’s judgment, vacated the jury verdict, and
remanded for entry of judgment for the state.1393
In Kodiak Island Borough v. Roe,1394 the supreme court, ap-
plying pre-1997 law, held that damages did not have to be appor-
tioned between intentional and negligent tortfeasors.1395  Roe sued
the Borough after two of its employees with criminal backgrounds
had intercourse with and impregnated Roe’s developmentally
challenged daughter while under the Borough’s care.1396  The su-
preme court held that the Borough was not entitled to have dam-
ages stemming from these intentional torts apportioned.1397  Since
1385. 74 P.3d 209 (Alaska 2003).
1386. Id. at 211.
1387. Id. at 211-12.
1388. Id. at 211.
1389. Id. at 212.
1390. Id. at 213.
1391. Id. at 213, 218.
1392. Id. at 219.
1393. Id.
1394. 63 P.3d 1009 (Alaska 2003).
1395. Id. at 1014.
1396. Id. at 1011.
1397. Id. at 1015.
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the torts occurred in 1991, the supreme court relied upon the ap-
portionment statutes that were applicable at that time.1398  These
statutes were silent on the apportionment of damages arising from
intentional conduct;1399 therefore, the supreme court applied the
common law of the time, which stated that “a person who is liable
to another based on a failure to protect the other from the specific
risk of an intentional tort is jointly and severally liable for the share
of comparative responsibility assigned to the intentional tortfea-
sor. . . .”1400  The supreme court then concluded that the Borough
was in fact negligent in failing to protect Roe’s daughter from its
employees’ intentional torts and therefore could be held wholly li-
able for the damages.1401  The supreme court also found that the
trial court did not err in allowing the jury to award damages for the
extraordinary costs associated with raising Roe’s granddaughter.1402
In Marine Solution Services v. Horton,1403 the supreme court
held that The Pennsylvania rule,1404 which shifts the burden of proof
to a marine vessel to show a lack of causation where the vessel is in
violation of a statutory duty, applies in non-collision cases if there
is a nexus between the statutory violation and the injury caused.1405
Horton, president of Marine Solution Services (“MSS”), was in-
jured while helping move one of MSS’s barges.1406  Horton filed suit
against MSS and the MSS employee operating the tugboat, alleging
five causes of action, including Jones Act claims based on Horton’s
status as a seaman.1407  At trial, Horton was found fifteen percent at
fault, and awarded compensatory damages.1408  The supreme court
held that Horton, despite his ownership of forty-nine percent of
MSS’s stock, was not an alter ego of the corporate entity, and that
he could therefore bring suit against MSS.1409  MSS also alleged that
Horton was not a seaman, and that therefore he should not have
been able to bring claims under the Jones Act.1410  The supreme
1398. Id. at 1011-12.
1399. See Former ALASKA STATUTES §§ 09.17.080, 09.17.080 (Michie 1991).
1400. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 14
(2000).
1401. Kodiak, 63 P.3d at 1015.
1402. Id. at 1018.
1403. 70 P.3d 393 (Alaska 2003).
1404. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. 125 (1873).
1405. Horton, 70 P.3d at 407.
1406. Id. at 399.
1407. Id. at 400-01.
1408. Id. 401.
1409. Id. at 402.
1410. Id.
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court disagreed, holding that a bright line rule requiring that an in-
dividual spend thirty percent of his time at sea to be considered a
seaman was not appropriate, and that the question of seaman
status was properly left to the jury.1411  MSS also alleged that The
Pennsylvania rule was improperly applied.1412  The rule provides
that where a vessel is in violation of a statutory duty intended to
prevent collisions, the burden of proof shifts to the vessel to show
that the violation was not the cause of the accident.1413  The su-
preme court disagreed with MSS’s contention that the rule should
only be applied in collision cases, and held that the rule applies if
there is a nexus between the statutory violation and the injury suf-
fered.1414
In State v. Sandsness,1415 the supreme court held that DFYS has
no duty to use due care in deciding whether to petition a court for
extension of a juvenile offender’s commitment.1416  Darrel Whitaker
shot and killed Sandsness shortly after being released from a juve-
nile detention center.1417  The plaintiffs, Sandsness’ widow and
daughter, subsequently sued DFYS for negligently failing to prop-
erly evaluate Whitaker before his release and to supervise him
adequately after his release.1418  The supreme court held that section
319 of the Restatement (second) of Torts did not impose a tort
duty on DFYS to seek a court-ordered extension of Whitaker’s de-
tention period.1419  The court’s reasoning was based on the rationale
that successful rehabilitation of juveniles requires the earliest pos-
sible reintegration of the juvenile with his family and community.1420
Furthermore, the court pointed to Alaska Statutes section
47.12.260, which permits DFYS to release juveniles when there is a
reasonable probability that the minor will not violate the law.1421
Therefore, the supreme court reversed and remanded the case for
entry of summary judgment for the state.1422
1411. Id. at 405.
1412. Id. at 406.
1413. Id. at 405 n.33.
1414. Id. at 407.
1415. 72 P.3d 299 (Alaska 2003).
1416. See id. at 308.
1417. Id. at 300.
1418. Id.
1419. Id. at 305.
1420. Id. at 303.
1421. Id.
1422. Id. at 308.
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In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. White-Rodgers Corp.,1423
the supreme court held that the state’s six-year statute of limita-
tions for trespass actions governed the claims of an insurer seeking
indemnification from third parties whose actions allegedly caused
property damage to two insureds.1424  After a natural gas explosion
destroyed the home of William and Sally Brook, State Farm, their
insurer, paid the property damages.1425  Nearly six years later, State
Farm filed a complaint seeking to recover such payments, alleging
that the explosion was caused by a natural gas leak that State Farm
traced to products manufactured, sold, or supplied by defendants
White-Rodgers Corporation, State Industries, Inc., and Semco En-
ergy.1426  Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that
State Farm’s claims were barred by the two-year statute of limita-
tions governing tort claims.1427  The federal district court certified
the question to the supreme court whether State Farm’s claims
would be governed by the two-year tort statute of limitations or the
six-year trespass statute of limitations.1428  Relying on Fernandes v.
Portwine,1429 the court examined the injuries claimed, rather than
the cause of action pled, finding that State Farm’s claim for prop-
erty damages alleged a substantial interference with the Brooks’
right to possess and use their property and that such alleged inter-
ference was unlawful.1430  The court concluded that the six-year
“trespass” statute of limitations governed State Farm’s claims.1431
In Zaverl v. Hanley,1432 the supreme court held that the defen-
dant could not testify at trial on topics he refused to discuss at his
deposition.1433 Zeverl’s estate sued inter alia, Defendant Borden for
negligently diagnosing and failing to treat Zeverl, ultimately caus-
ing her death.1434  As instructed by his attorney, Borden refused to
answer questions at his deposition regarding his opinion as to a
specific medical treatment.1435  Borden’s attorney stated that Bor-
den was not an expert and would not be offered as an expert re-
1423. 77 P.3d 729 (Alaska 2003).





1429. 56 P.3d 1, 5-6 (Alaska 2002).
1430. State Farm, 77 P.3d at 731.
1431. Id. at 731-32.
1432. 64 P.3d 809 (Alaska 2003).
1433. Id. at 811.
1434. Id.
1435. Id. at 812-13.
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garding the specific medical treatment.1436  At trial, however, the
court allowed Borden to testify as to his opinion.1437  The jury found
for the defendants. The supreme court held that Borden could not
testify at trial regarding topics he refused to discuss at his deposi-
tion because the inconsistent positions, without fair notice of the
changed testimony, thwarted the purposes of discovery.1438  The su-
preme court remanded to the trial court for determination of
whether Borden’s testimony in question was harmless or not.1439
Keith A. Rogers1440
1436. Id.
1437. Id. at 814.
1438. Id. at 815.
1439. Id. at 816.
1440. The editor extends his thanks to Alyssa Rower, Marika Athens, John
Fred, and the authors of the 2003 Year in Review: Wyatt Bloomfield, Matthew
Borah, Melissa Ganz, Stacy Hauf, Ryan King, Vikram Patel, Lindsay Pennington,
Kimberly Perdue, Trey Rayburn, Jim Stevens, Hayley Weimer, and  Abizer Zanzi.
